ETHOS

Justice in European Political Discourse – comparative report of six country cases

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About ETHOS

ETHOS - Towards a European THeory Of juStice and fairness, is a European Commission Horizon 2020 research project that seeks to provide building blocks for the development of an empirically informed European theory of justice and fairness. The project seeks to do so by:

a) refining and deepening the knowledge on the European foundations of justice - both historically based and contemporary envisaged;
b) enhancing awareness of mechanisms that impede the realisation of justice ideals as they are lived in contemporary Europe;
c) advancing the understanding of the process of drawing and re-drawing of the boundaries of justice (fault lines); and
d) providing guidance to politicians, policy makers, advocacies and other stakeholders on how to design and implement policies to reserve inequalities and prevent injustice.

ETHOS does not merely understand justice as an abstract moral ideal, that is universal and worth striving for. Rather, it is understood as a re-enacted and re-constructed "lived" experience. The experience is embedded in firm legal, political, moral, social, economic and cultural institutions that are geared to giving members of society what is their due.

In the ETHOS project, justice is studied as an interdependent relationship between the ideal of justice, and its real manifestation – as set in the highly complex institutions of modern European societies. The relationship between the normative and practical, the formal and informal, is acknowledged and critically assessed through a multi-disciplinary approach.

To enhance the formulation of an empirically-based theory of justice and fairness, ETHOS will explore the normative (ideal) underpinnings of justice and its practical realisation in four heuristically defined domains of justice - social justice, economic justice, political justice, and civil and symbolic justice. These domains are revealed in several spheres:

a) philosophical and political tradition,
b) legal framework,
c) daily (bureaucratic) practice,
d) current public debates, and
e) the accounts of the vulnerable populations in six European countries (the Netherlands, the UK, Hungary, Austria, Portugal and Turkey).

The question of drawing boundaries and redrawing the fault-lines of justice permeates the entire investigation.

Alongside Utrecht University in the Netherlands who coordinate the project, five further research institutions cooperate. They are based in Austria (European Training and Research Centre for Human Rights and Democracy), Hungary (Central European University), Portugal (Centre for Social Studies), Turkey (Boğaziçi University), and the UK (University of Bristol). The research project lasts from January 2017 to December 2019

Executive Summary

The primary goal of this study is to uncover how justice, as an abstract and complex concept and phenomenon, is conceptualized – explicitly and implicitly – in political *discourse*. Our interest in *political* discourse is driven predominantly by its presumed effects on the general public. Political debates contribute to, and often even determine, the societal recognition and social legitimation of social problems, such as specific forms of injustice, for example, as objects of state intervention; they also affect the social mobilization for action on social problems.

The primary objective of this report is to map the various conceptions of justice, and especially justice as representation, that emerge in the political debates in six countries participating in ETHOS project and to juxtapose them against the normative justice framework promoted on the European level. We focus on the imaging of justice for minority groups that are more likely to be classified as the 'other' and thus excluded from the (national) systems of reciprocity.

For the purposes of this study we defined political discourse as mode of knowledge manifested in texts by institutional political actors. In each country we analysed documents produced by political actors in two clearly defined discursive contexts: (1) recent election campaign(s) and (2) country specific case/ 'discursive event' that triggered debates on issues of justice, representation and/or rights of minority groups. The document analysis was supplemented by interviews with public figures.

In the course of the analysis, we identified four meta-discourses that fall along two distinctive axes – one related to the definition of *whose* moral reasoning and well-being is prioritized (majority vs minority) and the other pertaining to the delineation of *how* a specific vision of justice and imagined common good is to be realized (through dialogical reconciliation vs struggle).

One of the most interesting insights of our study is the interplay between temporality and history in shaping ideas about minority claims to justice. 'History' evolves from our analysis not only as an important *context* of contemporary political debates but also as one of the *battlefields* of (recognitive) and restorative justice. In general, the discourses identified on the national level seem to fall short of the European ideal as embodied in the documents issued by the European Parliament and Council of Europe.

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Introduction – why discourse analysis?

The primary goal of this study is to uncover how justice, as an abstract and complex concept and phenomenon, is conceptualized – explicitly and implicitly – in political *discourse*. The term discourse is notoriously imprecise and has been used to denote, among other things, a narrative, a text, talk, speech, conversation, interview, debate, policy, political strategy, ideology, knowledge system but also language *per se* and/or language associated with a specific field of social practice (cf. Wodak 2008; Fairclough 2010; Wodak and Meyer 2016). In this study we treat discourse as a mode of organizing knowledge, ideas, or experience that is rooted in language specific to concrete historical and institutional contexts and materially manifested in a variety of written, oral or graphic 'texts'.

Our interest in *political* discourse is driven predominantly by its presumed 'effects on the minds of the public at large' (van Dijk 1998:41). Public opinion does not exist in the vacuum but is shaped, and often manipulated, either by the media (e.g. McCombs and Reynolds 2009) or by (political) elites via the media (e.g. Zaller 1992). Through the media, politics is able to direct public attention toward some and away from other objective or putative condition and thus contribute to a specific rank-ordering of 'social problems' that demand public attention. On the other hand, public opinion is believed to have a profound influence on the legitimacy of political (in)action, for example, with respect to alleviating poverty (e.g. Gilens 2000), allocation of collective resources among various groups of population (e.g. van Oorschot and Roosma 2017) or developments in welfare policy in the aftermath of the financial crisis (Vis, van Kersbergen and Hylands 2011). After all, 'social problems' do not exist independently as a set of objective social conditions that have intrinsically harmful effects but are 'products of a process of collective definition' (Blumer 1971:300; Hilgartner and Bosk 1988). Political debates contribute to, and often even determine, the societal recognition and social legitimation of social problems, such as specific forms of injustice, for example, as objects of state intervention, but also reflect the social mobilization for action on the social problem. As noted by Blumer, 'the fate of the social problem depends greatly on what happens in this process of mobilization. How the problem comes to be defined, how it is bent in response to awakened sentiment, how it is depicted to protect vested interests, and how it reflects the play of strategic position and power' (1971:304). It is the collective definition of justice (and/or injustice) in the political sphere that is the object of this study.

The starting point of the study of discourse is that language is not a natural instrument of communication and/or reflection of a given social reality, but that language plays an active role in creating and changing identities and social relations. Discourse analytical studies are often rooted in the social constructionist approaches (Berger and Luckmann 1966; cf. Phillips and Hardy 2002; Jørgensen and Phillips 2002; Bergström, Ekström and Boréus 2017), where discourse can be seen as a form of social action that plays a part in producing the social world and thus maintaining specific social patterns. Other epistemological positions include structuralist and poststructuralist linguistic philosophy that emphasize the unique role of language in understanding reality and claim that our access to reality is always through language; since there are no given meanings of social phenomena, language constitutes a lens that determines the way we see things (cf. Butler 2007; Laclau and Mouffe 1985). A different approach, rooted in critical realism as developed by Bhaskar, builds on the presumption of a dialectical relationship between discourse and other elements of the social world (Fairclough 2010). Within this perspective discourse is seen as both constitutive of and being constituted by the (social) world. 'It is constitutive,' write Fairclough and Wodak

(1997), 'in a sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it' (p.258). It is the later position that guided our research effort.

The conceptualization of discourse as constitutive and being constituted by the social world brings to the fore the role of context. As emphasized by van Dijk (2003, 2005, 2016), discourse is always context specific, embedded in specific communicative settings, such as specific discursive event (e.g. electoral debate, demonstration, etc.), the field of action (e.g. politics) and the broader social, historical and political context (cf. Fairclough 2010). In the analysis presented in this report the various contexts in which the discourses of justice arise are given particular attention.

Study objectives

The primary objective of this report is to map the various conceptions of justice, and especially justice as representation, that emerge in the political debates in six countries participating in ETHOS project – Austria, Hungary, the Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey and the United Kingdom – and to juxtapose them against the normative justice framework promoted on the sub-national European level. We focus here in particular on the imaging of justice for minority groups: ethnic, religious, regional and migrant, that is groups that are more likely to be classified as the 'other' and thus excluded from the (by and large national) systems of reciprocity (Komter 2005).

The idea of justice as representation stresses that real political and social power lies with those who can participate in democratic debate and exercise influence on the way society's basic norms, laws and regulations are being set. Justice as representation is then a matter of being put on an equal footing in political participation in society. Yet, the basic question asked within this report is *not* whether or not, or to what extent, various groups (ethnic, religious, migrant) are on an equal footing in terms of (political) representation, but *how* their (potential) political participation in democratic debate (in various roles, as voters, members of pressure or issue groups, protesters, dissidents, etc.) is constructed in the political discourse.

Another basic question addressed in this study relates to the discursively constructed boundaries of justice. With enhanced mobility and shifting sources of belonging, the distinction of who is 'in' and who is 'out' – vital for (non-) realization of justice – is increasingly difficult to draw. The growing incidence of double and multiple citizenships co-exists with rising statelessness and the category of (non-)citizen – embedded in various sub-state, cross-state and supra-state political communities – becomes increasingly multi-layered (Anderson et al. 2014; Yuval-Davis 2011). Crucial as well as is the emergence of alternative identity-based sources of belonging (e.g. as a member of a specific cultural collectivity or unbounded cosmopolitan) which further complicate the traditional 'in-or-out' division based of formal membership (e.g. as a citizen of a particular polity) (Yuval-Davis 2011).

Those questions are not independent: the way the participation of minorities in political, or broader speaking – democratic – debates is collectively imagined, the extent to which it is cherished or vice-versa problematized and resisted, rests on the, often implicit, definition of (political) participation and the various roles and forms of participation that are culturally or structurally ascribed or available to different social groups. How those are defined depends, in turn, on the broader vision of justice – it's nature and scope (i.e. what does society owe to whom?) and the imagined community of value. In societies in which the belonging of (specific) minority groups is taken for granted, for example, due to their non-conspicuousness or near-complete assimilation, or alternatively – the acknowledged heterogeneity of the community of value – the question of the minority participation in

democratic debate may seem redundant and receive only meagre attention in public debates. The question of minority right to participate and thus influence the society's norms, laws and values might be similarly redundant, although for a very different reason, in societies in which the presence of minority groups is highly problematized; here it would be the *non*-participation of minority groups that is taken for granted, predominantly due to their alleged non-belonging. In the current study the search for the various understandings of minorities' (political) representation is interwoven into the investigation of the discursive construction of justice and its scope.

The temporal and geo-social context of the study

Current political debates, and especially those related to the issues of (in)justice, take place within a very specific temporal conjuncture, marked by a sense of growing insecurity, rise in populism and a drift towards authoritarianism, and the emergence of a variety of counter-movements. The sense of threat, while inherent in the 'liquid modern life' (Bauman 2006), has been recently aggravated by a series of crises, including the financial crisis of 2008, the debt euro-zone crisis, the subsequent social crisis marked by rapidly growing unemployment and soaring inequalities as well as migration and refugee crisis and – last but not least – the security crisis that followed the terrorist attacks in 2015 in Europe and at its immediate borders – in Turkey.

The various insecurities, ranging from physical – threat of terrorism, to economic – including the threat of precarity and impoverishment driven by the neo-liberal market expansion (Standing 2011), to ontological – related to the questions of identity and belonging (Giddens 1991; Bauman 2006), are further exacerbated by the apparent impotence of the (nation) state disempowered by the processes of globalization (Beck 2007). Undergoing 'enforced cosmopolitanization' (ibid., p.287) that tears down national boundaries and jumbles together the native and the foreign, a territorially delimited (nation) state is no longer able to fulfil its material functions (e.g. as *welfare* state) or 'accommodate the aspirations of identity driven social and regionalist movements' (Benhabib 2004:5).

As elaborated on in ETHOS Deliverable 4.1 (Buğra 2018), it is this deep-set sense of insecurity that gives impetus to populist revival characterized by hostility to 'elites', the elevation of an idea of popular will, the exclusion of any forms of (cultural) otherness and popularity of anti-democratic political projects. It is also the insecurity driven disillusion with and mistrust towards the state that motivates a variety of counter movements (Krastev 2014; Worth 2013).

The extent to which the above-mentioned processes play a role and co-define the political discourses that take place within concrete (often territorially) bounded social-political environments of (nation) states depend very much on their geo-social contexts. While in general reflective of and responsive to the global zeitgeist, the political debates in specific countries, especially those related to the (political) status of minorities, are rooted very much in social, cultural and historical contexts of those countries.

In **Turkey,** the discursive construction of minority claims of representation and/or recognition as well as the majoritarian responses to these claims are marked by a history of controversies around the very foundations of the secular Republic, the recurrent disruptions in the post-Second World War process of democratization and the ravages of the unresolved ethnic conflict. Not without significance is here the Alevi support for republican secularism, shaped by their collective memory of brutal massacres that go back to the 16th century and extend to the more recent religiously-inspired attacks (the last one took place in 1993), and feared by political Islamists as hostile to the value universe of the Sunni Muslim majority. Important as well is the Kurdish resistance to the

administrative control and armed conflicts between Turkish army and the Kurdish separatist forces (Buğra and Ertan 2018).

Current political debates in **Portugal**, on the other hand, are marked by attempts to challenge the institutionalized denial of the presence of ethnic difference and to bridge the parallel societies divided by the 'abyssal line' into two incommensurable realities – 'metropolitan' and 'postcolonial.' By allowing a radical separation of minorities in cultural, social and economic terms and 'locking' them into the reality of inescapable exclusion, the 'abyssal line' re-produces the colonial relations between citizens (white Portuguese who can claim their rights) and subjects (ethnically marked, deprived of citizenship rights and/or unable to effectively claim them) (Santos 2014 and Santos 2017 quoted in Menses, Martins and Brito 2018). It is the contestation of the existence of the 'abyssal line', on the one hand, and the rejection of the dominant vision of Portuguese society as tolerant and free of racism, on the other, that shape the political debates around the minorities' claims to justice.

While post-colonial heritage and the continued relevance of race in shaping social relations play an important role also in the Netherlands and the UK, the current political debates, especially those in which the mainstream political actors eagerly engage, focus on the problematization of the more recently arrived others. In **the Netherlands**, massive support of the Turkish-Dutch for the Erdogan (regime) demonstrated in 2016, following a coup-attempt in Turkey, triggered nation-wide debates about integration and loyalty of the hyphenated citizens of Muslim origin as well as the essence of 'Dutch-ness', the meaning of Dutch identity and threats the various others may pose to Dutch values and way of life (Lepianka 2018). In **the United Kingdom**, the ubiquity of migrants as objects of political discourses – either as a source of threat (for the sustainability of the welfare state or state security) or victims (of exploitive social and economic relations) contrasts with their oversight as subjects of political participation (Hartman, Dupont and Anderson 2018).

The topicality of the issues of migration, on the one hand, and (national) security, on the other can be also seen Austria and Hungary. In **Austria**, for example, parties which in 2017 emphasized the topics of migration, integration and terrorism did significantly better than parties which did not (Tiefenbacher 2018). While in both countries current political debates regarding minority justice claims are directly influenced by the recent refugee crises and the intense sense of physical and symbolic threat the new migrants pose, the debates in **Hungary** are deeply rooted not only in its complicated history of ethnic relations (e.g. with the Roma and Jewish minorities), but also in its history as victim of 'colonization' (i.e., occupation under the Ottoman Empire, Hapsburg Empire, Soviet Union, etc.), the implications of the 1956 uprising against the (Soviet) communist regime, the transition to democracy and capitalism in the 1990, and – last but not least – the Orbán government's 'radical transformation' or evolving regime change, drawing from nostalgia for the communist Kádár regime (1956-1989) (Zemandl 2018).

Methodology

According to van Dijk (1998), political discourse can be defined by its participants (actors or authors), usually politicians or political institutions, such as members of government, parliament or political parties, both at the local, national and international level as well as citizens, voters, members of pressure and issue groups, demonstrators, dissidents, etc., all of whom are actively involved in political process. Political discourse can be also defined as related to the political actions or practices, such as governing, ruling, legislating, protesting, dissenting, voting, etc. Finally, it can be also delimited by its 'political' context, such as cabinet meetings, parliamentary sessions, election campaigns, rallies, interviews with the media, bureaucratic practices and protest demonstrations.

For the purposes of this study we define political discourse as mode of knowledge manifested in texts by institutional political actors (political parties, actors such as ombudsmen, trade unions, (inter)national advocacies and civil society organizations) circulating (i.e. produced and received) in a political context and/or having political functions and implications. Such a delimitation of the scope of the 'political' allows focusing on political actors whose resonance among the public is allegedly the greatest; it also facilitates the cross-country comparability of the collected data. At the same time, in our selection of actors, we have tried to include the various perspectives/standpoints, encompassing, for example, not only the winners but also the important losers of the electoral campaign and/or newly emerging parties as well as (institutionalized) protest movements, especially those whose position on the issues of justice/injustice differs substantially from the position of the main political actors. In general, in every county analysed, we have tried to balance our sample with respect to the ideological position and/or institutional embeddedness of the actors selected for the analysis.

To uncover how justice, as an abstract and complex concept and phenomenon, is conceptualized – explicitly and implicitly – in political discourse, in each of the countries under study we have analysed 'texts'/documents produced by political actors in two clearly defined discursive contexts: (1) recent election campaign(s) and (2) country specific case/ 'discursive event' that triggered debates on issues of justice, representation and/or rights of minority groups. The choice of the to-be-analysed debates has not been driven by their 'representativeness' in terms of public popularity but rather the implications they (might) have for the understanding of justice, especially from the point of view of vulnerable populations.

In our analysis, we have focused predominantly on 'texts' that could be classified as 'official' communication by relevant actors, such as party programs, manifestos, electoral advertising, parliamentary debates, policy documents. With respect to (social) media content, we have by and large limited our sample to 'texts' issued or controlled by the political actors analysed – (official) interviews, statements, open letters printed or broadcast in public media, official electoral clips, clips/entries/posters/tweets posted by the actors themselves, for example, on their own website or YouTube channel, exerts from official events – party rallies, tv debates, communication by protests movements. However, researchers involved had some freedom to choose sources they found most appropriate for the analysis of the selected cases.

The document analysis, which forms the basis of the study, has been supplemented by a limited number of semi-structured interviews (4-7 per country) with public figures according to their capacity to shed light on the discourse(s) uncovered in the process of document analysis (incl. government representatives, ombudsman, representatives of local, national and/or international advocacies active on behalf of a specific minority/issue; recognized activists/members of issue and pressure groups active on behalf of a specific minority/issue; recognized

experts – researchers, scientists). In the selection of interviewees, we made efforts to secure the cooperation of actors or public figures (who might be seen as) representing the groups or points of view that are neglected (or underrepresented) in the dominant discourse(s).

The following discursive events have been analysed per country (for detailed description of cases and the justification for their inclusion in the analysis please see Appendix I; for the listing of documents analysed per country and discursive event see Appendix II):

Austria: (1) the electoral campaign of the 2017 general elections; and (2) debates surrounding the introduction of the Anti-Face Covering Act (2017) that prohibits full-face veiling in all public spaces and public buildings and that affects predominantly a small minority of Muslim women.

Hungary: (1) the multi-layered 2014 electoral campaign from winter to autumn of 2014, involving the national, European, and local elections; (2) Tusnád speech about 'illiberal democracy; and (3) debates triggered by migrant and refugee crisis of 2015/2016.

The Netherlands: (1) the electoral campaign of the 2017 general elections; and (2) debates around the controversial Black Pete figure that constitutes a crucial element of traditional nation-wide Saint Nicolas celebration while being also criticized as a symbol of unacknowledged racism that pervades contemporary Dutch society.

Portugal: (1) debates triggered by the local elections campaign in the municipality of Loures in 2017; and (2) public debate that followed the persecution of police officers on the grounds of violence against young men of minority origin (the 'Cova de Moura Case').

Turkey: (1) two national elections held in June and November 2015; and (2) two initiatives undertaken by the AKP government in the second half of 2000s to establish peace and social harmony – the 'Kurdish resolution' and the 'Alevi initiative.'

The United Kingdom: (1) the 2017 general elections, called by the Conservative Party in an attempt to consolidate its authority ahead of Brexit negotiations; and (2) the debates following the fire that engulfed Grenfell Tower in June 2017, killing over 70 residents and leaving many others traumatized and homeless.

The analysis of the texts selected involved qualitative content analysis with elements of discourse analysis, where content analysis entailed systematic search for underlying meanings, patterns and processes and careful mapping of themes and arguments used to convey a specific vision of justice, representative justice in particular; and where 'discourse analysis' came to the fore in our specific attention to both explicit and implicit meanings conveyed by the texts, e.g., via metaphors, allusions, similes, semantic and syntactic choices but also by silences or omissions (i.e. absence of specific topics/issues/actors from the discourse) as well as our specific focus on the (broader) context of communication. Strictly speaking, however, while rooted in the tradition of discourse analytical studies, our analytical approach is very much sociologically-oriented with only limited attention paid to the linguistic analysis *sensu stricto* (cf. Wodak, 2008).

The analysis presented in this report constitutes a synthesis of six country reports on political discourse about justice. In all countries, our analysis was guided by a set of questions related to (1) the framing of justice, representation in particular; (2) the moral grounds of various minority groups being given or denied (or restricted in) their right to representation; (3) the grievances, threats, conflicts and polarization mentioned or exposed; (4)

the nature of the political debates; and (5) rhetoric devices applied. However, mainly due to the divergent context and different agendas of the political actors included in the analysis, our country findings are not always straightforwardly comparable. The various country cases are therefore not directly compared in this report but rather used to highlight justice related themes and issues that cluster around certain visions of justice.

In the process of constant comparison and repeated re-reading and re-coding of country findings, four specific (meta) discourses were identified based on the recurrence (or persistent absence) of specific themes and consistency in the application of various argumentative structures and rhetoric devices. The process of comparative analysis could be seen as moving from inductive to deductive: the initial reading of the reports allowed discovering patterns in the choice of themes and the application of argumentative and rhetoric structures and lead to developing a framework (initially five, then four meta-discourses) that was subsequently applied to code and re-code the reports to confirm the appropriateness and cogency of the meta-discourses uncovered (cf. Patton 2015). The method applied in the comparative analysis resembles Skocpol and Somers' (1980) paradigm of the *macro-causal analysis* in that it involved asserting the applicability of the typology delineated to classify a wide range of arguments and debates. Researchers engaged in country-level data collection and analysis verified the soundness of the meta-level analysis and interpretations offered. Their remarks have been incorporated in this report. All the discourses are given distinctive names that summarize their content and reflect the essence of debates captured by them.

Analytical challenges

One of the biggest challenges we are confronted with in this analysis is the implicitness of justice. While people tend to have strong ideas about what is unjust or unfair, they do not necessarily find it easy to say what is just (e.g. Simon 1995). This is related to the empirical, temporal and psychological appeal of injustice and its call for the immediate eradication of the negative (ibid.). However, trying to understand ideas about justice via studying grievances is not unproblematic: injustice is not necessarily the opposite of justice and absence of injustice does not imply justice (Shklar 1990; Simon 1995). In fact, injustice has its own dynamic quite independent from justice. Moreover, paraphrasing Wolff (2015), there are many different ways of avoiding injustice, or – in other words – there are many different ways of doing justice in response to, or in avoidance of, a specific grievance.

In the approach we adapted, we look therefore at both the, often implicit, notions of justice and the frequently much more explicit grievances voiced by a variety of political actors, and – in particular – by activists and protest movements. We also look at the ideas about 'common good' and 'good life' (implicitly) present in debates that address the issues of just social and institutional order, outline the conditions under which the principles governing it are determined, and delimit the role of various groups in defining and accepting those conditions.

Challenging from an analytical point of view is also the entwinement of the various conceptions of justice. As observed by Buğra (2018), questions about representative justice are never independent of questions about redistribution and – especially – recognition. While the three conceptions of justice are indeed analytically separated in our analysis, we account for their mutual engagement. We also stay open to alternative conceptions of justice that may enhance our understanding of the nature of injustices in contemporary Europe and processes that legitimate them.

Overcoming methodological nationalism (Beck 2007; Wimmer and Schiller 2002) and trying to find common vocabulary that would allow mapping the similarities as well as divergences between the national contexts studied without falling into the trap of constructing the discourses as exclusive products (and manifestations) of specific national contexts constituted yet another challenge.

Finally, we tried to overcome the temptation to ascribe specific discourses to specific ideological perspectives and/or specific political actors thus forcing the ideas about justice and injustice into the already-existing-ideological boxes. Our research indeed shows that while specific political actors, especially political parties, do draw more extensively from one or two discourses, different invocations of justice are not necessarily tied to ideological positioning of any specific actor.

Findings

Who is being represented?

The analysis of the electoral campaigns in the various counties, showed marginal importance of minorities either as targets/addressees of political campaigning or contributors to mainstream political agenda, especially in countries in which there are no minority parties and/or the role of such parties in national politics is rather peripheral. The political campaigning of the parties analysed targeted predominantly the 'mainstream' public or 'real people,' which is usually represented as consisting of 'people who live in ordinary, working families,'[1] thus indirectly excluding those who may be (involuntarily) not working and/or not living in 'ordinary' families, such as homeless, people with disabilities, but also Roma and other minority groups that are not included in the, often implicitly, 'autochthonized' (and/or racialized) notion of the 'we'.[2] In some countries, appeal to the ordinary (working) people is combined with reference to nativist values (for example in Austria, Hungary and Portugal) or other values that are considered a part of national creed (e.g. liberal and democratic values in the Netherlands, or the 'Christian roots' of the cultural traditions and the way of life in Hungary). In Hungary, but also in the UK, there are also strong appeals to younger (autochthonous) voters typecast as a new generation of victims to establishment politics. This narrative is especially powerful in Hungary, troubled by mass economically-driven youth emigration.

The extent and the manner in which various (mainstream) political actors seek to represent minorities depends on the definition of the 'core' group that is being appealed to and the political landscape in each country. For example, in Turkey, all political parties, except for the nationalist MHP, insist on diversity as a value and resource and attempt to show that they take minority claims and grievances seriously. The responses to these claims and grievances differ, especially regarding the question of representation, but they have an important place in political party discourses (Buğra and Ertan 2018). In Hungary, on the other hand, in the context of the 2014 elections, the ruling Fidesz-KDNP government could claim the legitimate representation of Roma and Jewish populations only because of the absence of a viable competitor (an embattled left-wing political spectrum was unable to consolidate a pointed, appealing and visible claim of representation with respect to minorities) and in the context of a then-radical right-wing electoral contender (Jobbik). In the UK the Labour Party has been traditionally supportive of the

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[1] Conservative Party Manifesto (2017:1; 49). Available at: www.conservatives.com/manifesto.

[2] The use of the term 'autochthonous' throughout this report is controversial but deliberate. 'Autochthonous,' which means 'the one that is from here,' is a term that obscures 'racism' understood not only in biological but especially in cultural terms (Wekker 2016). To certain extent, in this report, the term 'autochthonous' could be replaced with a term 'ethnically native.' I have chosen it to demonstrate the continued relevance of racial (or ethnically nationalistic) reasoning in political discourse, hidden, for example, in the use of the pronoun 'we' and/or references to the native ('the Portuguese,' 'the Hungarian,' 'the Dutch,' etc.), supposedly ethnically homogeneous, by implication white, majority. The term is used throughout this report in parenthesis to indicate its non-obviousness and/or implicitness in the discourses identified.

(footnote continued)

rights of migrants and refugees and has avowedly aligned themselves with anti-racist project for decades. In the 2017 elections, the Labour Party included in its manifesto a pledge to protect Gypsy/Travellers against discrimination and uphold their right to lead a nomadic way of life. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, the PvdA (Labour Party) that was in the past considered a true representative of the minority voter, in the 2017 elections lost their minority electorate to the migrant party DENK, which might indicate the diminished appeal of mainstream parties to a minority voter. In Austria, however, there is currently no political party that claims to speak for minorities or on their behalf; occasional attempts to represent (also) minority members tend to be embedded in a broader 'diversity and multiculturalism' agenda, like in Graz, where the Communist Party (KPÖ) claims to represent the interests of all under the slogan 'we are all Graz.'[3] Similar attempts of generalized inclusion are made by left-wing parties in Hungary, albeit with little appeal outside the urban elite. In Portugal, minority claims have gained some political visibility only recently.

Whether or not and to what extent minority claims are accommodated in the political agenda is to certain extent related to the formal status of various minority groups as citizens and residents. There is little incentive for the political parties to address in their campaigning the non-voting residents: the (recent non-EU) migrants or minorities without citizenship rights. Differences in formal status between minority groups explain some of the variation in the accommodation of (specific) minority claims in the electoral campaigns, both within and across countries. On the other hand, however, the status of various minority groups in the community of *voters* is often discursively blurred, for example when citizens with migrant background are referred to as (second- or third-generation) 'migrants' or 'foreigners', or when reference to hyphenated citizens (e.g. Turkish-Dutch) serves the purpose of emphasizing their otherness and likely disloyalty rather than belonging. In fact, the inclusion of minority perspectives in the electoral programs is often more likely to appeal to the sensitivities of the majoritarian voter rather than reflect the position of the minority groups which due to their long-term settlement and/or formal status are allowed to vote.

Consequently, attention to minority claims in the political discourse seems predominantly related to their *actual* presence in the institutions of political representation (for a more thorough discussion of those issues see ETHOS Deliverable D5.2 by Anderson and Dupont (2018)). While in Portugal and the UK there are no minority parties as such,[4] the significance of such parties on the political scene in other countries varies. In Austria there is a small number of minority parties representing the interest of recognized – the so-called 'autochthonous' – minorities (Hungarians, Croats, Slovenes, Czechs, Slovaks and Roma) on a municipal/communal level,[5] yet these parties are

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[3] KPÖ Graz (2017) Wir alle sind Graz – Vorschläge für eine soziale und ökologische Stadt. Available at: https://www.kpoe-graz.at/download.php?f=c612cfefa4a7aa2ee4b3cf7b014bd711&target=0.

[4] In Portugal forming a party based on 'minority' status is actually illegal.

[5] Enotna Lista (Slovenian List in south Carinthia) is one of the notable exceptions. See: http://www.elnet.at/start/. The fact that the groups mentioned here are referred to as 'autochthonous' while being ethnically different from the majority testifies to the racial character of the term.

(footnote continued)

absent from the national or provincial level politics. In the Netherlands, a newly emerged minority party DENK that targets people with migrant background, Turks in particular, won 2.1% of the popular vote and 3 seats in the Parliament in the 2017 general elections. Far less marginal, albeit more convoluted, is the presence of minority parties in Hungary, where Roma as a statutorily 'national and ethnic minorit[y]' have been given the opportunity to form so-called 'minority self-governments' (on local and national levels). While the institutionalization of local and national minority self-governments (ORÖ) allows for the political representation of minority interests, including in parliamentary debate and proceedings, it is complicated by institutional arrangements that have seemingly subsumed such representations under the ruling Conservative-Christian government and political family. [6] Moreover, the fact that under the current electoral system minority voters have to choose between casting a vote in minority self-government elections and participating in general elections together with their majority compatriots leads to a dual representation system that relegates the significance of Roma representation (Zemandl 2018). Finally, in Turkey, parties that represent a large segment of the Kurdish population and have a very high share of votes in the regions where Kurds constitute the majority were, until 2015, only marginally represented in the national parliament due to a very high electoral threshold (10%), which prioritizes parties with the highest share in popular vote. This changed in 2015, when the pro-Kurdish HDP succeeded in passing the 10% threshold and entered the parliament with 80 (June elections) and 59 (November elections) candidates. [7] Still, it also should be noted that the *actual* presence of minority parties in the political arena does not necessarily translate into their *discursive visibility*, that is presence in the public sphere, for example via attention paid to them by the (mainstream) media.

The inclusion of ethnic minority members and/or citizens of migrant background in mainstream politics also seems rather marginal. In the current national Austrian parliament, only six out of 183 parliamentarians have a migratory background: three of them were born in Turkey, one in Bosnia, one in Sydney, and one whose parents are from Palestine. [8] Overall, in 2017, out of 684 political deputies on the national, provincial, and local level, only 27 (4%)

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[6] For example, the Roma party *Lungo Drom* – which won 75% of the votes in the 2014 national minority elections – formed a political alliance with Fidesz, whereby the Roma party's leader, Florián Farkas served as a member of Parliament under Fidesz. Furthermore, Farkas and Orbán signed an alliance in May 2011 whereby Farkas would be in charge of the country's Roma inclusion strategy. In the eyes of the Roma opposition figures and civil society, this indicated a structural monopolization of Lungo Drom – or the representation of the Roma – by the ruling Fidesz-KDNP political family (for more details see ETHOS Deliverable D5.2 by Anderson and Dupont (2018)).

[7] Such a success was possible, as the pro-Kurdish People's Democratic Party (HDP) changed their election strategy. Because of the 10% threshold, until 2015 they participated in national elections with 'independent' candidates, which allowed them to win a number of seats, albeit fewer had there been no or lower threshold requirements. In 2015 HDP decided to enter the elections as a single party, rather than a selection of 'independent' candidates, which positively influenced the number of seats won. Also, the share of the representatives of the Kurdish parties (HDP and its predecessors) in the municipal governments in the South-East of the country is quite substantial (Buğra and Ertan 2018).

[8] Medien-Servicestelle (2017) Nationalrat: Secht Abgeordneten haben Migrationshintergrund. Available at: http://medienservicestelle.at/migration_bewegt/2017/11/08/nationalrat-sechs-abgeordneten-haben-migrationshintergrund/.

(footnote continued)

had a migratory background.[9] This seems rather small when compared to the total share of people with migratory background living in Austria – almost 22%. Slightly more promising is the situation in the UK, where following the 2017 elections, BAME constitute 8% of the MPs (52 persons).[10] Similarly in the Netherlands, the 2017 elections brought to the Parliament 16 MPs (out of 150, i.e. 10.6%), which is relatively close to the share of minorities in the general population (12.7%). In the Netherlands, minorities are also relatively active on the local political level; for example in 2018 local elections, voters could choose from among the migrant parties in circa one-third of municipalities.[11] In Hungary, the number of MPs self-identifying as Roma is 1% (four out of 386 MPs) – again rather small if compared to the estimated population of Roma in Hungary (500,000-800,000; i.e. 5% to 8% of the total population[12]).[13] Most underrepresented among the 'political class' are the minorities in Portugal: just two prominent politicians – one MP and the current Prime Minster – of ethnic (African) ancestry vis-à-vis a significant but unknown share of Roma and Afro-descendants in the general population.[14]

To further complicate the issue, minority members active in politics do not necessarily wish to act and/or be perceived as representatives of (specific) minority populations, especially on issues that might potentially enhance minority-majority polarization. Operation Black Vote (a civil society organization in the UK), is therefore anxious to avoid the slippage between politicians as representing their constituents and politicians as representative *of* their constituents: 'not every black or minority ethnic MP wants to speak about race equality.'[15] This dilemma is best reflected in the UK, when, following the terrorist attack the mayor of London – Sadiq Khan – claimed to speak for Londoners and not for *Muslim* Londoners. Also, in the Netherlands, the mayor of Rotterdam, who himself has a Moroccan background and is known for anti-racism initiatives, referred to the 'security of thousands of [mainly autochthonous] children and their parents,'[16] when defending his decision to prevent anti-Black Pete demonstrations, which was criticized for silencing the minority voices and infringing on their civil liberties (for a discussion of the representative burden of minority groups who not only politically represent but are seen as

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[9] Medien-Servicestelle (2017) MigrantInnen in Politik weiter unterrepräsentiert. Available at:
http://medienservicestelle.at/migration_bewegt/2017/01/03/migrantinnen-in-politik-weiter-unterrepraesentiert/.

[10] House of Commons, 2017. General Election 2017: results and analysis, 51. Available at:
https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7979.

[11] https://nos.nl/artikel/2216178-aanbod-aan-migrantenpartijen-sterk-toegenomen.html.

[12] In Hungary's 2011 census, 315,000 of the country's almost 10 million people identified themselves as Roma, but experts largely agree that this is an underrepresentation since many try to hide their ethnic identity because of discrimination.

[13] See also: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/493021/IPOL-FEMM_ET(2013)493021_EN.pdf.

[14] As discussed later in this report, there is no official data on the ethnic origin of Portuguese citizens, mostly due to the denial of the heterogeneity of the Portuguese population and insistence on its homogeneity. According to the scarce official data available, migrant population, mostly of Brazilian origin, amounts to about 3.2% of the general population. For official migrations statistics see:
https://www.ine.pt/xportal/xmain?xpid=INE&xpgid=ine_base_dados.

[15] Operation Black Vote, 2017. 'A diverse Parliament matters – 2017 election', para 6. Available at: www.obv.org.uk/news- blogs/diverse-parliament-matters-2017-election.

[16] Rotterdam Municipality Council – debate on 17 November 2016, following the arrest of 200 anti-Black Pete protesters in Rotterdam. Available at: https://rotterdam.raadsinformatie.nl/vergadering/238628.

(footnote continued)

representative *of* minority groups see ETHOS Deliverable 5.2 by Anderson and Dupont 2018). On the other hand, as also discussed in Deliverable 5.2, some particularly disadvantaged minority populations – like Roma, can be rather suspicious of (institutionalized) political representation, also by their 'own' representatives, i.e. members of the same minority population. This is very well illustrated in Hungary, where the National Roma Self-Government faced with mounting criticism for corruption and its servient position in relation to the ruling Fidesz is 'not accepted by progressive Roma activists' and were 'it is documented that [Roma Self-Governments] put pressure on people to participate in the election and vote for the governing party in order to be eligible' for the public works-social assistance scheme.[17]

All in all, the actual underrepresentation of minorities in the politics is often exacerbated by their symbolic underrepresentation, as illustrated by their (relative) absence among the direct addressees/intended recipients of the electoral campaign. Our analysis of selected electoral campaign material shows that minority groups, included in the ambiguous and shifting 'we' or 'the people', are rarely directly appealed to. Implicitly this juxtaposes the 'core of the electorate' to minority groups. While this seems to be predominantly indicative of the non- or bounded recognition of minority groups as voters, arguably, this may also stigmatize their political participation and thus (further) alienate them from electoral politics (Hartman et al. 2018). Indeed, our analysis shows that minorities are represented predominantly by actors engaging in resistance discourses: civil society organizations, protest movements, some minority parties, and – only sporadically – by mainstream political actors. This seems to signify an emergence of alternative routes to political representation (cf. Krastev 2014), although who is actually speaking (i.e. which new group) and for whom exactly (i.e. which part of the community/minority in question) continues to be contested (for further discussion see Anderson and Dupont 2018).

The understandings of representation

In ETHOS project, justice as (political) representation is understood as real opportunity to participate in democratic debate and exercise influence on the way society's basic norms, laws and regulations are being set. While this may, and usually does encompass formal participation in democratic process (e.g. via presence in elected bodies, involvement in consultancy and decision-making mechanisms, presence in the executive, judiciary and law-enforcement agencies), it may also involve the exercise of civic rights and freedoms (and especially the freedom of expression and the freedom to associate and to form an assembly) as well as other routes to effectively influence the shape of public debate by having their voice heard, for example via mainstream media.

Our analysis of political discourse in six countries showed that while political participation of 'ordinary people' is constructed as a self-evidently good and desirable thing, the issue of minorities' political participation is often either silenced or problematized, especially by the mainstream political actors. There is also a discursive difference in the construction of formal participation in public institutions and democratic process (e.g. as voters) and the imaging of minority engagement in protest movements and initiatives. While the former might be in some national settings – the UK and the Netherlands – taken for granted, the latter is often problematized, in particular by the more

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[17] Interview H4.2.03 with a civil society activist in Hungary.

conservative and/or right-wing political parties, as a form of (anarchistic) troublemaking rather than political involvement.

Interestingly, political debates analysed only marginally touch upon a preferred form of democracy (representative vs. direct/participatory vs. authoritarian) that would best accommodate the needs and interest of (specific) minority groups as well as specific institutional arrangement that would facilitate widespread participation of minority and non-minority actors. Such a debate is present in Turkey where representative democracy (advocated by a centre left, secular CHP) is juxtaposed with direct forms of democracy that offer to minority groups certain degree of administrative self-determination (pro-Kurdish HDP):

> *(We will) open the way to the establishment of the necessary mechanisms – such as the city, people, neighbourhood, woman, youth assemblies, assemblies of ecology, social networks and platforms – in order to enable the peoples' direct participation to government.*
>
> *Everywhere in Turkey, the HDP will quickly bring to life regulations that follow an understanding of democratic regional administration, and will constitute the basis for the constitution of an administrative structure that would enable self-administration by people.*[18]

A debate on the form of democracy that could best serve the (representation of) minority groups takes place also in Hungarian 2014 elections, where a strong paternalistic state accommodating the (representative) needs of all, including minorities, embodied in the illiberal democracy model propagated by the Prime Minster – Victor Orbán, is contested as 'autocratic' and 'oppressive' and challenged with a vison of community-based participatory democracy that would (also) benefit the minorities proposed (then) by Green LMP party.[19]

Often the issue of (political) representation of minorities is not explicitly addressed but discussed in terms of 'listening to concerns', 'giving voice' and/or 'not ignoring [the needs and grievances]' of a specific group or community. Implicit here is the imaging of minorities as a weaker side of political interaction; a (passive) object rather (active) agent of political process. Such a positioning of minorities changes when the language of 'giving voice' is replaced or supplemented with the language of civil rights and/or (il)legitimate demands. Yet, while this change does allow minorities to (re)gain some of their political agency, it does not necessarily transform them into fully-fledged members of political struggle. As shown by the debates around the Black-Pete controversies in the Netherlands and those surrounding the Grenfell fire in the UK, minority concerns are not (necessarily) converted into issues worthy of political representation, but often interpreted as troublemaking or simply a nuisance. In the Netherlands, anti-Black Pete activists engaging in public protest are often portrayed as 'riffraff's', 'aggressive streetfighters', 'ethnic extremists' or 'Black Panthers' 'hateful towards everything that is white.'[20] Similar portrayals of Roma or Afro-descendant activists are also present in the Portuguese discourse (Meneses et al. 2018).

The latter example hints at how representative justice is intertwined, frequently in a complex and multi-layered manner, with other dimensions of justice, recognition in particular. Caught in the language of equality (incl. judicial, procedural, redistribution equality), rights (human rights but also social, economic and civil rights) and recognition

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[18] HDP, 7 June Election Manifesto. Available at: http://www.hdp.org.tr/tr/materyaller/genel-secimler/genel-secim-7-haziran/6010.

[19] Deliberative democracy was discussed also in the more leftist programs of the Green Left and Christian Union in the Netherlands, albeit without any direct reference to minority (political) participation.

[20] Martin Bosma (PVV) during the parliamentary debate on the Black Pete Bill on 16 February 2017. *Handelingen Tk 2016-2017*, 54-6. Available at: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20162017-54-6.html.

(e.g. when touching upon the issues of identity and self-determination), the meaning of representative justice is sometimes hard to disentangle (see also Anderson and Dupont 2018). Moreover, as shown by the Turkish case, the recognition of ethnic, religious or cultural difference might go together with tendencies to dismiss the problem of political representation, to selectively approach the legitimacy of the organizations and initiatives that represent minorities, and to politically instrumentalise and manipulate organized representation (Buğra and Ertan 2018). Further complexity is added by the already mentioned implicitness of justice and the difficulty of trying to understand ideas about justice via studying grievances.

Mapping the conceptions of justice

In the analysis, we identified four meta-discourses that synthetize the various strands of political debates on minority claims to justice. The four meta-discourses could be seen as heuristic devises, or Weberian ideal types, whose specific shape and application may – as illustrated in our discussion – differ per national setting, but also per political actor drawing from a particular discourse in a particular discursive context.

In our discussion we try to avoid ascribing discourses to clearly delimited ideological positions of various actors. In fact, our analysis shows that most political actors analysed for the purposes of this study are rather eclectic and tend to draw from at least two, and sometimes three, discourses depending on the context and the audience they want to address. At the same time, there is usually one discourse that seems to correspond most clearly with the ideological stance of the actor in question.

In the discussion that follows we will present the main facets of the four discourses identified (for graphic summary see Figure 1) and reflect upon the vision of community they imply. While addressing the questions of boundary drawing implicit in defining the scope of justice, we will reflect on the imagined role of minority groups in the community of value and the manner in which they are allowed, if at all, to participate in the democratic debate and/or otherwise influence the society's norms, laws and values.

Justice as book keeping

- *Balance of rights and obligations, benefits and burdens, freedoms and responsibilities*
  - ⇨ *Particular attention to **redistributive claims***
- *Limits: community of values*
- *Belonging: conditional; in case of minorities: integration as precondition*
- *Common good: defined by the majoritarian values*
- *National variation: considerable related to definition of the core values*

Justice as majoritarian rule

- *Ontological security by giving rule (back) into the hands of the people*
  - ⇨ *Particular attention to claims for **native (as opposed to minority) recognition***
- *Limits: cohesive, homogenous nation*
- *Belonging: exclusive; in case of minorities: conditional tolerance; assimilation required; disloyalty (of elites) not tolerated*
- *Common good: defined by the well-being of the majority*

Justice as responsibility

- *Responsibility for the other*
  - ⇨ *Attention to claims for **minority recognition***
- *Belonging: (un)conditional; humanity or community of value*
- *Common good: unity in diversity – mutual accommodation and solidarity*

Justice as freedom from oppression

- *Responsibility for the other*
  - ⇨ *Attention to claims for **minority recognition and representation, also as condition** for distributive justice in social and economic sphere*
- *Belonging: own belonging stressed*
- *Common good: unity in diversity – mutual accommodation*
- *National variation: considerable*

Figure 1 The four discourses of justice – a summary

Justice as book keeping

Within the discourse of *justice as book keeping*, justice is most often defined as a balance between rights and obligations, benefits and burdens, freedoms and responsibilities: 'Whoever claims rights must also fulfil obligations.'[21] Any type of entitlement is here (implicitly) conditioned upon contribution, even though at times an exception can be made for the (most) vulnerable:

> *Whoever works and contributes, cannot be the 'dumb' one. Whoever wants to benefit, must first contribute. Whoever is entitled to benefits, shall receive them (…). Whoever cannot help themselves, must be helped* (ÖVP Election Manifesto, Austria).[22]

The belief in the power of contribution is (implicitly) built on a vision of a meritocratic society, in which individual success is, or should be, linked to individual effort, conditioned (mainly) upon individual engagement and self-responsibility, while not fully independent of the social environment. The mismatch between the effort (hard work) and the result (decent pay, payable mortgage, secured future for oneself and one's children) is then identified as one of the main grievances. In the UK and Hungary, in particular, the creation of the appropriate conditions to enable individual success and proper recognition of individual effort is high on the political agenda. In the UK, this vision – promoted predominantly by the Conservative party – encompasses, among other things, the elimination of 'racial disparity' and a belief that the injustices experienced by minority ethnic groups such as racism in the acceptance of job applications will be mitigated through meritocracy which recognizes only hard work and not background or identity. In Hungary, on the other hand, where the sense of 'hardworking families' being wronged by ruthless neo-liberal foreign elites pervades, the 'just' remedies encompass the re-nationalization of the economy, full-employment and the workfare policy targeting the 'multiply disadvantaged' (especially the Roma), and tough approach towards those who find it more 'comfortable to live on [hardworking taxpayers'] assistance' (implicitly, the Roma).[23]

The vision of justice as an equation between rights and obligations, freedoms and responsibilities brings also to the fore the issue of the (symbolic) indebtedness of the individual to the community in which he/she is embedded. In most countries the debt can be paid by the contribution of hard work, abiding by the law and – in case of immigrants or the marginalized (ethnic) minorities, such as the Roma in Hungary – integration. The latter rhetoric is particularly

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[21] Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (2017) Plan A für Austria. Das Programm für Wohlstand, Sicherheit & gute Laune. Available at: http://diepresse.com/mediadb/Wahlprogr.pdf.

[22] Österreichische Volkspartei (2017) Der Neue Weg. Aufbruch & Wohlstand, Teil 2/3. Das Programm der Liste Sebastian Kurz – die neue Volkspartei zur Nationalratswahl 2017. Available at:
http://diepresse.com/mediadb/Wahlprogramm_Teil2_Aufbruch%20und%20Wohlstand.pdf.

[23] Orbán during the annual State of the State Address on 7 February 2011, quoted in: Lambert, S. (2016c). *The orange files - Notable quotes: Prime minister Viktor Orbán.* Available at: https://theorangefiles.hu/christian-democratic-peoples-party/.

(footnote continued)

strong in Austria and the Netherlands, best reflected in the following quote from the electoral program of the Dutch Christian Democrats (CDA):

> *Integration requires reciprocity. Newcomers themselves have the responsibility to integrate into a society that also offers everyone the opportunity to actually participate. The government is investing in increasing these opportunities by expanding the range of pre- and early-school education and additional funding for educational disadvantage policy, primary education, effective integration and the fight against low literacy.*
>
> *The government sees Dutch citizenship as something to be proud of and what you must earn by doing everything possible to quickly integrate: learning the language, respecting our laws, embracing freedom and equality and looking for work.*[24]

While in essence (re-)distributive, i.e. related to the distribution of burdens and benefits, and usually evoked in relation to social justice, the vision of justice as book-keeping, might extend as well to recognitive and representative claims, for example, when the minority right to freedom of expression and demonstration is questioned on the grounds of public safety. This is the case in the Netherlands, where the right of the activists to protest against the figure of Black Pete (which they see as an embodiment of racism) is juxtaposed with the right of the (implicitly autochthonous) majority to 'a joyful celebration' and/or contingent upon the perceived threat such a protest may pose to the public. In such cases, when individual and group rights are being weighed against the rights and/or welfare (real or assumed) of a wider community, justice may involve seeking the golden middle, an equilibrium that would enable the conciliation of the interests of various social groups. What counts here is not (necessarily) the balance between the debit and the credit, but the outcome that maximizes the well-being of the greatest number. This – by and large – utilitarian vision of justice is focused on concessions made by the various sides (or social groups).

The *discourse of book keeping* seems to echo the tradition of social contract, within which justice is seen as derived from agreement of everybody concerned motivated by their enlightened self-interest (Rippon, Theuns, de Maagt, Zala and van den Brink 2018). While embracing the majoritarian way of life by newcomers and/or minority members is presented as a choice made in their own best interest; the embracing of (some) diversity by the majority is construed as an inescapable necessity but also a value and an asset. At the same time, the relationship between the sides of the 'contract' is inherently unequal, with the majority enjoying the unquestionable (and largely undefined in its scope) power to determine the contractual terms, such as accepting the majoritarian values and their way of life and/or conforming with the integration requirements. As aptly put in the ÖVP party program (Austria): 'we are […] allowed to ask of those who want to immigrate, that they live according to our values and

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[24] CDA - Standpunten: Immigratie & integratie [CDA – Key Program Points: Immigration and Integration]. Available at: https://www.cda.nl/standpunten/immigratie-en-integratie/.

(footnote continued)

expectations.'[25] In other words, minoritized members accepting 'the rules' is construed as a condition *sine qua non*, albeit not a guarantee, of their belonging and bearing the fruit of that membership. Accordingly, the legislative text of the Anti-Face-Covering Act in Austria postulates that 'those how are not prepared to accept Enlightenment values will have to leave our country and society.'[26]

The very framing of the 'our values' implicates their (moral) pre-eminence – these are not represented as some parochial customs but 'fundamental values of a European, democratic state.'[27] While the precise composition of this moral core may differ per country (and the ideological provenance of the political actor appealing to them), they characteristically touch upon the liberal-democratic ideals of equality, civil rights and individual liberties, pluralism, openness and (religious) tolerance, work ethic and respect of the rule of law. In case of Hungary and Turkey, the moral 'core' is more firmly rooted in 'our common historical trajectory shaped by the fundamental values of our nation'[28] entrenched either in Christianity (Hungary) or Islam (Turkey).

The unequal power relations between the (hypothetical) sides of the 'contract' are sometimes hidden behind a dialogical opening. For example, in the attempts at dialogue with minority groups, a majoritarian governments' understanding of 'the fundamental values of the nation' might replace the groups' own interpretations of their culture and its place in the value universe of the society. This might be seen reflected in the AKP's democratic opening to resolve the tensions around the Alevi question:

> *Along with different languages, in relation to different beliefs and sects, too, we have taken bold steps (…) for the first time, we have prepared the ground for discussing the different interpretations of the Islamic faith in a free environment and overcoming its problems in a democratic environment.*[29]

The superiority of the majoritarian creed is, however, not only openly preached, but also reflected in the incredulity which accompanies evaluations of the assumed transgressions. As in the case of an apparent rejection of the majoritarian values by Turkish-Dutch demonstrating in the summer of 2016 in support of Erdogan(-regime). Remarkable here are the instances of attributing the behaviour of the Turkish minority members to their failed integration, miscomprehension of the Dutch values and normative non-belonging coupled with a nearly complete absence of attempts to link their frustration and apparent dissatisfaction with the Dutch democracy with their

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[25] Österreichische Volkspartei (2017) Der Neue Weg. Ordnung & Sicherheit, Teil 3/3. Das Programm der Liste Sebastian Kurz – die neue Volkspartei zur Nationalratswahl 2017. Available at: https://diepresse.com/mediadb/pdf/Wahlprogramm_Teil3.pdf.

[26] Al Jazeera (2017) Austria moves to ban full-face veil in public spaces. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/austria-moves-ban-full-face-veil-public-spaces-170131131559685.html.

[27] Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich. Integrationsgesetz und Anti-Gesichtsverhüllungsgesetz sowie Änderung des niederlassungs- und Aufenthaltsgesetzes, des Asylgesetzes 2005, des Fremdenpolizeigesetzes 2005, des Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetzes 1985 und der Straßenverkehrsordnung 1960. Jahrgang 2017, ausgegeben am 8. Juni 2017, Teil 1. Available at: https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2017_I_68/BGBLA_2017_I_68.pdf.

[28] AKP 2015 Election manifesto, p.13. Available at: https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/dosya/59647.

[29] AKP 2015 Election manifesto, p.25. Available at: https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/dosya/59647.

(footnote continued)

disadvantaged position in the society (Lepianka 2018). Strong here is the idea of the power of persuasion. As stated by UK Prime Minister Theresa May in her speech after the London bridge attack in 2017, 'the evil ideology of Islamic extremism [will] only be defeated when we turn people's minds away from this violence and make them understand that our values – pluralistic British values – are superior to anything offered by the preachers and supporters of hate.'[30]

In the *discourse of book keeping*, the disadvantaged position of minorities, if acknowledged, is often (implicitly) attributed to individual choices and/or failures of minority members to properly integrate and/or the more general fiasco of the abstracted 'integration policies.' Only sparingly, is it explicitly linked to social environment that may not be 'meritocratic enough' (*vide*: the UK). Interesting in this context is the rhetoric of the ruling Fidesz in Hungary and the emphasis given to the public works program represented as the 'largest benefit given [by the Fidesz government] to the Roma' who, due to it, could experience their 'first opportunity to take part in the Hungarian economy' and 'integrate into the majority society.'[31] While this rather boastful rhetoric accepts the state-responsibility for the creation of opportunities, it may also constitute a source of scapegoating of those who might have failed to use them.

Boundaries of the imagined community of value

Central in the *discourse of book keeping* is the notion of belonging conditioned not, or not explicitly, on race, ethnicity, religion or any other markers of origin, but the community of values. Diversity is embraced as an unavoidable, or sometimes indeed desirable, element of social (and economic!) reality. The Labour Party manifesto (the UK) states, for example, that 'public and private sector employers depend on immigrants,' and stresses to 'value their contributions, including their tax contributions.'[32] Racist or otherwise overtly discriminatory language is carefully avoided and the belonging of the various others to the community of value emphasized. In Turkey (AKP), ethnic differences are recognized, cultural diversity affirmed as a value and a resource, and solution sought to end the Kurdish conflict and 'embrace' other minority groups, such as Alevi and the Roma through dialogue and mutual understanding.

This type of discursive inclusiveness is well illustrated in the statement of Sebastian Kurz (ÖVP, Austria): 'Islam belongs to Austria.' However, as noted by one of the interviewees in Hungary:

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[30] MAY, T., 2017. *PM statement following London terror attack: 4 June 2017.* Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-following-london-terror-attack-4-june-2017.

[31] Orbán, V. (2014b, October 10). *Magyarország legnagyobb rejtett tartaléka a roma közösség*. Speech of the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán at the occasion of the visit to the National Roma Minority Self-Government. Available at: http://www.kormany.hu/hu/a-miniszterelnok/beszedek-publikaciok-interjuk/magyarorszag-legnagyobb-rejtett-tartaleka-a-roma-kozosseg.

[32] Labour Party Manifesto (2017: 28). Available at: https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/labour-manifesto-2017.pdf.

(footnote continued)

when they [the ruling Fidesz-KDNP government that claims legitimate representation of Roma and Jewish minorities] speak about the coexistence of Hungarians and Roma or Hungarians and Jews, it implies that these minorities are not necessarily and in all sense part of the [Hungarian] group.[33]

Indeed, as already mentioned, at least in case of specific (minority or migrant) groups, it is more appropriate to talk about *conditional* belonging, best reflected in another quote from the ÖVP party manifesto (Austria) in relation to refugees/ third country nationals:

everyone who has come to Austria via legal means and would like to build something for themselves here, is welcome to do so. [However] the prerequisites for this are learning the German language, accepting values, and participating in the labour market.[34]

Similar rhetoric is used in Hungary:

There is no chance; we are going to send you back. This continent will not be your homeland, you have your own homeland, this is our homeland, we built it. We will gladly work together with you, we have our laws, respect them if you want to come here, which also has its own regulations. But it is impossible that you run across our fences and our borders in a way that violates the law.[35]

Thus, the openness to newcomers or migrants is accompanied by a clear indication of the boundaries of majoritarian hospitality: legality, cultural integration (often understood as assimilation) and economic contribution appear as conditions *sine qua non* of being admitted into the community of value. In some cases, not only symbolically but also physically; as envisaged by left-centrist Liste PILZ in Austria:

Step 1: selection of refugees in their [home country]: those with the best chances of integration and those with the highest need, are allowed to enter the country.

Step 2: Austria-preparation: Before they come to Austria, they are prepared for half a year in a secure refugee camp, controlled by the UN. They learn German and find out, what is expected of them. Next to that, employment-specific support begins.[36]

Particularly striking in the above quote is the straightforward reference to the expectations the host Austrian society may have from the prospective refugees, which seems to resemble a contractual transaction (NB reflected also the statements of other political actors, such as ÖVP). The selective refugee policy is reminiscent of the UK (and Dutch) proposals of selective admission of labour migrants that aims at attracting 'hard working migrants' with

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[33] Interview H4.2.01 with a political scientist in Hungary.

[34] Österreichische Volkspartei (2017) Der Neue Weg. Ordnung & Sicherheit, Teil 3/3. Das Programm der Liste Sebastian Kurz – die neue Volkspartei zur Nationalratswahl 2017. Available at: https://diepresse.com/mediadb/pdf/Wahlprogramm_Teil3.pdf.

[35] Statement by Orbán on July 3, 2015, on what to say to migrants who intend to enter Hungary illegally; Orbán: ez nem lesz a te hazád, ez a mi hazánk (2015, July 3). *Népszava online.* Available at: http://nepszava.hu/cikk/1062348-orban-ez-nem-lesz-a-te-hazad-ez-a-mi-hazank.

[36] Liste Pilz (2017) Liste Pilz Arbeitsprogramm: Flüchtlingspolitik – ja, es geht! Available at: https://listepilz.at/liste-pilz-arbeitsprogramm-fluechtlingspolitik-ja-es-geht/.

(footnote continued)

key skills in 'strategically important sectors' while reducing the number of 'unskilled migrants' associated with (welfare) abuse.[37] Central here is the notion that the 'value' of the figure of the migrant is evaluated exclusively from the perspective of the economic and/or demographic interest of the host society. Interestingly, in Hungary this role is assigned to Roma, conceived by the ruling party as a 'hidden reserve' well suited (much better than the 'managed migration') to solve the Europe's demographic and labour supply problems.[38]

More ambiguous is the (contribution-based) belonging of EU-migrants, who might be discursively separated from migrants in general and non-EU migrants specifically. For example, in the UK, the EU-migrants are constructed as migrant-*citizens* and the Third Country Nationals (TCNs) as migrant-*workers*. The status differences between the two groups is most explicitly reflected in the Labour Party Manifesto, which asserts that 'EU nationals do not just contribute to our society: *they are part of our society.*'[39] Although this assertion does not relate in any way to the political rights and/or political representation of EU-*citizens*, it does shed an interesting light on contribution as not necessarily sufficient to secure belonging (belonging extends beyond 'just contributing'). Alternatively, it shows the arbitrariness of applying 'contribution' as a condition of belonging (for some 'others' the requirement to contribute is simply waived).

Unclear is also the status of non-native (or non-autochthonous) groups that are already settled – the (subsequent generations of) post-colonial citizens (the Netherlands, the UK and Portugal), children and grandchildren of labour migrants (the Netherlands), illegal inhabitants (Portugal) and national minorities, such as Roma (Portugal, Hungary),[40] Jews (Hungary) or Kurds and Alevi (Turkey). In those cases, it might be better to talk about '*contingent*' or *'marginal' belonging*, afforded to those who – like the hardworking Roma in Hungary – are 'proud of their Hungarian identity', 'don't want to separate themselves, exclude themselves, and position their lives against us', but 'who plan to be part of the nation.'[41]

All in all, the relationship between the individual and the (implicitly autochthonous) community of value, is in this discourse ambivalent and country specific, depending – in part – on the ideological provenance of political actors drawing from it. In the Netherlands, where civic rights and freedoms constitute the core of the national creed, the liberal party (VVD) is very careful not to dichotomize the individual and the community of value, but to focus instead on the individual freedom to choose to be(come) a part of Dutch society by accepting its principal values of liberal democracy, rule of law and tolerance. 'Take it or leave it' is thus the message sent by the Prime Minister to the Turkish-Dutch who seemed to disregard and violate those values during pro-Erdogan manifestations in Rotterdam in the summer of 2016.

At the same time, the discourse of *justice as book keeping* is permeated with a distinction between *morally deserving* and *undeserving*, where deservingness is construed in terms of economic contribution, and thus in a sense commodified, abiding by the rule of law and/or adherence to a particular (majoritarian) cultural value system.

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[37] Conservative party Manifesto (2017:20; 54). Available at: https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto.

[38] Statement by Orbán on July 3, 2015, on what to say to migrants who intend to enter Hungary illegally; Orbán: ez nem lesz a te hazád, ez a mi hazánk (2015, July 3). *Népszava online.* Available at: http://nepszava.hu/cikk/1062348-orban-ez-nem-lesz-a-te-hazad-ez-a-mi-hazank.

[39] Labour Party Manifesto (2017: 24). Available at: https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/labour-manifesto-2017.pdf .

[40] The ambiguity of the position of the Roma, for example, in Portugal is reflected in the fact that even though they are in theory citizens, they still fall under the scope of the High Commissioner for Migration.

[41] Statement by Orbán on July 3, 2015, on what to say to migrants who intend to enter Hungary illegally; Orbán: ez nem lesz a te hazád, ez a mi hazánk (2015, July 3). *Népszava online.* Available at: http://nepszava.hu/cikk/1062348-orban-ez-nem-lesz-a-te-hazad-ez-a-mi-hazank.

While the distinction applies in equal measure to citizens and non-citizens, the deservingness of the *non*-citizens and *non-autochthonous* citizens is likely to be subjected to stricter scrutiny and subject to more punitive measures (for discussions of how immigrant/minority status affects perceived deservingness see, for example, van Oorschot, Roosma, Meuleman and Reeskens 2017).

The deserving considerations and the conditional belonging are highly relevant for the imaging's of representative justice with respect to minority groups: while not *a priori* excluded based on biological (race, ethnicity) or cultural characteristics, minority groups have to 'earn' their inclusion in the community of value. Although this inclusion seems to encompass the (promise of) participation in the political community, it is neither unconditional nor unbounded – it is granted only to those who are able to prove their wholehearted adherence to the majoritarian (implicitly autochthonous) normative core and might be re-examined once this adherence is questioned. This casts some doubt on the actual ability of the minority groups to exercise influence on the way society's basic norms, laws and regulations are being set. While not impossible, securing effective influence may require from the minorities seeking alliances with members of the majoritarian group, strategic adjustments in prioritizing claims and/or choosing the forms of representation that allow step-wise rather than radical change.

Justice as majoritarian rule (and 'ontological security')

The connotations of justice are within this discourse, at least at first sight, rather unclear. On the one hand, justice seems to imply the right to define the rules of the game (which shall belong to the majority); on the other, it denotes the right to security and freedom from threat, where threat can be both realistic (physical, economic) as well as symbolic (e.g. to one's identity or own narrative). In its essence, the discourse of justice advocated here builds upon the human craving for 'ontological security' defined by Giddens as 'confidence (…) in the continuity of [one's] self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments' (Giddens 1991: 91), which seems to constitute a contemporary (or, to stay close to Gidden's terminology: late-modern) version of the Rooseveltian plea for 'freedom from fear' (Oomen and Timmer 2018).

Understood in such terms, justice requires eliminating or, at least, neutralizing the source of threat, which is often personified in the figure of the Other. What, therefore, most decisively differentiates this discourse from other discourses identified in this study is its explicit focus on the imagined well-being of the (implicitly autochthonous) majority and the very sharp and highly exclusive distinction between the 'insiders' and the 'outsiders', where the definition of the outsider may differ per political actor but also per specific national setting – from Muslim in countries affected by the refugee crises (Hungary, Austria, the Netherlands), to various categories of migrants (in countries hosting big numbers of labour migrants: Austria, the Netherlands, the UK), to historically present minorities, such as Kurds or Alevi's (in Turkey), Roma and Afro-descendants (in Portugal), to (corrupt) elites and members of the political opposition disloyal to the national creed (Turkey, Hungary, the Netherlands).

What is just or unjust is evaluated solely from the perspective of the (autochthonous) majority (the insiders). While the discourse is predominantly applied by the (far) right-wing, (ultra) conservative and populist political actors, certain elements of it are drawn upon also by more moderate actors and find appeal with the majority of the (autochthonous) population. In Turkey, for example, the potential threat of Kurdish 'terrorism' and separatism, fuelled by armed conflicts between the Turkish army and the Kurdish separatist forces, which since the 1980s have

caused the death of an estimated thirty-five thousand people from both sides, remains an important element in the imagination of many non-Kurds and is discernible in the discourse of parties also in the centre(-left) of political spectrum (such as CHP). Also, while the discourse is most prevalent in countries 'stung' by populism – Austria, Hungary, the Netherlands and Turkey – some elements of it are traceable in the UK, especially in the Brexit-related anti-European rhetoric, and Portugal.

Capitalizing on the multiple sources of threat, the discourse combines claims pertaining to fair or 'just' redistribution with claims for (majoritarian) recognition and demands of bounded representation for the non-autochthonous groups; high on the political agenda are also appeals for safety, given an extra impetus by the migration crisis. With respect to redistribution, the discourse focuses, on the one hand, on the job insecurity experienced by the native (implicitly autochthonous) population thus emphasizing the role of employment as a universal panacea ('if there is work, there is everything!');[42] and on the other, it highlights the problem of benefits and privileges unduly enjoyed by foreigners,[43] migrants or minority members at the expense of the (autochthonous) majority. Abuse of the welfare system and using benefits without equivalent contribution by the minority members (such as Roma) and/or (subsequent generations of) immigrants constitutes a prominent grievance in Austria (FPÖ), Hungary (Jobbik) or, on occasions, in Portuguese local elections (PPD/PSD).[44] In countries hit by migration crisis, very strong is the rhetoric of 'stealing jobs' from the natives, aptly captured by Jobbik's slogan: ''No Vacancy' sign should be put up at the Europe's borders'[45] and reflected in billboards: 'If you come to Hungary, you cannot take jobs away from Hungarians' that hang throughout Hungary (in Hungarian) in the summer of 2015 (Zemandl 2018). In the Netherlands (PVV), at least equal attention is paid to the seemingly privileged position of the hyphenated-Dutch (i.e. Dutch citizens with migrant background) before the law, for example, when their assaults to public officials and violation of public order are seen as receiving no or inadequate punishment. Increased conditionality in access to the national system of reciprocity for newcomers (FPÖ, Austria) and stricter application of state coercion with respect to 'foreign/migrant/minority' trouble makers (FPÖ, Austria; PVV, the Netherlands; Jobbik, Hungary) are constructed as most straightforward measures to secure 'fairness' to the natives.

Within the discourse of *majoritarian rule* claims for recognition are 'twisted' or rather 'reversed'; what is demanded is not the accommodating of the needs of neglected or demeaned minorities but the healing of the wounds of the allegedly disadvantaged majority. As such, the majoritarian claims for recognition resemble the 'exclusionary

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[42] The 2014 electoral slogan of Jobbik quoted in Vona, G. (2014). Kimondjuk. Megoldjuk: A Jobbik országgyűlési választási programja a nemzet felemelkedéséért. Available at: https://www.jobbik.hu/sites/default/files/cikkcsatolmany/kimondjukmegoldjuk2014_netre.pdf.

[43] In Hungary, this applies in particular to foreign financial institutions, international companies and 'the Brussels,' who are believed to have drained the country and harmed the average Hungarian (Zemandl 2018).

[44] 'André Ventura. Roma lives almost exclusively from State subsidies'. Sebastião Bugalho. *'I' newspaper*, edition of 17 July 2017. Available at: https://ionline.sapo.pt/artigo/572563/andre-ventura-os-ciganos-vivem-quase-exclusivamente-de-subsidios-do-estado?seccao=Portugal_i.

[45] Immigration increases tensions in Europe (n.d.). Alfahir. Available at: https://www.jobbik.com/immigration_increases_tensions_europe.

(footnote continued)

identity politics' characteristic for populism (Müller quoted in Buğra 2018). In the debates analysed, such claims are traceable in the calls for the protection of the homeland, its native (autochthonous) population and dominant culture, and expressed, for example, in the FPÖ (Austria) postulate to substitute 'the *European Convention of Human Rights* with an *Austrian Convention of Human Rights*, which would also protect the right to Heimat [Homeland] for Austrians' (FPÖ).[46] Similar rhetoric is heard in Turkey (MHP, AKP), the Netherlands (PVV) and Hungary (Jobbik, Fidesz-KDNP). In Turkey, non-commitment to Turkish identity and nation is interpreted by the conservative nationalist MHP as an act of disloyalty and a fuel for 'the disastrous possibility of Turkey's separation along ethnic lines or another disastrous possibility of a sectarian division.'[47] In the Netherlands, Austria and Hungary, where there is no threat of the dismembering of the country, protection of autochthonous culture and identity is strongly coupled with warnings against cultural colonization (via Islamisation) of own country and Europe in general by migrants from Africa and the Far and Middle East (FPÖ, ÖVP in Austria; PVV, the Netherlands; Jobbik, Hungary). In Hungary, the revival of ethno-culturalism is also powerfully linked to the perceived threat of western (neo-)liberal dominance. While this sense of threat cannot be decoupled from the country's history of 'colonization' (i.e., occupation under the Ottoman Empire, Hapsburg Empire, Soviet Union, etc.), it has been powerfully reinforced by the processes of globalization and Europeanisation (especially, but not exclusively, in the rhetoric of Jobbik and Fidesz-KDNP, as well as Green LMP with its anti-global capital position).

Claims for the sovereignty of the own nation-state are within *the discourse of majoritarian rule* almost unanimous, although not equally explicit and/or prominent in all countries under investigation.

Not surprisingly claims for (native) majoritarian recognition are coupled with demands for restricting the recognitive claims of the Other; for example when postulating a ban on ritual slaughter of animals (FPÖ, Austria; PVV, the Netherlands), justifying the introduction of the veil ban (different actors in Austria) or excluding the possibility of according status to languages and cultures different from the autochthonous (MHP, Turkey).[48] Resistance to the recognition rights of others is particularly strong in cases in which the narrative of the Other is seen as threatening to the majoritarian identity, like in the Netherlands and Portugal, where anti-racism movements jeopardize the majoritarian self-image of openness, tolerance and racial innocence. Such controversies bring to the fore the issues of historical justice, where 'fair' and 'unfair' often revolve around the perceived violation of what is considered 'the truth.'

While the notion of *historical justice* is particularly strong in the resistance discourses, discussed in this report under the heading of *justice as freedom from domination,* within the *discourse of majoritarian rule* it acquires, similarly to recognition, an alternative interpretation. Here, historical justice requires not the verification and possibly overthrowing of the dominant narrative, but rather its affirmation. This rejection of doubt and insistence on one and only one possible interpretation of (historical) events exposes the majoritarian need for *narrative security* and could be seen as one of the possible building blocks of Giddensian 'ontological security' (cf. Giddens 1991: 91). Grievances against the falsification of majoritarian historical narrative are very clearly articulated in the

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[46] Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (2017) Österreicher verdienen Fairness. Freiheitliches Wahlprogramm zur Nationalratswahl 2017. Available at: http://diepresse.com/mediadb/fpoe2.pdf

[47] Devlet Bahçeli, 26 October 2015, Ankara Rally. Available at: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/dun-yedi-duvele-meydan-okuduk-/siyaset/detay/2137774/default.htm.

[48] It is important to note that the 'difference blind' positions of MHP and CHP fundamentally differ; while MHP bases is plea on the supremacy of Islam, CHP's plea in rooted in secularism historically fuelled by a strong sense of Islamist threat (Buğra and Ertan 2018).

Netherlands, where counter-narratives insisting on the colonial provenance of the clown-like figure of Black Pete are rejected as 'fake news' and seen as a ruthless 'orchestrated attack' to the primordial Dutch tradition, Dutch culture and Dutch identity. Also in Portugal, narratives challenging 'a long [Portuguese] tradition of contact with other cultures and peoples' and the vision of the Portuguese as 'used to tolerating difference, at least in terms of ethnic origin, race and religion' (Guerra 2017 quoted in Meneses et al. 2018) are not appreciated.

The dominant (to-be-protected) narrative is built on the vision of the unquestionable primacy of a dominant (autochthonous) culture, value system and way of life. For example, the Turkish MHP draws from a vision of 'the beautiful people of a beautiful country' convincingly captured by utterance: 'How happy is the one who calls himself a Turk!'[49] Pride in belonging to own nation is frequently immersed in the memory of the heroic past and the victorious struggles against external enemies:

> *In the past, we have challenged the powerful nations of the world and we defended Çanakkale. In the past, we resisted imperialism and launched the Great Offensive (final military operation of Turkish War of Independence). In the past, we stood up to captivity and we were born at the dawn of the independence. In the past, we said 'no' to rebellions and invasions and we founded the Republic. If necessary, we will do it again, we will succeed again.[50]*

In case of Hungary, the sense of pride is evoked (also) in relation to more recent history:

> *It is no accident that we have gathered here [to the 'Hero's' Square' in Budapest]. The spirit of Hero's' Square imparts strength and duty (…) Let it remind you that for the last twenty years we fought with muscle, pain, and sweat and we fought with honour. Let it remind you that one we finally succeeded in moving ahead, the old comrades always showed up, turned back the wheels of time and, with it, pushed our lives back into the past. Let's remember that this continued for twenty years. But let us also remember that we who are here today never gave up.[51]*

The conviction of own (moral) superiority often goes hand in hand with a sense of victimhood, especially strong in Hungary, where the apprehension of historical injustice of the Treaty of Trianon[52] is passed down from generation

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[49] Devlet Bahçeli, 26 October 2015, Ankara Rally. Available at: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/dun-yedi-duvele-meydan-okuduk-/siyaset/detay/2137774/default.htm; similar rhetoric is used by the rival AKP, who speaks of 'a beautiful devotion to our red flag' (Ahmet Davutoglu, 27 October 2015, Antalya Rally. Available at: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/basbakan-ahmet-davutoglu-antalya-da-antalya-yerelhaber-1035593/).

[50] Devlet Bahçeli, 26 October 2015, Ankara Rally. Available at: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/dun-yedi-duvele-meydan-okuduk-/siyaset/detay/2137774/default.htm.

[51] Orbán Viktor beszéde a Fidesz választási nagygyűlésén (2014, March 30). *Magyar Nemet.* Available at : https://mno.hu/belfold/orban-viktor-beszede-a-fidesz-valasztasi-nagygyulesen-1218640.

[52] The Treaty of Trianon of 1920 was signed by the Allied powers and Hungary in conclusion of World War I. As a result, Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory and, thus, two-thirds of its inhabitants (https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Trianon). For subsequent generations of Hungarians, Trianon is considered profoundly humiliating – perceived as the unjust dismantling of a great nation and partitioning of an ethnic community. Nationalistic discourse and ethno-culturalism in Hungary are primarily informed by this collective history (Zemandl 2018).

(footnote continued)

to generation, along with the denial of harms inflicted on others. In the UK, the Netherlands and Portugal racism or any other form of discrimination are marginalized, denied or silenced. In Portugal in particular, the persistence of the myth of lusotropicalism (Castelo 2011 referred to in Meneses et al. 2018)[53] contributes to the self-image of Portuguese society as welcoming and integrative, egalitarian and non-discriminating. Also in Hungary and Turkey the historically embedded claims of minorities to (restorative) justice are – within this discourse – downplayed/relativized or silenced/unrecognized. This is well illustrated in a speech by Orbán, in which he acknowledges the Hungarian 'crime of collaboration' but simultaneously shifts the blame onto Germany – 'the perpetrators of genocide':

> *The way I see it, we Hungarians have done everything we could do. We asked for forgiveness even though we know that the crime of collaboration with the perpetrators of genocide is unforgivable. We have given reparations even though we know that what took place is irreparable. At the same time, we will not recognize responsibility that does not apply to us. That is why we must state straightforwardly that without German occupation there would have been no deportation, no wagons and no hundreds of thousands of lives lost. Without this understanding it is difficult to imagine sincere coexistence built upon trust.*[54]

The (current) structurally disadvantaged position of minorities remains by and large unacknowledged.[55] In most cases minority groups, and especially the (offspring of) racialized migrants, are assumed to be the undiscussed beneficiaries of the 'migration deal' (or 'welfare deal'), which places them on the side of the debtors. As such they do not only need to play by the rules set by the majority (and thus adjust), but also to keep repaying their endless debt of gratitude by proving their (economic) usefulness and/or loyalty to the host society. Narratives that question the moral integrity, indeed superiority, of the (autochthonous) majority are condemned as unfair, manipulative and interpreted as instances of native misrecognition.

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[53] The term lusotropicalism was coined by Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre to describe the distinctive character of Portuguese colonialism. In Freyre's opinion, the Portuguese had shown a special adaptability to the tropics, not for political or economic interest, but as the result of an innate and creative empathy. Thus, in the Portuguese overseas territories colonialism operated mainly through miscegenation and interpenetration of cultures, generating affects and proximity (Meneses, Martins and Brito 2018).

[54] Orbán's response on 29 April 2014 to a letter of complaint from Hungarian Academy of Arts member Katalin Dávid regarding the memorial under construction in Budapest to the German occupation of Hungary in March 1944; see Orbán, V. (2014d, April 29). Mélyen tisztelt Dávid Katalin professzor asszony! *Origo.* Available at: http://www.origo.hu/attached/20140430davidk.pdf. Suppression of Hungarian blame is even more explicit in the rhetoric of far-right Jobbik; see for example: Derényi, D. (2015, June 5). Mitől óvja a Jobbik a magyar zsidó értelmiséget? HVG. Available at: http://hvg.hu/itthon/20150605_Mitol_ovja_a_Jobbik_a_magyar_zsido_ertelm & Nemzeti1 TV (2015, May 29); A holokauszttal, mint bunkósbottal verik a magyar emberek fejét. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3oaw_h19-Zs#t=479.

[55] Exceptional here might be Hungary, where the ruling party (Fidesz) boasts having created the 'opportunity [for the Roma minority] to take part in the Hungarian economy' and (thus) 'integrate into the majority society' (Orbán, V. 2014. Speech of the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán at the occasion of the visit to the National Roma Minority Self-Government - *Magyarország legnagyobb rejtett tartaléka a roma közösség.* October 10th, 2014). However, in this specific case the *discourse of majoritarian rule* might be actually merging with discourse of *book keeping*. Such sentiments towards Roma are absent from the rhetoric of Jobbik, which casts 'gypsies' as anti-social, irresponsible and inactive (Zemandl 2018).

(footnote continued)

The repression of the right of the Other to a counter-narrative might be also seen as an attempt to impinge on the opportunity of the Other to participate in democratic debate and thus exercise influence on the way society's basic norms, laws and regulations are being set, and interpreted as disregard for their representative claims to justice. Indeed, right to representation understood as power and/or real influence on the society's norms and values, is very much reserved within this discourse for the native (or implicitly autochthonous) majority. The reasons for this bounded representation differ. While in Turkey, the politically engaged minorities, Kurds especially, are seen as a realistic threat to the unity of the country, in other countries under investigation, politically engaged minorities are typically constructed as troublemaking rather than politically involved. For example, in the Netherlands, the construction of anti-Black Pete activists[56] as racist terrorists is used to legitimize the infringement of their civil freedoms – freedom of expression and demonstration – and, thus, to mute their claims to racial justice and calls for social change. In Austria, on the other hand, the ban on veil that impinges on the freedom of expression and the freedom of religion of the Muslim community is construed as liberating for Muslim women, which prioritizes the majoritarian narrative of gender equality over the minority's counter-narrative of self-determination. In both cases – the Dutch and the Austrian – the advocating and/or legitimizing of the infringement of civic freedoms of minority actors happens in the name of the rule of law, public safety and the well-being of the 'innocent' majority.

Such claims subtly parallel the Hungarian discourse of illiberalism, which, while not entirely rejecting the fundamental principles of liberalism, such as freedom, does postulate 'a different, special, national approach,' in which the liberal ideology is no longer the central element of state organization.[57] Orbán's rejection of liberalism is linked to the refutation of 'liberal' ideas of tolerance and political correctness, conviction of the moral and economic decline of liberal values, and a strong belief in the failure of liberal democracy to protect the weak, who are 'continuously […] trampled over.'[58] Although Orbán's rhetoric is already strongly anti-elitist, in the context analysed (2014-2016) it is still harsher in Turkey, where the discourse of illiberalism takes the form of a radically illiberal approach to democratic representation and the criminalization of political opponents as plotting against 'us' – the (sole) legitimate representatives of the people. Striking in those discourses is the idea that (true) democracy – is something that still has to happen, as aptly captured in the ruling AKP's (Turkey) talk about the nations' 'march of development or advance towards democracy.'[59] In both Turkey and Hungary, this post-liberal vision of democracy

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[56] The figure of Black Pete – a clownish character that features in the most popular national festivity of Saint Nicolaus – is seen by its opponents as embodiment of racism inherent to Dutch society (for more details see Appendix I).

[57] Orbán, V. (2014a, July 30). *Prime minister Viktor Orbán's speech at the 25th Bálványos summer free university and student camp*. Website of the Hungarian government. Available at: http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp.

[58] Orbán, V. (2014a, July 30). *Prime minister Viktor Orbán's speech at the 25th Bálványos summer free university and student camp*. Website of the Hungarian government. Available at: http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp.

[59] Davutoglu, A. (2015, May 6). Prime Minister Ahmet Davutogly's speech at Ağrı rally for 7 June 2015 elections. Available at: https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/basbakan-davutoglunun-istanbul-mitingi-konusmasinin-tam-metni/74831#1.

(footnote continued)

is reminiscent of a specific reading of Rousseauean idea of *general will*, which assumes the subordination of the individual to the will of the majority embodied in the ruling leader.

The plea for illiberalism is the strongest in Turkey and Hungary and – at least in our data – absent in the UK and Portugal. Particularly interesting, however, is the relative appeal of illiberalism in the Netherlands – a country whose creed is based on values of liberal democracy. Calls for the limiting of the freedom of expression for extremist preachers (cautiously) articulated not only by the (far) right parties but also those more at the centre of the political spectrum (such as CU in the Netherlands) may appear paradoxical, but at the same time testify to the growing 'mainstreaming' of illiberalism.

Illiberal claims are often paralleled by appeals for safety, and law and order that resonate with popular fear of extremist terror and – in Austria, Hungary and the Netherlands – the anti-Islamic imaginaries. 'Migrant-Islam-terrorist nexus' (Vidra 2017 quoted in Zemandl 2018) that discursively connects extremist terror with Islam and Islam with migration is evoked to frame the influx of refugees as 'significant security risk' that requires physical protection of national (and European) boarders and an immediate stop to 'illegal migration' construed as a source of 'chaos and disruption.'[60] The language of legalism and public safety is applied not only to refugees and irregular migrants, but also the settled minority populations, for example, when advocating 'tougher' law and order policies to address (minority) crime[61] and/or legitimating restrictions imposed on minority customs (such as wearing a veil or ritual slaughter of animals) construed as 'against the rules.'

All in all, within the *discourse of majoritarian rule* justice is about restoration and/or protection of a specific vision of a community and good life that is threatened, persuasively captured in Jobbik's emotional claim of 'taking back our homeland.' Even though the discourse is permeated by a strong sense of victimhood, claims for the compensation of harms, both those already experienced and well as those feared, are – with the exception of Hungary – difficult to disentangle. Calls for the exclusion of the Other could be more appropriately classified as

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[60] Zeit im Bild (2017) Kurz: 'Unkontrollierte Migration führt zu Chaos'. Austrian Broadcasting Service ORF. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/ZeitimBild/videos/10155592416971878/.
[61] This is reflected, for example, in a very strong anti-Gypsy rhetoric of Jobbik; see for example: A 60 lépés program (2014-es választási program) (2014). *Jobbik.hu.* Available at: https://www.jobbik.hu/programunk/60lepes;
Indul a Jobbik aláírásgyűjtése az ingyenes gettófelszámolásért (2014, June 16). *Jobbik.hu.* Available at: https://www.jobbik.hu/hireink/indul-jobbik-alairasgyujtese-az-ingyenes-gettofelszamolasert;
Nagy, J. & Neményi, M. (2014, December 11). Vona Gábor: A cigányozás és a zsidózás nem vezet sehová. *24.hu*. Avalable at: https://24.hu/belfold/2014/12/11/vona-gabor-a-ciganyozas-es-a-zsidozas-nem-vezet-sehova/.
Szigorúbban büntetné a választási csalást a Jobbik (2013, October 8). *Mandiner.* Available at: http://mandiner.hu/cikk/20131008_szigorubban_buntetne_a_valasztasi_csalast_a_jobbik.

(footnote continued)

preventive measures that would stop the further decomposition of the existing moral order. Hidden behind them is, however, a desire to restore the old – pre-multicultural – order imagined as free of 'parallel societies.'[62]

Boundary drawing

The imagined gulf between the (autochthonous) majority and the (migrant) minority is what most strongly differentiates the *discourse of majoritarian rule* from other discourses identified. Recognition and representation of minorities (ethnic, religious or cultural) are by and large rejected as a valid and acceptable concern. Migrants, associated with illegality, criminal behaviour, benefit scrounging as well as religious fundamentalism and terrorism (especially in Austria, Hungary and the Netherlands), are seen as incompatible with the native culture and as a threat to the native population in social, economic and symbolic terms. In Hungary, for example, refugees are depicted as violent, terrorists, harassers of women, and non-law abiding.[63] In Austria, children with migratory background are – due to their inadequate command of German language – seen as jeopardizing the learning success of Austrian children and foreign employees (both EU-citizens and TCNs) are presented as putting the native employee in a disadvantage (FPÖ).[64] The already settled 'migrant' population, including citizens with migrant background, is not necessarily less threatening, mainly due to their failed integration and unclear loyalties. In the Netherlands, the mass pro-Erdogan manifestations in the aftermath of the coup attempt in Turkey that gathered a few generations of Turkish-Dutch in Rotterdam provoked invocations against those who 'misuse our liberties to take away our liberties' (Wilders, PVV).[65]

Thus, while active participation of migrants and the (consecutive generations of) citizens with migrant background in the integration process is *in principle* considered a condition *sine qua non* of belonging, acculturation or even assimilation constitute no guarantee for being admitted into the community of values.[66] In fact, under the majoritarian rule, the non-belonging or – at best – *contingent tolerance* seems inherent in the condition of the Other. Indeed, as illustrated by a Dutch postulate (by PVV) to expel offenders with dual citizenship and/or to

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[62] Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (2017) Österreicher verdienen Fairness. Freiheitliches Wahlprogramm zur Nationalratswahl 2017. Available at: http://diepresse.com/mediadb/fpoe2.pdf.

[63] Orbán: ez nem lesz a te hazád, ez a mi hazánk (2015, July 3). *Népszava online.* Available at: http://nepszava.hu/cikk/1062348-orban-ez-nem-lesz-a-te-hazad-ez-a-mi-hazank; Orbán: Gazdasági bevándorlóknak nem adunk menedéket (2015, January 11). Available at: https://index.hu/belfold/2015/01/11/orban_gazdasagi_bevandorloknak_nem_adunk_menedeket/.

[64] Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (2017) Österreicher verdienen Fairness. Freiheitliches Wahlprogramm zur Nationalratswahl 2017. Available at: http://diepresse.com/mediadb/fpoe2.pdf.

[65] Gert Wilders (PVV) during the parliamentary debate 'Algemene Politieke Beschouwingen' (21 September 2016). *Handelingen TK 2016-2017,* 2-6. Available at: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/handelingen/TK/2016-2017/2/h-tk-20162017-2-6?resultIndex=6&sorttype=1&sortorder=4.

[66] As pointedly noted by Vidra (2017), 'Having only a few Muslims and having them far away, is the acceptable model for Hungary: 'Hungary appreciates its law abiding Muslim community (we like kebab shops and buying lamb for Easter) (…) While appreciating the Muslim community, Hungary does not want the number of Muslims to grow' (Vidra 2017:17 quoted in Zemandl 2018).

(footnote continued)

question the belonging of (hyphenated) citizens who seem disloyal to the majoritarian creed, formal citizenship does not necessarily protect the imagined Other from marginalization or even expulsion. This points to the existence of *liminal* categories of social belonging, whose inclusion and exclusion from the community of values can be context and group specific even if their legal status as citizen is formalized. Exemplary here is the Jobbik's construction of Roma in Hungary – criminalized and problematized, but at the same time construed as re-formable by 'a cadre of leadership for Gypsies in Hungary who consider Hungary their home and who endeavour for a relationship of brotherhood with Hungarianism.'[67] Such imaging allows for simultaneous othering of the Roma population as a whole and the elevation of 'a cadre of leadership' considered worthy of inclusion in the Hungarian family. Similarly ambivalent is the discursive construction of Hungarian Jews, who are sometimes referred to as 'compatriots', but on other occasions – via the notion of 'coexistence' – 'treated as and adjunctive component of the nation and not explicitly an integral part of it' (Zemandl 2018).

The questioning of the belonging of formal citizens on the basis of their ideological incompatibility is particularly persistent in Hungary and Turkey, where the identification of the ruling coalitions with the 'will of the nation' is the strongest and where the possibility of a change of the ruling parties is discursively constructed by those in power as a 'threat to the nation' (AKP in Turkey; Fidesz-KDNP in Hungary). The Other in those cases is the (liberal) 'elites' conceived as traitorous to the state/nation and alien to the cultural values of the majority.[68] This trope is particularly strong in Turkey, where the political rivals of the ruling AKP are presented as 'parallel gang of Gulenists'[69], 'gang of four' and 'axis of evil' whose aim is to prevent the party from fulfilling its historical mission. However, also in Hungary the 'the fallen left-wing' is accused of 'always [being] prepared to incite journalists, European Union institutions, banks, cartels and multi-national companies [...] [;] to write Tavares reports and to propagate lies about Hungary,'[70] whereas the Soros-founded civil society organizations are depicted as 'internal enemies' 'fulfilling the delirious dreams of the [undemocratic] leader' and working against the will of the Hungarian people.[71]

In the Hungarian case interesting as well is the explicit inclusion into the 'Hungarian nation' of the ethnic Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries, such as Romania, Serbia, Ukraine or Slovakia. Constructed by the ruling Fidesz-

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[67] Jobbik (2014) A 60 lépés program (2014-es választási program). Available at: https://www.jobbik.hu/programunk/60lepes.

[68] Interestingly, in Turkey the anti-elitisms of the ruling party (AKP) is linked to a particular interpretation of the history, focused on the injustices against the Sunni Muslim population by the elite in the 'regime of tutelage' held in power by the military and the civilian bureaucracy (Buğra and Ertan 2018).

[69] The Gulen network, organized around a spiritual leadership of the preacher Fetulhah Gulen, had been very influential in Turkish politics, especially under the AKP rule. However, the relations between the network and the government have eventually become very tense and finally turned into a mutual hostility. The Gulenists were accused of being a terrorist organization staging the unsuccessful coup attempt of July 15, 2016.

[70] Orbán's speech to supporters on 10th May 2014. Available at: https://theorangefiles.hu/christian-democratic-peoples-party/ [accessed on 31 August 2017]. Similar rhetoric is applied by Jobbik, which accuses political establishment (including Fidesz) of 'stealing, cheating and lying' – see: Vona, G. (2014). Kimondjuk. Megoldjuk: A Jobbik országgyűlési választási programja a nemzet felemelkedéséért. Available at: https://www.jobbik.hu/sites/default/files/cikkcsatolmany/kimondjukmegoldjuk2014_netre.pdf.

[71] Prime Minister's statement cited in Vidra (2017:18); Interview (H4.2.02) with a social scientist in Hungary.

(footnote continued)

KDNP as victims of history, involuntarily chopped away from the Hungarian people, these members of 'community of Hungarians' have been offered citizenship and – as dual citizens – a right to cast their votes by post. Such a possibility is, however, not offered to more recent émigrés from Hungary itself who have settled in Western Europe (Zemandl 2018). This seemingly administrative distinction results in structural but also symbolic exclusion of those who do not necessarily share the Conservative-Christian and nationalistic ideology of the ruling party – the official figures indicate that most of the émigrés tend to vote against the Fidesz-KDNP government.

In its totality, the discourse of *justice as majoritarian rule* seems conspicuously absent in the UK. While the calls to contain (certain types of) migration are wide-spread and interpretations of 'racism and discrimination as a kind of patriotism'[72] are marginally present, missing is the supremacy rhetoric that vanquishes the legitimacy of minority claims. This might be related to the non-national character of the UK – a state comprised of four nations and to the decades long struggles of BME activists often drawing on politics emerging out of anti-colonial resistance. It may also be related to the anti-European agenda that dominates the discourse of nationalistic parties, like UKIP.

Overall, however, the discourse of *justice as majoritarian rule* clearly shows the continued or – in the aftermath of crises that have been troubling Europe – renewed relevance of native based communities (the heartland communities) as the source of belonging. It also shows the (discursive) interconnectedness of the various facets of belonging – race and ethnicity, religion, common ancestry and cultural heritage as well as the territoriality. The non-autochthonous Other is constructed here as inerasably different (van der Haar and Yanow 2011); a source of contamination and/or threat (Yuval-Davis 2011) that cannot be wiped away by naturalization and formal citizenship. Their membership in the national community is at best 'contingent' – subjected to continual probation. Exposed to othering are also (domestic) cosmopolitans, whose rejection of the bounded nature of any narrowly defined community (Seubert and Gaus 2013; Duyvendak 2011) and acceptance, indeed promotion, of multiple and overlapping alliances, is seen as a threat to the (ontological) security of the national community.

The delineation of the community of value in terms of primordial ties of ethnicity, common ancestry and unique cultural heritage effectively denies representation to anyone deemed Other. Even if formally included in the political community, minority members – contingently tolerated – are denied to right to co-define the social order (which *per definitionem* is not theirs) or even to question it. Since their non-belonging is taken for granted, it is their attempts at claiming representation (especially via less formal routes, such as civil engagements, exercise of civil rights and civil disobedience) rather than non- or limited representation that are problematized as a source of (ontological) threat.

Justice as freedom from domination, oppression & neglect

The discourse of *justice as freedom from domination, oppression and neglect* encompasses several country and sometimes even issue specific resistance discourses. The level of institutionalization of such discourses depends on the country – it is strongest in the Netherlands and in the UK – the countries with the highest proportion of minority involvement in main-stream politics. In the UK, for example, the anti-racist discourse is quite mainstream, with Conservative party manifesto denouncing 'private landlords and businesses who deny people a service on the basis

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[72] Liberal Democrat Manifesto (2017: 69). Available at: https://www.libdems.org.uk/manifesto.

of ethnicity, religion or gender,' ethnic profiling in 'stop and search' police practices, the use of force against BAME prisoners and the ethnic pay gap. Similar claims are voiced in the Netherlands by minority party DENK, but also the mainstream left or centre-left parties, such as GroenLinks (Green Left). In Turkey, the issues of (historical) injustices against minority groups are raised by pro-Kurdish liberal-left HDP and the secular, centre-left CHP. Finally, in Hungary, political left (parties that were united under the Left Union in 2014) claims to stand in defence of the Jews, Roma, homosexuals and other (historically) victimized groups.

In all countries, but especially in Austria and Portugal, where no minority parties exist and where the representation of racial or ethnic minorities in the mainstream politics (e.g. as MPs and/or members of official governmental bodies) is rather marginal, the resistance discourses are created and perpetuated by minority organizations and/or protest movements (e.g. anti-Black Pete movement in the Netherlands). The parties, movements and civil society organizations which seek to represent (specific) minority groups often stress their inclusiveness and engagement on behalf of very different communities. While in many cases this is indeed the case (see Open Black Vote aligned with Open Disabled Vote in the UK), their rhetoric does not always match their actual involvement. For example, in the Netherlands, the activists involved in opposition against the racist practices symbolically encapsulated in the tradition of Black Pete claim to represent all people of colour,[73] ethnic minorities, Islamic communities,[74] Roma people,[75] refugees and all other (minority) groups 'who suffer similar issues of discrimination, racism and exclusion.'[76] Still, their explicit focus on the grievances of the members of the black community (rooted in the history of slavery), suggests it might be in fact the black community that is given priority as the object of representation.

As in other discourses, a clear notion of representation is often missing. Claims for minority (political) representation appear most directly verbalized in Turkey, where debates seem to revolve around a form of democracy – representative *versus* direct – that would best accommodate the needs and interest of ethnic, cultural and religious minorities, such as Kurds and Alevi (for details see discussion in the section '*The meaning of (minority) representation*).' Emphasized in this debate (CHP, HDP) is the need for (collective) self-determination understood as participation (direct or indirect) in decision making and the significance of institutional arrangements that would ensure the widespread participation in seeking consensus on divisive issues. Also in the Netherlands, the question of minority effective participation in decision making is raised by the newly emerged minority party DENK. In Portugal, where consecutive generations of Afro-descendants are denied citizenship and treated as immigrants,

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[73] New Urban Collective (2014). 'Waarom wij vreedzaam protesteren.' Available at: http://nucnet.nl/waarom-wij-vreedzaam-protesteerden-gouda-zwarte-piet-racisme-repressieve-tolerantie-en-ons-fundamentele-recht-op-vrijheid-van-meningsuiting.

[74] Action Group Zwarte Piet Niet (without date). Available at: http://www.zwartepietniet.nl/ [accessed on 16-01-2018].

[75] New Urban Collective (2014). 'Beyond Blackface Emancipation.' Available at: http://nucnet.nl/beyond-blackface-emancipation-struggle-black-pete-dutch-racism-afrophobia.

[76] New Urban Collective (2014). 'Beyond Blackface Emancipation.' Available at: http://nucnet.nl/beyond-blackface-emancipation-struggle-black-pete-dutch-racism-afrophobia.

(footnote continued)

that is, as 'someone that is here in the passing, who is incapable of creating a proper representation,'[77] representation is construed as related to formal status (citizenship) but also recognition as fully-fledged member of the society. Indeed, as continued by Abílio Neto: 'they are Portuguese, they don't know another reality (…). And, they must feel represented.'[78] This 'feeling represented' is in all national contexts we analysed articulated as 'being listened to', 'having one's needs and interests recognized' and/or being able to engage in struggle against discrimination, for example by exercise of civil rights and freedoms.

In most countries, most important, but also most obvious, with respect to representative justice, is the claim for voice. The lack of voice on the part of the minorities in question, or insufficient attention to the minority voices, especially in a country that boasts its democratic values, is perceived as gross injustice. While this grievance was present in all countries analysed, the urgency of the claim for voice, is most tragically illustrated in debates following the Grenfell fire (the UK), in which the authorities were repeatedly accused of having dismissed local concerns, in particular those voiced by residents of colour. This is best illustrated by Joe Delaney describing the mismatch between the needs of the residents and the actions of the authorities with respect to the regeneration of Grenfell Tower:

> *When it was decided that the building would be regenerated as opposed to demolished, the bulk of the money spent on that regeneration was spent on the exterior, which didn't do any of the residents any good whatsoever. The residents of the tower would have rather things like decent lifts and better quality facilities within the properties.*[79]

This brings to the fore the issue of accountability to the population one is supposed to (and/or claims to) represent. Central here seems an idea that authorities derive their legitimacy (predominantly) from their capacity and willingness to represent the interests of those under their authority. The role of accountability became very clear in the Grenfell case, when activists accused the authorities of a number of transgressions: absence in the aftermath of the fire coupled with attempts to take credit for the community responses to the tragedy,[80] and a potential cover-up.[81] Accountability was further stressed in the Mayor of London Sadiq Khan's public letter to the PM, in which he also emphasized the importance of including community members in the Public Inquiry:

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[77] Abilio Neto and Cristina Roldão statements during the debate in 'Pros and Cons' program with the theme '*Portugal, a racist country?*' RTP, 17 July 2017. Available at: https://www.rtp.pt/play/p3033/e298781/pros-e-contras; group interview PT4.2.03 with youngsters from Cova da Moura.

[78] Abílio Neto statement during the debate in 'Pros and Cons' program with the theme '*Portugal, a racist country?*' RTP, 17 July 2017. Available at: https://www.rtp.pt/play/p3033/e298781/pros-e-contras.

[79] Interview UK4.2.05 with Joe Delaney from Lancaster West Residents Association, the UK.

[80] LANCASTER WEST RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION (2017). *Lancaster West RA official statement in relation to Nicholas Holdgate resignation.* 22 June. London: Grenfell Community Response and Support.

[81] Interview UK4.2.O2 with Judy Bolton, an activist from Justice for Grenfell, the UK.

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It is (…) essential to ensure that families, survivors and civil society groups have a role in drawing up the Terms of Reference for the Public Inquiry and are consulted on where Inquiry hearings are held as any attempt to exclude them from the process risks further fuelling mistrust.[82]

Accountability has also proven important in Portugal, in the 'Cova da Moura Case' (2017), when 17 police officers were charged by the General Prosecutor with fabrication of documentation, slanderous denunciation, falsehood of testimony and torture against six young men arrested in 2015 when protesting against 'arbitrary and violent' arrest of one of them in Alfragide – a part of Amadora metropolitan area of Lisbon. In an official statement by the General Prosecutor the police were accused of a grave abuse of power, racism, torture and violation of duties.[83] The importance of accountability (and transparency) of authorities was also raised in case of the Black Pete (the Netherlands), when the Mayor of Rotterdam was requested to provide evidence that the violent police intervention against the peaceful demonstrators was indeed necessitated by public safety.[84]

In connection to representation, the issue of the misuse of power becomes particularly salient in debates surrounding policy decisions that implicitly or explicitly limit the minority groups' rights and civil freedoms. The grievances over the violation of civil liberties are most strongly articulated in the Netherlands, where authorities are accused, among other things, of unjustified and possibly unlawful restrictions of the protesters' right to demonstration,[85] unequal treatment of various groups of activists,[86] their repression through legal action, police non-neutrality, aggression and physical violence.[87]

Concerns about the state interference with individual freedom to self-expressions, freedom of religion, the right to private life and the right to self-determination were raised in Austria in response to the vail ban introduced in

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[82] KHAN, S. (2017). *Mayor's letter to the Prime Minister 20 June.* London: Mayor of London, London Assembly, para 8.

[83] '18 agentes da PSP acusados de tratamentos desumanos na Cova da Moura.' *Jornal de Notícias*, 11 July 2017. Available at: https://www.jn.pt/justica/interior/18-agentes-da-psp-acusados-de-tratamentos-desumanos-na-cova-da-moura-8627762.html; See also: *'Juíza recusa suspender 18 polícias da esquadra de Alfragide acusados de agredir jovens da Cova da Moura',* Público e Lusa, 28 September 2017. Available at: https://www.publico.pt/2017/09/28/sociedade/noticia/juiz-recusa-agravar-medidas-de-coaccao-para-18-policias-da-esquadra-de-alfragide-1787004.

[84] Rotterdam Municipality Council – debate on 17 November 2016, following the arrest of 200 anti-Black Pete protesters in Rotterdam. Available at: https://rotterdam.raadsinformatie.nl/vergadering/238628.

[85] Action Group Kick-Out Zwarte Piet KOZP (2016) 'KOZP veroodeeelt onrechtmatige massa arrestatie'. Available at: http://stopblackface.com/kozp-veroordeelt-onrechtmatige-massa-arrestatie-vreedzame-demonstranten-door-aboutaleb/ [accessed 16-01-2018]; New Urban Collective (2014) 'Pleidooi Inzake Hoger Beroep Sinterklaasintocht.' Available at: http://nucnet.nl/pleidooi-inzake-hoger-beroep-sinterklaasintocht-racisme-bouw-je-niet-af-racisme-schaf-je-af.

[86] Action Group Kick-Out Zwarte Piet KOZP (2017) 'Vreedzaam Protest Tegen Zwarte Piet Tegengehouden.' Available at: http://stopblackface.com/vreedzaam-protest-tegen-zwarte-piet-tegengehouden-op-weg-naar-dokkum/; New Urban Collective (2014) 'Waarom wij vreedzaam protesteren. Available at: http://nucnet.nl/waarom-wij-vreedzaam-protesteerden-gouda-zwarte-piet-racisme-repressieve-tolerantie-en-ons-fundamentele-recht-op-vrijheid-van-meningsuiting.

[87] Action Group Kick-Out Zwarte Piet KOZP (2016) 'KOZP veroordeelt onrechtmatige massa arrestatie. Available at: http://stopblackface.com/kozp-veroordeelt-onrechtmatige-massa-arrestatie-vreedzame-demonstranten-door-aboutaleb/.

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2017.[88] Paradoxical in both the case of Austria and the Netherlands was that the protest movements and/or minority actors – frequently 'othered' for their parochialism, non-assimilation and non-compatibility with democratic values of their host societies – use the rhetoric of civil rights and liberties, rule of law and democratic freedoms *to oppose* the *oppression* they experience from the (allegedly) democratic society and its institutions.

A particularly often articulated form of oppression is 'racism', especially this implicit, hidden in daily and institutional practices and almost uniformly ignored or even openly denied by (a big part of) mainstream politics. The official denial of racism is best summarized by Mamdou Ba, the leader of the Portuguese association SOS racism: '(…) obviously there is racism in Portugal and we all know it (…) the problem is that we strive to make the debate on racism a taboo.'[89] The examples of (hidden) racism provided by the resistance discourses are indeed numerous, from racist traditions (the Netherlands), to (implicitly) racist policies (vail ban in Austria), to dirty politics (the manipulative misrepresentation of Diane Abbot in the UK), to structural discrimination (all countries), to maltreatment of minority members by the police (Portugal, the Netherlands).

In Austria, for example, the veil ban is discursively linked to racism and the historical tradition of othering: 'this liberation of the Muslim woman (…) is also an old pattern of racist discourses, which we can observe for hundreds of years, and [it's] nothing new.'[90] In the UK, hostile attacks against Shadow Home Secretary Diane Abbot – a BAME – that included, among other things, a Facebook ad which was a mashup of Abbott's statements pierced together to make it sound as if she supported al-Qaida were denounced by Labour MPs and activists as 'driven by straightforward racism and misogyny'.[91] They were also referred to as 'dog-whistle politics'[92] – that is a way to mobilize racism implicitly but not explicitly in the same way that a dog whistle affects the behavior of dogs without being actually heard (Asthana and Steward 2017 quoted in Hartman et al. 2018).

Much more serious accusations of racism are raised in Portugal and, to a lesser extent, in the Netherlands. In relation to the Portuguese 'Cove da Moura Case', the six men detained by the police claimed to be the 'victims of tremendous physical and psychological violence by officials of an authority dominated by feelings of xenophobia,

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[88] IGGÖ (2017) Stellungnahme zum Anti-Gesichtsverhüllungsgesetz. Available at:
https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXV/SNME/SNME_09487/imfname_621450.pdf; see also: Dokustelle für Muslime (2017) Stellungnahme der Dokustelle zum Ministerialentwurf. Available at:
https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXV/SNME/SNME_09476/imfname_621394.pdf.
[89] Mamadou Ba statement during the debate in 'Pros and Cons' program with the theme '*Portugal, a racist country?'* RTP, 17 July 2017. Available at: https://www.rtp.pt/play/p3033/e298781/pros-e-contras.
[90] Interview A4.2.03 with an academic expert working on Islam in Austria; see also: Potz, et al. (2012) Muslime in Österreich: Geschichte – Lebenswelt – Religion. Grundlagen für den Dialog. Verlag Tyrolia; referred to in Tiefenbacher (2018).
[91] GUARDIAN, 14 June 2017, Abuse of Diane Abbot driven by racism and misogyny, says Umunna. Available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/14/abuse-of-diane-abbott-driven-by-racism-and-misogyny-says-umunna.
[92] NEW STATESMAN, 7 June 2017. All politicians expect criticism. But has the treatment of Diane Abbot crossed a line? Available at:
https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/june2017/2017/06/all-politicians-expect-criticism-has-treatment-diane-abbot-crossed-line.

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hate and racial discrimination.'[93] This claim was recognized by the General Prosecutor who agreed that the men were subjected to 'degrading and inhuman treatment.'[94] Also in the Netherlands, police interventions during anti-Black Pete demonstrations were criticized for their brutality ('He was hit with a fist in his face by an agent, while other cops kicked him'[95]), attempts at intimidation of the protesters 'by fanatic pro-Pete policemen who hit the activists with obvious pleasure and humiliated them at the police station,'[96] and subsequent repression, as in case of Kno'ledge Cesar whose clearance/permit to work as body guard was withdrawn following his violent arrest by the police and the (unjustified) accusation of the mistreatment of a police officer.[97]

With respect to the latter case attention is also drawn to the unequal treatment with respect to law. In the Netherlands, activists draw attention to differential treatment of black and white protesters illustrated, for example, by selective police intervention: 'While the Dutch People's Union, known for its extreme right-wing ideology (...) was demonstrating (...), hundreds of unlawfully arrested [anti-Black Pete] demonstrators were detained at the police station in Maassluis.'[98] Also in Portugal, existence of double standards is stressed and attributed to flawed law ('ineffective, inefficient and absolutely inoperative to (…) ensure effective protection of victims'[99]) as well as flawed practices that thrive in inherently racist institutions ('laws alone do not change anything at all, if those who apply them are also racist'[100]). In all cases, the infringement of the rights of the minority groups was seen as abuse of those who are already relatively powerless; injustice committed by political players to 'minorities that have by far fewer power resources than the dominant society does.'[101]

The grievances related to race-related discrimination brings to the fore the importance of recognitive claims to justice. In resistance discourses identified in our analysis, claims for recognition are often articulated either in conjunction with or in the form of grievances over non-recognition as fully-fledged members of the society, misrecognition, calls for respect as well as demands of restorative justice understood both as an outcome (i.e.

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[93] As stated in the accusation claim submitted against the police force.

[94] 'MP pede suspensão imediata dos 18 agentes da esquadra de Alfragide', *Diário de Notícias*, 7 September 2017.

[95] New Urban Collective (2014). 'Waarom wij vreedzaam protesteren.'Available at: http://nucnet.nl/waarom-wij-vreedzaam-protesteerden-gouda-zwarte-piet-racisme-repressieve-tolerantie-en-ons-fundamentele-recht-op-vrijheid-van-meningsuiting.

[96] Action Group Kick-Out Zwarte Piet KOZP (2016) 'KOZP veroodeeelt onrechtmatige massa arrestatie'. Available at:
 http://stopblackface.com/kozp-veroordeelt-onrechtmatige-massa-arrestatie-vreedzame-demonstranten-door-aboutaleb/.

[97] Action Group Kick-Out Zwarte Piet KOZP (2017) 'Veroordeling Jerry Afriyie na anti-Zwarte Piet protest.' Available at :
http://stopblackface.com/veroordeling-jerry-afriyie-na-anti-zwarte-piet-protest-gouda-toont-toenemende-repressie-aan/.

[98] Action Group Kick-Out Zwarte Piet KOZP (2016) 'KZP veroordeelt onrechtmatige massa arrestatie.' Available at:
http://stopblackface.com/kozp-veroordeelt-onrechtmatige-massa-arrestatie-vreedzame-demonstranten-door-aboutaleb/.

[99] Mamadou Ba's statement during the debate in 'Pros and Cons' program with the theme '*Portugal, a racist country?*' RTP, 17 July 2017. Available at: https://www.rtp.pt/play/p3033/e298781/pros-e-contras).

[100] Mamadou Ba's statement during the debate in 'Pros and Cons' program with the theme '*Portugal, a racist country?*' RTP, 17 July 2017. Available at: https://www.rtp.pt/play/p3033/e298781/pros-e-contras).

[101] Interviewee A4.2.03 with an academic expert working on Islam in Austria.

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restoring the harmful effects of past and present harms) and a process (i.e. a dialogue between the harmed minority and the harm-inflicting majority) (Gavrielides and Antinopoulou 2013).

Discursive absence is one of the most fundamental grievances voiced in the resistance discourses. In Portugal, where no official data on the actual share of various (historically present) minority groups, such as Afro-descendants or Roma, is available, this form of non-recognition appears most serious and – in the eyes of the populations themselves – indicative of their 'inferior' status (Meneses et al. 2018).[102] It is also seen as instrumental for the denial of representation. At the end, as noted by Albínio Neto, being recognized as having a 'numerical importance' is related to being recognized as having an 'impact' and thus 'being able to pressure politicians.'[103] Discursive absence may also take the form of the non-recognition of a minority's' historical role. In the UK, Operation Black Vote draws attention to such representations of historical developments of western liberal values which often exclude women and people of colour 'from the mainstream historical record' (Hartman et al. 2018).

Particularly relevant here is the frequency of grievances related to misrecognition (see also Anderson and Dupont 2018), evident, for example, in the ignoring or negating the minority need (and right) to nurture their chosen, also religious, identity; but also in in the (false) depiction of minority members as 'oversensitive', 'whining' and 'trapped in the past'[104] troublemakers (rather than citizens or residents entitled to voice their concern) and/or a source of threat. In the Portuguese 'Cova da Moura' case, the circumstances under which the six young men had been arrested were initially portrayed (in the media) as police being attacked by 'a neighbourhood black mob', which strengthened the image of the Afro-descendants as violent perpetrators. Also in the Netherlands, the anti-Black-Pete activists complain about being criminalized and represented as 'violent hooligans' and a threat to public safety.[105]

Misrecognition as false representation is also illustrated in the quote from an interview on the aftermath of the Grenfell fire:

> *the media, when they filmed people to talk about their experience, they just filmed Muslim women, often wearing the hijab. So, it looked like they had just come to this country (…). And people started talking 'you are never going to know who was in that tower' and 'I bet all of these people are subletting'. While in that tower, there were people who lived there for three or four generations. It was a very diverse community.*

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[102] Portugal is not the only among analyzed countries, where statistical data on (specific) minority groups is missing (the population of Afro-descendants is estimated at about half a million, compared to 10 million of the total population; the number of Roma is estimated at 37 thousand). Turkey does not collect official statistics about the share of Kurds (estimated at 20 per cent) and Alevi's (estimated at 15 per cent) in the population (Buğra and Ertan 2018); in Austria the data is outdated (Tiefenbacher 2018).

[103] Abilio Neto's statement during the debate in 'Pros and Cons' program with the theme '*Portugal, a racist country?*' RTP, 17 July 2017. Available at: https://www.rtp.pt/play/p3033/e298781/pros-e-contras).

[104] New Urban Collective (2014). 'Beyond Blackface Emancipation.' Available at: http://nucnet.nl/beyond-blackface-emancipation-struggle-black-pete-dutch-racism-afrophobia.

[105] New Urban Collective (2014). 'Waarom wij vreedzaam protesteren.' Available at: http://nucnet.nl/waarom-wij-vreedzaam-protesteerden-gouda-zwarte-piet-racisme-repressieve-tolerantie-en-ons-fundamentele-recht-op-vrijheid-van-meningsuiting.

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And the majority of people had their own businesses. We had people who were nurses, those who were doing the zero-hour jobs.[106]

The quote draws attention to the grievance of being othered and thus, symbolically, set outside the community of value.[107] Here the othering involves lumping together very diverse groups and individuals under a stereotypical homogenizing label. Yet the misrecognition goes further than that and takes the form of non-recognition of one's contribution. Activists in both the Netherlands, the UK and Hungary draw attention to the imagining of minority members as burden (to the welfare state) rather than working class and the obsession with their supposedly undocumented status:

They are working class people, the majority of them, so there is that stigma and discrimination applied to them as well. There is race discrimination. There is islamophobia, because it is a large number of Muslim people living in there.[108]

Such stigmatization allows ignoring the structural causes of their precariousness ('also the desire to avoid any kind of structural explanation. And that's where the obsession with the undocumented – there wasn't anything about their lives, or why they were undocumented, or what happened, or what other policies were affecting them'[109]) and leads – as in case of Grenfell Tower – to neglectful and sometimes contemptuous treatment by the authorities.

Important here is the recognition of the 'historically constructed relations of power,'[110] which connects with the acknowledgement of responsibility for the lot of certain groups and brings to the fore the issue of accepting (historical) blame. The demand to recognize the continued relevance of the historical injustice suffered by various minority groups is in fact at the core of their claims for justice. In Turkey, the memory of the Kurdish rebellions against attempts to establish administrative control over the Kurdish regions by the newly formed Republic *and* their military suppression remain important in shaping Kurdish political movements and their demands for collective self-determination. In Hungary, very strong is the resistance against the relativizing of the Hungarian collaboration in the Holocaust and the 'confusing of murderer and the victim', which dishonours 'all Jewish, Roma and gay victims of the Holocaust.'[111] In both Portugal and the Netherlands, the demands of the acknowledgment of

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[106] Interview UK4.2.O2 with Judy Bolton, an activist from Justice for Grenfell, the UK.

[107] The injustice of such representations is painfully reflected in the statement of Robert Sulek, the president of Hungary's Islamic Community in response to the government's anti-refugee campaign: 'I wish the government would think more carefully before starting campaigns like this (….).9 It's our wives who get spat on and have their veils ripped off in the street' (Zemandl 2018).

[108] Interview UK4.2.03 with Zita Holbourne - BMELawyers4Grenfell activist, the UK. Similar grievances are raised in Hungary, where the Regional Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees who started a billboard campaign aimed at 'highlighting refugees who have successfully integrated into Hungarian society' (Thorpe 2015 quoted in Zemandl 2018).

[109] Interview UK4.2.06 with Grenfell community activist, the UK.

[110] Cristina Roldão's statement during the debate in 'Pros and Cons' program with the theme '*Portugal, a racist country?*' RTP, 17 July 2017. Available at: https://www.rtp.pt/play/p3033/e298781/pros-e-contras).

[111] Controversial monument divides Hungarians, angers Jewish community (2014, July 24). *Euractiv.* Available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-europe/news/controversial-monument-divides-hungarians-angers-jewish-community/

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the persistence of the colonial yoke and claims for the decolonization of the collective imaginary are at the core of resistance discourses, thus bringing to the fore the questions of historical and restorative justice.

As in other discourses, claims for representative and recognitive justice often merge with redistributive concerns – embedded in claims for equality in participation in social life, access to political rights, non-discrimination in institutional settings, e.g. labour market, education, housing. The link between minority underrepresentation in the positions of power and institutional racism are broadly acknowledged. In both the UK and the Netherlands, where overt discrimination of minority communities, racism in particular, is not acceptable, activists draw attention to hidden racism and the intersections of race and class. The latter is particularly strongly discussed in the UK, where the migrant background of the residents of Grenfell Tower is brought in conjunction with their working-class status, for example by protest movement Justice by Any Means, which in its call for a protest march draws on dichotomies of raw/delicate, working class/wealthy, safety/profit, resident/homeowner or investor, and immigrant/citizen. Reference to class conflict and application of the 'working class' versus 'wealthy' dichotomy, is very strongly present in Corbyn's (Labour Party) reply to the PM's public apology for the immediate response to the fire, where he argues that 'from Hillsborough,[112] to the child sex abuse scandal, to Grenfell Tower the pattern is consistent, working class people's voices are ignored, their concerns dismissed, by those in power.'[113] In both Portugal and the Netherlands, institutional racism is evoked when discussing the unequal treatment before the law, school segregation and residential segregation: 'when we look at the metropolitan belt of Lisbon, if we take a photograph of the social reality, the marginalization, the ghettos are a reproduction of symbolic and physical violence and the one who are the most affected are the black and gypsy people.'[114] The structural roots of the inequalities are most forcefully emphasized in Portugal by Mamadou Ba:

> *Why does this happen? (…) is because they don't exist for the State. If the State existed for them in equal circumstances as for other citizens, they would not need to get together, to create bonds to overcome the problems and failures created by the absence of the State…when there is a need for agglutination of forces on the part of communities it is because the State is absent.*[115]

While the discourse of *justice as freedom from domination, oppression and neglect*, is used predominantly by resistance movements and civil society organizations 'on the ground', it might be also manipulatively applied by

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[112] The Hillsborough disaster was a human crush at Hillsborough football stadium in Sheffield, England on 15 April 1989 resulting in 96 deaths and 766 injuries. The main cause of the disaster was found to be poor police control, but this finding was only after sustained media and police cover-ups.

[113] CORBYN, J., 2017b. The pattern in clear from Grenfell, working class voices are ignored – Corbyn's speech in Parliament, https://labourlist.org/2017/06/the-pattern-is-clear-from-grenfell-working-class-voices-are-ignored-corbyns-speech-in-parliament/.

[114] Mamadou Ba's statement during the debate in 'Pros and Cons' program with the theme '*Portugal, a racist country?*' RTP, 17 July 2017. Available at: https://www.rtp.pt/play/p3033/e298781/pros-e-contras); similar view was also expressed by Fabian Figueiredo (interview P4.2.01).

[115] Mamadou Ba's statement during the debate in 'Pros and Cons' program with the theme '*Portugal, a racist country?*' RTP, 17 July 2017. Available at: https://www.rtp.pt/play/p3033/e298781/pros-e-contras.

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various mainstream actors. In Turkey, for example, the ruling AKP draws from it when bringing accusation against pro-Kurdish HDP as a party 'busy abusing our Kurdish citizens.'[116] Also in Austria, the language of equality and freedom from oppression is misused by conservative actors in debates surrounding the legislation the Federal Act on the Prohibition of Face Covering in Public; for example, when the far-right FPÖ postulates 'zero-tolerance against Islamisation and the oppression of women'[117] thus framing itself as a defender of the (allegedly) suppressed Muslim women.

Attempts at political manipulation do not go unnoticed and are condemned by the (representatives of) minority actors. As noted by one of the interviewees in Austria: 'In the ban on the full-face veil, it is not at all about the women. The ban on the full-face veil, it's about a signal to Austrians: we are doing something against it [the barbaric].'[118] Moreover, the discursive conjunction between threat 'through terrorism' and 'the refugees who had to flee from exactly that' is criticized for being 'absurd and cynical,'[119] taken up by political actors to further polarize the society for their own political ends and as counterproductive. In the end, the ban may actually push the women in question to further isolation and dependency rather than integration.

Such voices bring to the fore the notion of 'truth' (as opposed to fake news and fake debates) and the questions of who is allowed, and to what extent, to impose a specific narrative. Within this discourse, a dialogue – event though openly preached by the activists, is not necessarily obvious. As put by anti-Black Pete activists in the Netherlands, 'racism is not a matter of compromise.'[120]

All in all, a vision of good (just?) life that emerges from the grievances evoked within the discourse of *freedom from domination, oppression and neglect* is that of country where institutional racism, discrimination and structural inequality constitute a subject of national debate; a country offering equal opportunities, where 'all (…) have equal chances and the right to develop their talents in complete freedom';[121] a country governed by the rule of law and living up to standards of democracy, where the human rights and civic freedoms of the population groups are not violated by the authorities, but cherished and protected. It is a vision of an open, inclusive society, reconciled to multiculturalism and searching for a new tone of inter-societal dialogue; a society that is free from colonial thinking; free from racism and discrimination, and where no social groups are structurally stigmatized and ignored. But it is

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[116] Ahmet Davutoglu,17 May 2015, İstanbul Rally. Available at: https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/basbakan-davutoglunun-istanbul-mitingi-konusmasinin-tam-metni/74831#1.

[117] Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (2017) Null Toleranz gegen Islamismus und Unterdrückung von Frauen. FPÖ Website. Available at: https://www.fpoe.at/artikel/null-toleranz-gegen-islamismus-und-unterdrueckung-von-frauen/.

[118] Interview A4.2.01 with and expert and practitioner working with discrimination in Austria.

[119] Interview A4.2.05 with a practitioner and representative of Islamic faith community in Austria.

[120] New Urban Collective (2014). 'Pleidooi inzake hoger beroep Sinterklaasintocht. ' Available at: http://nucnet.nl/pleidooi-inzake-hoger-beroep-sinterklaasintocht-racisme-bouw-je-niet-af-racisme-schaf-je-af.

[121] New Urban Collective (2014). 'Waarom wij vreedzaam protesteren.' Available at: http://nucnet.nl/waarom-wij-vreedzaam-protesteerden-gouda-zwarte-piet-racisme-repressieve-tolerantie-en-ons-fundamentele-recht-op-vrijheid-van-meningsuiting.

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also a vision that needs to be (peacefully) fought for; realized in the process of (painful) confrontation – via awareness arising actions, campaigns, legal action, participation in peaceful protests and/or acts of civil disobedience. Interestingly, in Hungary, the discourse of justice as *freedom from domination, oppression and neglect* does not focus on the relative position of minorities via-à-vis the majority but rather on defending the voters of all facets of society from Orbán's regime of oligarchy and oppression. Minorities are here subsumed in the broad category of those who 'live in fear' of Orbán's regime.[122]

Boundary drawing

Within this discourse, the victimized (minority) groups or communities (and the activists/resistance movements representing them) are often juxtaposed to authorities presented as either heartless, or negligent, or biased and discriminatory. In relation to the Grenfell case (the UK), Labour MP David Lammy reflected on the fire protocol by saying: 'Good people do what they are told, and they stay in their flats', thereby creating a dichotomy between 'good people' and 'bad authorities' who 'ignored' and 'let them suffocate.'[123] This opposition is further strengthened in the contrasting of the absence of an organized and emphatic response of local and national government ('This was five days later, and there was still no response from officials'[124]) with the intense involvement of the community members ('I saw a man carrying mattresses tied to his back, he was carrying them to the church, because he knew people were sleeping on floors'[125]). The relationship between the Portuguese minorities (both Afro-descendants and Roma) and Portuguese authorities also seems antagonistic. In the Netherlands, (local) authorities are spoken of with utmost criticism, and often with contempt and/or ridicule.

The relationship between the victimized (minority) groups or communities (or activists that represent them) and the authorities is marked by distrust or even hostility (e.g. in the Netherlands or Hungary). In the Grenfell case (the UK), the mistrust could be attributed to the failure at acting on behalf of their own 'constituency', attempts at cover-up and exclusion of many community members from meaningful (core) participation in the Inquiry process.[126] At the same time, the concept of 'community' is blurred and contested even among the 'members'. This shows that, within the discourses of resistance, the definition of 'them' might be easier to arrive at than the definition of

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[122] Bajnai, G. (2013, February 14). Gordon Bajnai's speech at the governance assessment meeting of the Together 2014 Electoral Alliance. *Free Hungary.* Available at: http://www.freehungary.hu/index.php/comments/1775-gordon-bajnais-speech-at-the-governance-assessment-meeting-of-the-together-2014-electoral-alliance [retrieved 31 August 2017]; see also: MSZP. (2014). *Igazság, biztonság, szabadság, jólét: Az MSZP ajanlata Magyarországnak* [Translation: Truth, security, freedom, prosperity: MSZP's offer to Hungary]. Available at: https://mszp.hu/sites/default/files/ajanlat_magyarorszagnak_kongresszus20131019.pdf.

[123] OWEN, J., SICH, A. and STRAUSS, J., 21 June, 2017-last update, Grenfell Tower fire David Lammy: 'If burning in your home is not political, I don't know what is' – video [Homepage of Guardian], [Online]. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/video/2017/jun/21/david-lammy-if-burning-in-your-home-is-not-political-i-dont-know-what-is-video.

[124] Interview UK4.2.02 with Judy Bolton from Justice for Grenfell, the UK.

[125] Idem.

[126] Interview UK4.2.03 with Zita Holbourne – a BMELawyers4Grenfell activist, the UK.

(footnote continued)

'us'. One of the interviewees, describes the Grenfell communities as 'a range of communities, but they are all interconnected'[127].

Nevertheless, a boundary that is most apparent in this discourse, and most ambiguous, is the one between the victimized (minority members) and the majority. The existence of the boundary is particularly conspicuous in anti-racism discourses, when the injustice experienced by the minorities is attributed to the normative patterns inherent in the dominant culture. At the same time, it is also a boundary that is most vigorously denied (and/or subjected to symbolic dismantling) by the minorities themselves, for example when emphasizing their own belonging ('we are Dutch'[128]), rejection of second class citizenship, complaints against the instances of 'othering' and claims to a legitimate place in society. The ambiguity of the boundary is further strengthened by the minoritarian demands of restorative justice, where the restoration (or creation) of a societal bond is conditioned on the majority's eagerness to engage in critical self-reflection about (the present day legacy of) its colonial history as well as the 'overt or covert feelings of superiority', '[white]'innocence' and 'being good.'[129] This insistence on the acknowledgement of own racism by the majority, construed by activists as a condition *sine qua non* of effective societal dialogue, may in fact jeopardize the dialogue and lead to further polarization.

Of all the discourses identified in the analysis, it is the resistance discourses – grouped here under the heading of *justice as freedom from domination, oppression and neglect* – that most directly touch upon the issues of representation and problematize the non- or under-representation of minorities. Importantly, problematized is not only the limited representation of minorities on the issues of vital interest to themselves, but also on issues of relevance to the society as a whole. Construed in this discourse as fully-fledged although not always accepted members of the community of value, minorities are believed to have the right to co-define or even re-define the community's normative core. Again, it is their (claimed) belonging that defines their position within the community of value and delineates the scope of their representative rights.

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[127] Interview UK4.2.04 with Judith Blakeman from Labour Councillors of Kensington and Chelsea, the UK.
[128] New Urban Collective (2014). 'Waarom wij vreedzaam protesteren.' Available at: http://nucnet.nl/waarom-wij-vreedzaam-protesteerden-gouda-zwarte-piet-racisme-repressieve-tolerantie-en-ons-fundamentele-recht-op-vrijheid-van-meningsuiting .
[129] New Urban Collective (2014). 'Beyond Black Emancipation Struggle.' Available at: (http://nucnet.nl/beyond-blackface-emancipation-struggle-black-pete-dutch-racism-afrophobia.

Justice as care and responsibility (or harmony through care and responsibility)

While the discourse of *care and responsibility* has several strands, they all seem connected by a vision of a good society – harmonious, inclusive and committed to the values of social solidarity. The actors that draw from and contribute to this discourse range from (mainstream) political parties (e.g. Green Left in the Netherlands, Left Unity in Hungary, NEOS in Austria) to protest movements and civil society organisations which try to attach their sometimes very specific claims and grievances to a more universalist framework that could appeal to a broader public.

Embedded (implicitly) in the *human rights framework*, justice is seen as universal good eligible to all, simply by virtue of humanity. In the aftermath of Grenfell fire, *justice as care and responsibility* demonstrated itself in the collective response of 'the community [that] has come forward'[130] to assist the victims of the fire as well as in the 'amnesty' offered by the government to the victims-undocumented tenants, including undocumented migrants. While not without shortcomings (temporality, conditionality and selectivity), the amnesty arrangement offered some recognition of the personhood of undocumented immigrants, but also a promise of inclusion in the political community (Hartman et al. 2018). Similar sentiments are echoed in the rhetoric of the actors pleading on behalf of refugees, for example in Hungary, where 'grass root social mobilization of people helping refugees' is described as 'an immense manifestation of solidarity'[131] and/or in the Netherlands, where claims for the recognition of refugees' humanity permeate claims for redistribution and representation through formal admission to the community of values.[132]

Within a slightly less universal strand of this discourse, justice is constructed in the spirit of *egalitarianism and/or liberal citizenship*, although a notion of 'emphatic liberalism' coined by the Hungarian Liberal Party (MLP)[133] might also be applied. According to this vision, justice may and often does require equal footing that puts all on par with each other and assures everybody has a chance to be(come) a fully-fledged member of a community. This may involve the acknowledgement of cultural and political rights (see centre-left CHP in Turkey),[134] stopping (economic) exploitation and facilitating redistribution and political empowerment (strongly present in the discourse of Green LMP in Hungary and the migrant DENK in the Netherlands).

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[130] ISLAMIC RELIEF UK, 14 June 2017, 2017-last update, Grenfell Tower CNN Interview | Islamic Relief UK. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=265rc48-2Xc&ab_channel=IslamicReliefUK.

[131] Interview H4.2.02 with a social scientist in Hungary.

[132] GroenLinks Electoral Programme (2016) 'Tijd voor Verandering. Verkiezingspramma 2017-2021'. Available at: https://groenlinks.nl/sites/groenlinks.nl/files/Verkiezingsprogramma-digitaal-2017-2021.pdf.

[133] Liberálisok. (2014). *Az együttérző liberalizmus programja* [Translation: 'The program of empathetic liberalism']. Available at: http://liberalisok.hu/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Liberalisok-Programja.pdf.

[134] CHP, November 2015 Election Manifesto, p.43. Available at: https://www.chp.org.tr/Public/0/Folder//52608.pdf

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In the election program of NEOS (Austria) 'removing blocks and opening perspectives' appears then as a necessary pre-condition of 'a society, where each and every one has the chance to go forward out of their own power, and to build something for themselves.'[135] While liberal values of individual effort and contribution are not disregarded ('We believe in success through education and contribution'), attention is paid to the levelling of the playing field and policies that 'bring chances for everyone, rather than privileges for few.'[136] In the Netherlands and Hungary attention is paid, among other things, to the de-criminalization of the (minority) norm-violating behaviour and searching for the (structural) causes for the minority ('Gypsy' in Hungary) apparent non-belonging: exclusion and discrimination experienced through segregation (in neighbourhoods and schools), inequality on the labour market and before the law, vulnerability to poverty, sense of neglect. Common here is the language of 'social justice,' 'social rights,' 'social inclusion,' and 'equal opportunities in education,' but also 'standing up to discrimination and racism,' 're-establishment of self-worth,' 'support for cultural and identity promotion,'[137] and – last but not least – political empowerment, for example via (local) 'participatory democracy,'[138] 'where people not only talk and participate, but have their share in decision making.'[139]

(Implicitly) present in this discourse is also the recognition of the need, indeed the imperative, to warm-heartedly embrace diversity and stay dialogically open to the Other. This is best reflected in Turkey, where the recognition of difference and just representation for minority members are seen as a necessary requirement to attain the objective of repairing a damaged social fabric and maintaining social solidarity, for example by the pro-Kurdish HDP, which tries to reach the left-liberal segments of the non-Kurdish population by jointly emphasizing the questions of recognition and political representation in a transformative approach that would accommodate the existing socio-political order. Clearly 'justice' is construed here not, or not only, as something that is due to a particular group but

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[135] NEOS Österreich (2017) Leitantrag. Available at: http://diepresse.com/mediadb/pdf/Wahlmanifest_NEOS.pdf

[136] NEOS Österreich (2017) Leitantrag. Available at: http://diepresse.com/mediadb/pdf/Wahlmanifest_NEOS.pdf.

[137] Bajnai, G. (2013, February 14). Gordon Bajnai's speech at the governance assessment meeting of the Together 2014 Electoral Alliance. *Free Hungary.* Available at: http://www.freehungary.hu/index.php/comments/1775-gordon-bajnais-speech-at-the-governance-assessment-meeting-of-the-together-2014-electoral-alliance; Gyurcsany, F. (2013). *Európai Magyarországot! Demokráciát, biztonságot, fejlődést! A Demokratikus Koalíció programja 2013* [European Hungary! Democracy, security, development! the 2013 program of the Democratic Coalition]. Available at: http://dk365.hu/kongresszus/data/dk_program.pdf. Liberálisok. (2014). *Az együttérző liberalizmus programja* [The program of empathetic liberalism]. Available at: http://liberalisok.hu/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Liberalisok-Programja.pdf; MSZP (2014). *Igazság, biztonság, szabadság, jólét: Az MSZP ajanlata Magyarországnak* [Truth, security, freedom, prosperity: MSZP's offer to Hungary]. Available at: http://mszp.hu/page/download?ct=doc&cid=4&dt=atch&did=43.

[138] Green LMP party in Hungary: Lehet Más a Politika (2014). Az LMP választási programja 2014. Available at: https://lehetmas.hu/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/AZ-LMP-V%C3%81LASZT%C3%81SI-PROGRAMJA-2014-teljes1.pdf.

[139] KuzuKuzu/Öztürk (DENK) during the parliamentary debate 'Algemene Politieke Beschouwingen' (21 September 2016). *Handelingen TK 2016-2017,* 2-6. Available at: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/handelingen/TK/2016-2017/2/h-tk-20162017-2-6?resultIndex=6&sorttype=1&sortorder=4.

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(also) as an equilibrium that allows harmonious co-existence or even some form of abstracted unity, captured by Christian Democrats (CU) in the Netherlands: 'Against segregation. Against dichotomy. One country.'[140]

However, the meaning of 'harmonious coexistence' is not always very clear and/or coherent. While it implies mutual accommodation, it is often vague to what extent it stretches beyond the 'non-humiliation' or 'non-violation of dignity' of the Other, which would correspond to the Margalitian (1996) concept of *decency* that members of a given society owe to the non-members.[141] When combined with claims for redistribution, it does seem to presuppose the inclusion of the various others in a common system of reciprocity. At the same time, however, it is not clear to what extent, if at all, the various Others are treated as partners able to co-define and maybe even re-define the moral creed of the society. Especially when used in conjunction with other discourses, the 'unity in diversity' is likely to lose its air of unconditional inclusion. In fact, the success of 'colourful coexistence of cultures' is often framed as dependent on the good-will of the Other, especially the newcomers, and their willingness to fit in and 'abide by our rules.'[142] Thus, even though in its essence, the *discourse of care and responsibility* seems open to difference and dialogical, not everything is negotiable. The acceptance of the normative core, which comprises the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights and civil freedoms, is again – similarly to the *discourse of book keeping* – a condition *sine qua non* of belonging, albeit not always explicitly articulated.

The vagueness of 'harmonious coexistence' and the implicit presence of conditionality, makes the *discourse of care and responsibility* susceptible to hijacking. This seems to be the case in Turkey, where conservative nationalist MHP claim to embrace everyone yet only under the condition of the unity of ideals, aspirations and feelings:

> *Everyone has a place in our heart. We see every human being as a respectable child of the great Turkish nation. We are ready to embrace the secular, the religious, the Alevi, the Sunni, the easterner, the westerner, the northerner, the southerner, all of them. Nothing good can be obtained with separation. Conflict has no meaning, division no benefit. We unite all hearts, consciences and hopes in our Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). We bring together the ideals, excitement and ardour of all in the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).*[143]

Similar 'capture' of the rhetoric of care and responsibility towards the Other is detectable in the Hungarian's ruling government's (Fidesz) boasting its benevolence towards Roma population benefited (unprecedently) by the government's public work program, which allowed them to experience their 'first opportunity to take part in the

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[140] Segers (CU) during the parliamentary debate 'Algemene Politieke Beschouwingen' (21 September 2016). *Handelingen TK 2016-2017,* 2-3. Available at: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/handelingen/TK/2016-2017/2/h-tk-20162017-2-3?resultIndex=3&sorttype=1&sortorder=4.

[141] The spirit of Margalit's distinction between members and non-members and the rights attached to each status is aptly captured in the electoral program of Christian Union in the Netherlands: 'Human rights are universal, civil rights are bound to a country. You are a fellow human being, being a citizen is less obvious.' CU Verkiezingsprogramma 2017-2021 'Hoopvol realistisch.' Available at: https://www.christenunie.nl/verkiezingsprogramma.

[142] Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (2017) Plan A für Austria. Das Programm für Wohlstand, Sicherheit & gute Laune. Available at: http://diepresse.com/mediadb/Wahlprogr.pdf.

[143] Devlet Bahçeli, 19 May 2015, İstanbul Rally. Available at: https://www.haberler.com/mhp-nin-istanbul-mitingi-7368466-haberi/.

(footnote continued)

Hungarian economy,' gave them an 'opportunity to integrate into the majority society' and – last but not least – offered them (a sense of) empowerment when the 'Roma community could feel that they really take part in the design and direction of these programs.'[144] The manipulative dimension of such rhetoric is well reflected in one of the interviews:

> And the reason why they are saying that because of the Roma framework program, which was initiated during the Hungarian presidency of the EU and actually that was an important issue for them. So, that was one of the main issues on the agenda, of the EU presidency (. . .) I think it had a very important political aim (. . .) to show that Hungary [is]…trying to do something important politically for the Roma.[145]

The above example seems to indicate that the embeddedness of the *discourse of care and responsibility* in the (international) language of universal human rights might actually constitute its weakness rather than strength mainly due to its proneness to manipulation and vulnerability to abuse for political ends. However, as indicated by our Hungarian interviewees, at least equally problematic might be the alienation of the international (human rights) rhetoric from those whom it seeks to represent:

> Maybe they had some messages about poor people, the failure of this public work scheme, how the criminalization of homeless is not acceptable and maybe some progressive policy issues, but they were not…I think they very much relied on an international language about liberal rights and not really leftist messages.[146]

Moreover, by representing 'values and not groups',[147] the adherents of this discourse may unintentionally objectify rather than empower the vulnerable; at the end, the symbolic siding with the marginalized and the discriminated resonates best with the socially conscious, well-educated and urban elite. As noted by another Hungarian interviewee:

> they represent the values of equality and dignity (…) So in that sense they very clearly side symbolically with marginalized and discriminated groups. At the same time, their electorate is typically – they are most highly educated, urban groups, so they cannot say to represent [the marginalized] groups in the sense these groups will vote for them. The other way around. They represent in the sense the social elite [who has a] social conscious (…).[148]

Finally, the use of the human rights and cosmopolitan rhetoric of unbounded belonging may not be necessarily motivated by the consideration of justice for and well-being of minority groups, but rather the preoccupation with countries' belonging to a 'European community of value.' The Hungarian Left, for example, seems to be more

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[144] Orbán, V. (2014b, October 10). *Magyarország legnagyobb rejtett tartaléka a roma közösség*. Speech of the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán at the occasion of the visit to the National Roma Minority Self-Government; Kacsoh, D. (2017, November 29). A Fideszre szavaz a cigányság. *Magyar Hirlap.* Available at: http://magyarhirlap.hu/cikk/104365/A_Fideszre_szavaz_a_ciganysag.
[145] Interview H4.2.02 with a social scientist in Hungary.
[146] Interview H4.2.03 with a civil society activist in Hungary.
[147] Interview H4.2.01 with a political scientist in Hungary.
[148] Interview H4.2.01 with a political activist in Hungary.

(footnote continued)

preoccupied with preserving Hungary's image as a progressive, welcoming and inclusive European state than actually correcting any claimed grievances (Zemandl 2018).

Boundary drawing - (un)conditional belonging?

At the heart of this discourse, justice is boundless and unconditional, equally applicable to all 'fellow humans' (human dignity strand) or at least all those occupying a single (national) territory (egalitarianism and/or liberal citizenship stand). The latter is nicely reflected in the slogans of the Hungarian Left Unity: 'Unity, New Government, Opportunity for Everyone,' 'Together 2014', 'we pay equal attention to everyone'[149], 'everyone's Hungary,'[150] but also in the non-exclusionary we-rhetoric of Sadiq Khan (Mayor of London) that emphasized the commonalities between the various others in the aftermath of the London Bridge attack. In his narratives, Khan aimed to establish unity among 'innocent' people regardless of migration, BAME or visiting status by setting out a juxtaposition between 'these coward terrorists' and 'innocent Londoners and visitors'. While his use of the term 'visitors' alluded to the many tourists in the city, it also discursively added to his inclusion of non-British people, combined with his status as the first BAME mayor of London, and the public imaginary of the diverse 'city of Londoners':

> *We stand together tonight to honour the memories of the innocent lives lost and people injured in the barbaric attack in our city on Saturday night. London stands in defiance against this cowardly attack on our city, our people, our values and our way of life.*[151]

Crucial in this we-rhetoric is openness to multiple identities. In one of his speeches, Khan declares himself 'a proud and patriotic British Muslim,' thus powerfully emphasizing that allegiance to Britain is not in contradiction with Muslim identity.[152] The embracing of difference as enriching rather than threatening might be indicative of a cosmopolitan opening with its plea for the accommodation of difference and extending the scope of justice beyond a (narrowly) defined community (see, for example, Benhabib 2004). On the other hand, as already noted, the inclusion is not always unbounded or unconditional. A closer scrutiny of the Left Unity electoral programs (Hungary) reveals that the 'everybody' of the electoral slogans, might in fact be limited to the 'default' community member: children, students/youth, women, workers and the middle classes, small businesses, pensioners, families, the 'vulnerable,' [153] where 'vulnerable' include all those who are wronged by the previous/current political establishment. Indeed, as shown by Green LMP party (Hungary), claiming to support the rights of national and ethnic minorities, does not necessarily go hand in hand with affording them space in the electoral program. The ambiguity and conditionality of belonging affects the implicit vision of representative justice for minority groups: why in principle 'eligible,' specific groups, and especially those who are not (yet) formally and/or symbolically

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[149] MSZP (2014). *Igazság, biztonság, szabadság, jólét: Az MSZP ajanlata Magyarországnak* [Translation: Truth, security, freedom, prosperity: MSZP's offer to Hungary]. Available at: mszp.hu/page/download?ct=doc&cid=4&dt=atch&did=43.

[150] Gyurcsany, F. (2013). *Európai Magyarországot! Demokráciát, biztonságot, fejlődést! A Demokratikus Koalíció programja 2013* [Translation: 'European Hungary! Democracy, security, development! the 2013 program of the Democratic Coalition']. Available at: http://dk365.hu/kongresszus/data/dk_program.pdf.

[151] Sadiq Khan's official statement in response to London Bridge attack, 2017. Available at: https://www.standard.co.uk/news/london/london-bridge-terror-attack-mayor-sadiq-khan-condemns-deliberate-and-cowardly-attack-on-innocent-a3556376.html.

[152] Sadiq Khan speech after London Bridge attack. 2017. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/london-bridge-attack-2017-sadiq-khan_uk_593591a7e4b013c48169dfb1.

[153] MSZP (2014) A kormányváltók nyolc ígérete, nyolc pontja (2014, March 8). *Kapcsolat.hu*. Available at: http://kapcsolat.hu/cikkek/kormanyvaltok-nyolc-igerete-nyolc-pontja.

included in the community of value may find themselves at the mercy of the sympathetic (sections of the) majority, offered neither tools nor routes to pursue claims that might not be fully compatible with the majoritarian creed. On the other hand, despite (or because of) its 'toothlessness', the *discourse of care and responsibility* appears to offer an *agora* – a place where the various claims can be debated, or at least presented, without an immediate threat of sanction or expulsion.

National discourses vs. EU normative framework

Reconstructed for the purpose of this report on the basis of number of carefully selected documents, the European normative framework of (representative) justice[154] appeals to the vision of an inclusive, pluralistic, cohesive, stable and peaceful society, 'where individuals maintain their own identities while respecting each other's difference.'[155] It is built upon shared European values of democracy, and the primacy of human dignity, tolerance, and respect for diversity. It appeals to ideals of mutual respect, understanding and recognition, open dialogue and solidarity, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, social justice and the special needs of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, non-discrimination, social inclusion and integration, active participation and co-operation. Since diversity is seen 'as an integral part and a major asset of European societies for centuries', the contribution of minorities to the 'richness and diversity of Europe' is taken for granted.[156] The question then is not whether or not to protect minorities, or whom exactly to protect, but rather 'what' is required to manage diversity most effectively.'[157]

According to the documents analysed, creating conditions for effective participation of minorities in public affairs – considered a condition *sine qua non* of societal cohesion and stability and 'the development of a truly democratic society'[158] – shall involve not only active prevention of any forms of discrimination and/or creation of policy niches in which minority issues might be (inadvertently) compartmentalized, but also, or predominantly, the implementation of measures that lead to active involvement of minorities in the mainstream social, cultural and public life and, implicitly, promote viewing and treating minorities as an integral part of the mainstream society.

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[154] Conventions, reports and resolutions issued by the Council of Europe (CoE) and reports and resolutions issued by the European Parliament (EP). For a list of documents analysed see Appendix II.

[155] Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (2016) *2.4 Action Plan on Building Inclusive Societies (2016-2019)*. CM Documents CM(2016)25. Council of Europe: Strasbourg.

[156] REPORT on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union in 2015 (2016/2009(INI)) Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Rapporteur: József Nagy; Council of Europe (1995) *Framework Convention For The Protection Of National Minorities and Explanatory Report*. H (95)10. Council of Europe: Strasbourg; see also Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (2008) *Commentary on the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and public affairs*. ACFC/31DOC(2008)001. Council of Europe: Strasbourg; Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (2016) *2.4 Action Plan on Building Inclusive Societies (2016-2019)*. CM Documents CM(2016)25. Council of Europe: Strasbourg.

[157] Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (2016) 'Part VI Minority rights with a broad scope of application,' in: Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities *The thematic commentary No 4 The scope of application of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities*. ACFC/56DOC(2016)001. Council of Europe: Strasbourg.

[158] Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (2008) *Commentary on the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and public affairs*. ACFC/31DOC(2008)001. Council of Europe: Strasbourg; see also Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (2016) 'Part VI Minority rights with a broad scope of application,' in: Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities *The thematic commentary No 4 The scope of application of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities*. ACFC/56DOC(2016)001. Council of Europe: Strasbourg.

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While a clear definition of representation is missing, understood in the spirit of ETHOS as power/real opportunity to participate in democratic debate and exercise influence on the way society's basic norms, laws and regulations are being set, representation is the very substance of the European discourse. In the Council of Europe (CoE) documents under investigation, participation in the public sphere is construed as entailing various forms of (political) representation, such as presence in elected bodies, involvement in consultancy and decision-making mechanisms, presence in the executive, judiciary and law-enforcement agencies, and – last but not least – effective influence on the shape of public debate via various media and presence in media-related bodies (supervisory boards, independent regulatory bodies, public service broadcast committees and auditors' councils). It is also clearly entangled with the civil rights and freedoms, and especially the freedom of expression and the freedom to associate and to form an assembly. Finally, intertwined in a complex and multi-layered manner with other dimensions of justice, representative justice is frequently caught in the language of equality (incl. judicial, procedural, redistribution equality), rights (human rights but also social, economic and civil rights) and recognition (e.g. when touching upon the issues of identity and self-determination).

Understood in redistributive terms, equality is demanded, for example, with respect to minorities' 'equal access to economic sectors and social services', presence of 'equal opportunities' and minorities' 'participation in the delivery of benefits and outcomes.'[159] The importance of recognitive justice is reflected in frequent references, especially in CoE documents, to issues of free self-identification as well as issues of specific 'needs' of various minority groups and their right to, and the (public) support for, the protection, preservation and development of their culture and identity,[160] as expressed/embodied in their religion, language, tradition and cultural heritage. Similar arguments resonate in European Parliament (EP) 2014 resolution, which recognizes the dissimilarity of the needs of various minority groups and calls for public policies that would not only protect minority persons and groups but also foster 'their appropriate development.'[161] The resolution draws attention to situations when the non-realization of *redistributive claims to justice*, e.g. in case of homeless persons and/or the poorest and most deprived sections of the population is coupled with recognitive *injustice*, for example, when those more in need are criminalized by existing laws and policies.

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[159] Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (2008) *Commentary on the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and public affairs*. ACFC/31DOC(2008)001. Council of Europe: Strasbourg.

[160] Ibid.; see also: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2015) *Resolution 2076 on Freedom of religion and living together in a democratic society*. Council of Europe: Strasbourg.

[161] P7_TA(2014)0173 Fundamental rights in the European Union (2012) - European Parliament resolution of 27 February 2014 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union (2012) (2013/2078(INI)).

(footnote continued)

Important in the context of recognitive justice are calls for the facilitation of the visibility of (national) minorities and the creation of conditions that would allow to 'have their voice heard'[162] not only on issues of particular relevance to them but also on those of relevance to the society as a whole. Crucial here is the understanding of minority identities as non-exclusive and the necessity to allow (national) minorities 'to both preserve their identities' and to become 'an integral part of society.'[163] In the context of the latter, the assertion that 'establishing a set of specific rights for persons belonging to national minorities' is vital to enable full participation and equality in society 'while being protected from assimilation.'[164] Essential as well is the assertion that any imposed categorization on the basis of predetermined characteristics, including those considered emblematic for identity (such as 'language, religion, culture, ethnic background, specific traditions or visible features'[165]) may constitute a violation of the minority right to identity. In a similar vein, underscored is the importance of freedom of thought, conscience and religion, which includes freedom to express religious affiliations as well as freedom to refrain from any such expression and freedom to change religion or belief.[166] In case of Roma communities, of utmost relevance is also freedom of movement, i.e. 'the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member State.'[167]

All in all, the need to protect minorities and respect their claims to justice is repeatedly legitimated by reference to the EU's founding principles and the core of European values. At the same time, the protection of minority groups is seen to serve society as a whole, and as such seems to acquire an instrumental dimension. The effective participation of (national) minorities, for example in consultation mechanisms and advisory bodies, is seen as 'essential' not only to ensure that the needs and interests of specific minority groups are taken into account, but also, or predominantly, to promote trust among minority communities, to enhance 'discussion and dialogue

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[162] Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (2008) *Commentary on the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and public affairs*. ACFC/31DOC(2008)001. Council of Europe: Strasbourg.

[163] Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (2016) 'Part VI Minority rights with a broad scope of application,' in: Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities *The thematic commentary No 4 The scope of application of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities*. ACFC/56DOC(2016)001. Council of Europe: Strasbourg.

[164] Ibid.; see also: Council of Europe (1995) *Framework Convention For The Protection Of National Minorities and Explanatory Report*. H (95)10. Council of Europe: Strasbourg.

[165] Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (2016) 'Part VI Minority rights with a broad scope of application,' in: Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities *The thematic commentary No 4 The scope of application of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities*. ACFC/56DOC(2016)001. Council of Europe: Strasbourg.

[166] REPORT on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union in 2015 (2016/2009(INI)) Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Rapporteur: József Nagy.

[167] Ibid.

(footnote continued)

between different groups in society', and thus to 'promote societal cohesion and stability.'[168] In a similar vein, integration and cohesion are also likely to benefit from breaking with the problematization of difference. Abandoning the either-or logic embedded in the in- and out- discourse and the binary stereotypes (e.g. the stereotypes of migrants as either victims or criminals) and ensuring that 'the space for diversity and for being 'different' is socially protected and affirmed' is seen as route towards greater integration and cohesion of European societies.

How 'European' are the national discourses?

When comparing the national discourses to the European discourse of justice, and especially justice as representation, it is difficult to ignore, the anti-European sentiments permeating the nativist discourses as well as the resolutely pro-European rhetoric of their political opponents. Whether or not and how specific discourses accommodate the European rhetoric with respect to minority claims to justice relates very much to their construction of Europe as a community of value vs. Europe as institutional yoke and/or source of oppression. The polarisation of discourses seems particularly strong in countries most affected by the populist and authoritarian zeitgeist – Hungary, Austria and Turkey, where the far-right and (more) conservative parties position themselves in opposition to European ('We are (…) members of these alliances and not hostages (…). In the European Union elections we must tell Brussels loudly and resolutely: respect the Hungarians!'[169]), and where their political opponents see Europe as both a normative anchorage and a salvation from authoritarian oppression and oligarchy (Left Unity and LMP parties in Hungary).

The anti-European and especially illiberal rhetoric, *par excellence* exclusive, bitterly contests the spirit of inclusiveness, openness and tolerance invoked in the European normative framework. In fact, the most conservative, and especially the far-right populist discourses, include vivid illustrations of intolerance, discrimination and a variety of race, ethnicity and religion related 'phobias' (e.g. via Afrophobia, anti-Gypsyism, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia and anti-migrant sentiment) diagnosed in a number of EP and CoE documents[170] as one of the biggest challenges of contemporary Europe.

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[168] Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (2008) *Commentary on the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and public affairs*. ACFC/31DOC(2008)001. Council of Europe: Strasbourg; see also Council of Europe (1992) *Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level*. ETS 144. Council of Europe: Strasbourg.

[169] Orbán's speech to supporters on May 10, 2014. Available at: https://theorangefiles.hu/christian-democratic-peoples-party/.

[170] P7_TA(2014)0173 Fundamental rights in the European Union (2012) - European Parliament resolution of 27 February 2014 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union (2012) (2013/2078(INI)); P8_TA(2015)0286 Situation of fundamental rights in the EU (2013-2014) - European Parliament resolution of 8 September 2015 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union (2013-

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Striking in those discourses is not, or not only, the very sharp distinction between the 'majority' and the 'minority' or the 'insiders' and the 'outsiders,' but also the fluidity of the boundary drawing and the existence of liminal categories whose (always) contingent inclusion in the community of value is conditioned upon their perceived loyalty and contribution to the well-being of the (autochthonous) majority.

The European vision of a society that is open to diversity and able to embrace and respect each other's difference is particularly strongly contested in the discourses of illiberalism, where the problematization of otherness and the permeating either-or-logic feeds calls for the exclusion of the other and the bounding of their (political, civil) freedoms. Illustrative here is the hostile attitude to hyphenated citizens, whose involvement in the politics of their country of origin is – contrary to the spirit and recommendations of the *Resolution 2043 on Democratic participation for migrant diasporas*[171] – interpreted as a sign of disloyalty towards the host country and condemned (the Netherlands), or even prosecuted (dual citizenship is not allowed in Austria). Such forcing of the minority members to choose their loyalties clearly contradicts CoE approach to multiple and non-exclusive (self-)identifications and may contribute to the injustices of misrecognition.

Yet, a discursive gap exists not only between the European discourse and the *discourse of majoritarian rule*. Also other discourses identified in our analysis, while declaratively faithful to the common European creed, do not necessarily attempt to move beyond those by and large 'preambular' declarations. Thus, even though the dominant European vision of common good – as open, tolerant and inclusive – is traceable all non-nativist discourses, i.e. in the discourse of *justice as book keeping*, discourse of *justice as care and responsibility* and – especially – discourse of *justice as freedom from domination*, specific measures through which the inclusion of minorities and their 'on par' participation in the society could take place are discussed rather sparingly.

In general, despite its apparent affinity with the European normative framework, mostly via its quasi-cosmopolitan vision of community, the discourse of *justice as care and responsibility* falls short of the European ideal. Its ambiguity about the manner of inclusion and co-existence of the various others – especially those who may not share the normative creed on which the vision of common good is built and/or the implicit conditionality related to it, make it an easy prey to political hijacking and thus rob it of credibility. Of all the discourses, this one seems to be the most vision 'under construction' – a project that will reveal itself in the process of realization. This 'foot-looseness' might be related to the fact that of all the discourses this one is least bound to a specific repertoire of grievances; as if the walk into the future could take place without looking back.[172]

The repeatedly stressed in CoE and EP documents minority need for adequate representation and effective participation in the public and political sphere justified by their vulnerability and proneness to discrimination, (historically and/or structurally) disadvantaged position and the need for redress (particularly relevant with respect to national minorities and indigenous peoples) is actually best reflected in the resistance discourses grouped in this report under the heading of *justice as freedom from domination, oppression and neglect*. Demands of justice voiced here correspond most clearly to the specific recommendations of the European Parliament and Council of Europe,

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2014) (2014/2254(INI)); see also: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2015) *Resolution 2076 on Freedom of religion and living together in a democratic society*. Council of Europe: Strasbourg.

[171] Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2015) *Resolution 2043 on Democratic participation for migrant diasporas*. Council of Europe: Strasbourg.

[172] Although in the Netherlands, political actors that draw from this discourse – Groen Links (Green Left) and CU (Christian Union), postulate increased attention to the colonial past and the grievances that originate from the times of slavery.

for example, in Portugal – in the claims for formal inclusion in the political community via citizenship rights; in the Netherlands – in the demands of non-discrimination in the exercise of civil liberties (the Black Pete case); and in the UK – in the complaints against lack of *effective* representation in elective bodies (the Grenfell fire case). At the same time, this is also a discourse that most explicitly links the specific justice claims to the normative framework of human rights, human dignity, enriching cooperation, societal dialogue and multicultural opening – issues high on the European agenda.

Among the discourses identified, particularly paradoxical appears the logic of the discourse of *justice as book keeping*, where the invocations to the European creed and open embracing of European ideals of mutual respect, understanding and recognition, solidarity, social justice, non-discrimination, social inclusion and integration are combined with strong ideas about the conditionality of belonging and near complete neglect of structural diagnoses as to the causes of the minority (sense of) non-belonging.

Largely missing in the national discourses is also the intersectional approach to vulnerable populations recommended in the European discourse. While the CoE and EP documents analysed highlight the between and the within-group differentiation, e.g. with respect to gender or age, that may call for different policy approaches, such nuancing is by and large missing even in the most minority-friendly discourses (the Grenfell fire case, where the intersection of class and race is mentioned, being an exception).[173] Even the resistance discourses, while highlighting the 'multiple and simultaneous' vulnerabilities of different groups, fail to acknowledge that similar vulnerabilities and forms of discrimination might require different 'tailor-made' measures that would accommodate the heterogeneity of needs and interests, e.g. with respect to allocation of resources. While this omission might be interpreted as an attempt to form a unified 'we' that could successfully resist domination, it might deepen the non-recognition of smaller or less vocal minorities (or minorities-within-minorities) and/or lead to new intra-minority forms of domination.

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[173] P8_TA(2015)0286 Situation of fundamental rights in the EU (2013-2014) - European Parliament resolution of 8 September 2015 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union (2013-2014) (2014/2254(INI)); P7_TA(2014)0173 Fundamental rights in the European Union (2012) - European Parliament resolution of 27 February 2014 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union (2012) (2013/2078(INI)).

Discussion and conclusion

The primary goal of this study is to uncover how justice, as an abstract and complex concept and phenomenon, is conceptualized – explicitly and implicitly – in political *discourse* in six countries participating in the ETHOS project – Austria, Hungary, the Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey and the United Kingdom – characterized by divergent historical heritage, differences in political, social policy and legal traditions as well as dissimilarities in their current socio-economic contexts. We focused on the imaging of justice, representative justice in particular, for minority groups: ethnic, religious, regional and migrant, as groups most vulnerable to 'othering' and exclusion from the (national) systems of reciprocity.

In the course of the analysis we asked not only whether or not, or to what extent, various groups are on an equal footing in terms of (political) representation, but especially *how* their (potential) political participation in democratic debate is constructed in the political discourse. Other research questions related to the imagined scope of justice, or the discursively constructed boundaries of justice, and the relation between the political discourses uncovered in the participant countries and the normative justice framework promoted on the sub-national European level.

The three conceptions of justice – redistribution, representation and recognition – constituted the starting point of our investigation. Our analysis confirmed their intertwined nature envisaged at the outset of the project. As observed by Buğra (2018), questions about representative justice are indeed never independent from questions about redistribution and – especially – recognition. Political debates that address the issues of just social and institutional order unavoidably relate to questions of (representational) justice, either explicitly or implicitly, when presenting a specific vision of this order, outlining the conditions under which the principles governing it are determined, and delimiting the role of various groups in defining and accepting those conditions.

However, our analysis shows that the various claims are not only interconnected and/or necessarily mutually reinforcing, but that, at least in some contexts, attention/focus on the realization of some claims, for example, claims of recognition, may 'crowd out' other claims, such as claims of representation. Among cases analysed, this is best illustrated by the Turkish case, where the recognition of ethnic, religious or cultural difference seems to go together with the tendencies to dismiss the problem of political representation (Buğra and Ertan 2018), and the Hungarian case, where recognition of Roma as national minority is accompanied by attempts to politically instrumentalise and manipulate organized representation (Zemandl 2018).

Our analysis also showed the difficulty of defining the boundaries of representative justice. The ability to question, contest and act upon the legal and institutional structure of society (e.g. via exercise of civil rights) does not necessarily, or at least not straightforwardly, translate into the ability to co- or re-define the common good defined around shared values. Moreover, our findings illustrate how the very idea of common good as defined around shared values may become problematic from the justice point of view. Since such a definition inherently involves the overlooking of differences between the diverse notions of good life, the recognition of some always comes at the cost of misrecognition or non-recognition of others. In our analysis this is best reflected in the discourse of *justice as the majoritarian rule* and the various resistance discourses grouped under the discourse of *justice as freedom from oppression, discrimination and neglect*, which – when contrasted – provide an apt illustration of the (assumed) trade-off between the majority vs. minority recognition (and, as consequence, the right to representation). In a paradoxical way a parallel tension is also detectable in the most unbounded of the discourses

uncovered – the discourse of *justice as care and responsibility*, where the attempt to (discursively) accommodate the various visions of good life through seemingly unconditional inclusion of the numerous others fails to draw a comprehensive yet coherent vision of common good.

The four meta discourses identified in our analysis could be construed as falling along two distinctive axes – one related to the definition of *whose* moral reasoning and well-being is prioritized (majority vs minority) and the other pertaining to the delineation of *how* a specific vision of justice and imagined common good is to be realized (through dialogical reconciliation vs struggle) (see Figure 2).

well-being majority

Justice as book keeping	**Justice as majoritarian rule**

Through reconciliation ——————————————————— *Through struggle*

Justice as responsibility	**Justice as freedom from oppression**

well-being minority

Figure 2 The four discourses of justice along the axes of focus (*whose* well-being is prioritized) and process (*how* achieved).

Within the discourse of *justice as book keeping* the common good defined as a sort of equilibrium whose meaning and shape is determined by the majoritarian values and way of life is to be achieved through 'conflict resolution' i.e. seeking ways to accommodate the minority claims without compromising the position of the (autochthonous) majority. Search for conflict avoidance is also present in the discourse of *justice as responsibility and care*, within which common are claims for accommodation of both the majoritarian claims and the claims by minority groups. Problematic within this discourse of unbounded belonging is its implicit assumption about the common adherence to liberal values and respect for individual freedom, which is bound to exclude those to whom the values of liberal freedoms are less dear. Demand of respect for minority claims of representation, recognition and redistribution are at the heart of the resistance discourses grouped under the heading of *justice as freedom from oppression, discrimination and neglect.* Minority and majority claims to justice (and/or right to co-define the common good) are here antagonized and their realisation for one side always happens at some form of cost for the other.

Although the popularity of various discourses among political actors does seem to be related to their (self-)positioning on the political scene – with the *justice as majoritarian rule* discourse more popular among (far-) right wing and conservative actors, *justice as book keeping* drawn from predominantly by the broad spectrum of centrist

actors and *justice as care and responsibility* and the various resistance discourses grouped under the *justice as freedom from oppression*, *discrimination and neglect* most popular on the left side of the political spectrum – most of the actors use the various discourses rather eclectically, drawing simultaneously from two or three of (sometimes seemingly) contradictory frames. For example, appeal to nationalistic sentiments is not necessarily bounded to (far-) right and conservative parties, but applied as well by more centrist or even left-wing actors (e.g. Green LMP party in Hungary). Moreover, the choice of a specific discourse might be in some cases related to a specific (minority) group and/or the specific (discursive) circumstances, such as the imagined audience. The Turkish AKP, for example, combines dialogical openness to and recognition of Kurdish and Alevi minorities with anti-Semitic sentiment and hostility towards political opponents as aliens to 'our culture' (Buğra and Ertan 2018). In all countries, some political actors engage in the manipulative use of certain discursive elements to contest their dominant image (e.g. as xenophobic) and/or to demonstrate their openness and readiness to accommodate various groups, and thus to appeal to a broader public.

The eclectic use of the discourses by various political actors, makes the distinctions between them less sharp. For example, the discourse of *justice as book keeping*, when used by (far-)right and/or (ultra) conservative political actors, could be seen as folding into the discourse of *justice as majoritarian rule* – it does follow a similar logic in terms of delineations of 'belonging.' What differentiates the two discourses is the sharpness of the us-them division (with the boundary being more permeable in case of the *book keeping* discourse), declared openness to diversity and willingness to accommodate minority claims (again, greater in the *discourse of book keeping*), vision of common good (more ambiguous in case of the *discourse of book keeping*) and – last but not least – the very vision of what constitutes justice (some form of equilibrium in *book keeping* vs. dominance in *majoritarian rule*). Differences are also discernible in the rhetorical devices used alluding either to reconciliation (the *discourse of book keeping*) or struggle (the *discourse of majoritarian rule*) as a manner to achieve justice.

One of the most interesting insights of our study is the interplay between temporality as well as history in shaping ideas about justice, and in particular, ideas about minority claims to justice. Historical memory is absolutely crucial to understand the salience of certain threats. For example, the memory of the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire gives an aura of reality to nationalist fears of the dismembering of the country. Also, in many cases minority claims to recognition and/or representation can be understood only through the lens of history or rather, a specific *memory of history*. Indeed, as shown also in our analysis, certain historical theme's or episodes are selectively remembered and interpreted differently by different actors on the political scene thus reflecting differences in (political) outlook. This selectiveness and, effectively, social construction of historical memory contrasts sharply with the claim for 'truth' and the notion of justice as narrative security that allows for the protection and celebration of a specific vision of the 'truth' that lays the foundation for collective identity. 'History' evolves from our analysis not only as an important *context* of contemporary political debates but also as one of the *battlefields* of (recognitive) justice.

Related to historical memory are the claims of restorative justice, understood both as an outcome and a process. Crucial here is the idea present in a variety of resistance discourses that admitting responsibility for harm, such as racial discrimination, inflicted upon minorities is a condition *sine qua non* of true reconciliation and the mending of broken social liaison. Such minority claims conflict with majoritarian claim of narrative security that constitutes an important component of ontological security, understood following Giddens as 'confidence (…) in the continuity of [one's] self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments' (Giddens 1991: 91).

Other justice related issues that have not been explored in the current study yet which constitute an important element of national discourses include: the contentious nature of gender justice (relevant, for example, in Hungary) and the continued relevance of class. The latter issue became particularly clear in the analysis of discourses surrounding the Grenfell Tower fire and the Portuguese debates about structural exclusion of Afro-descendants and Roma. Recognizing the problems of claiming class as a purely cultural identity, Grenfell debates illustrate how class/shared living spaces can serve to build commonalities between different minority groups and between minority groups and the majority (white working class); inability to build such commonalities due to (residential) segregation was debated in Portugal. The Grenfell debates also showed how class is recognized as limiting access to representational mechanisms (see also Anderson and Dupont 2018). Indirectly, the relevance of class for representative justice could be also traced in the electoral campaigning targeting the 'ordinary hardworking families' and anti-elitisms spreading beyond strictly-populist discourses (as reflected, for example, the anti-elite rhetoric of the Conservative party in the UK).

The various discourses identified in this analysis tap into alternative ontologies of social world build on different visions of the individual (freedom), community, democracy and the role of the state. Implicitly the tensions between them reflect the fundamental tension between the liberal and communitarian vision of common good, where the former emphasizes the autonomy of the individual and the importance of rights to individual liberty among citizens of equal status, and the latter accentuates the social nature of the self and the normative value of community (that shapes the individual and his/her choices). On the other hand, however, considering the centrality of 'a' community in all discourses uncovered in our analysis and differences between the visions of 'community' inherent in different discourses, the discourses identified might be also seen as echoing different versions of communitarianism; from *liberal communitarianism* that defends the rights of individual while emphasizing the importance of social solidarity, responsibility and respect for other value systems (implicit in the discourse of *justice as care and responsibility* and the various resistance discourses); through *republican communitarianism* that respects individual autonomy yet recognizes the importance of the societies' normative creed and the rule of law that protects individual rights (tacitly present in the discourse of *justice as book keeping* that seeks equilibrium among various social groups yet recognizes the dominance of the majoritarian tradition as the source of community's normative core); to *nostalgic communitarianism* that prioritizes traditional bonds rooted in the shared morally significant history (echoed in the discourse of *justice as majoritarian rule*).[174]

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[174] The distinction between the different types of communitarianism is based on the interpretation offered by Szahaj (2000).

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Appendices I – Background information on the discursive events analysed per country

Appendix I: Austria

Event 1: Austrian national election on 15th October 2017

1.1.   Background

On 15th October 2017 an early parliamentary election was held in Austria. The two opposition parties, the far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Greens (die Grünen) together submitted a proposal for a new parliamentary election, which was approved by the grand coalition Social Democrats (SPÖ) and People's Party (ÖVP) in May 2017. Since 1955, with an exceptional period of six years from 2000 to 2006, the ÖVP and SPÖ have been in coalition. The two coalition parties do not only reflect a ruling coalition, but work as a corporatist apparatus with joint stable control over public and business services, known as the '*Proporz'*. However, this 'duopoly' has been challenged in the recent years due to the rise of the right-wing FPÖ with its anti-immigrant, protectionist rhetoric, and smaller parties like the Greens – from whose fraction the current President Alexander van der Bellen comes – as well as the liberal NEOS. In addition to these structural developments, the recent changes within the parties themselves and changing leadership structures may have contributed to a significant restructuring of the Austrian political system taking place. With the ongoing influence of the FPÖ, both major parties can be said to have moved to the right on the political spectrum, towards authoritarianism, welfare chauvinism and a reinstatement of law and order.

In general the political discourse has become strongly reactionary, with topics like migration flows, welfare provisions, national identity and security dominating the discourses in light of external factors like the 'refugee crisis'. While nationally recognized ethnic minorities are not part of any public discussion, a new minority has been constructed that dominates political debates: Muslims. This heterogenous group faces immense scrutiny from the institutional side and is enabled a claim to justice, in various spheres, only through civil society or individual voices.

1.2.   Election parties

Amidst a climate of new political dynamics, chaotic internal party affairs, and new leadership, the premature parliamentary elections in Austria took place on 15 October 2017. Altogether, 16 parties ran for election.

The official political alignment of the main contending parties, i.e. those who before the election were assessed to exceed the 4% margin for entering parliament, was summarised by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies as follows:[175]

- **List Sebastian Kurz – The New People's Party (ÖVP):** previously the Austrian People's Party; centre-right; conservative, free-market; hardening stance on immigration, cap benefits for foreigners; pro-EU.

- **Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ):** centre-left; social democracy, increased public spending; more open to immigration and keeping asylum laws as they are; pro-EU.

- **Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ):** far-right; populism; economic liberalism but support for welfare state; anti-immigration; Eurosceptic; pro-Russia.

- **The Greens (Grüne):** centre-left; environmentalism; socially liberal; pro-EU.

- **The New Austria and Liberal Forum (NEOS)**: centre; liberalism, lower taxes; socially liberal; pro-EU.

- **Peter Pilz' List (PILZ):** left-wing; social justice, increased public spending, redistribution; socially liberal; critical of migration/asylum policy.

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[175] https://www.csis.org/programs/european-election-watch/austria

1.3. Selection of documents

The same range of documents was identified for all major parties as shedding light on the current political discourse:

- party manifestos of all major parties, all available online

- official election campaign material (particularly campaign posters)

- television interviews given at the Austrian National Broadcasting Service (ORF) in the framework of pre-election TV confrontations and interviews.

Event 2: Federal Act on the Prohibition of Face Covering in Public (Anti-Face-Covering Act – AGesVG), entered into force on 1st October 2017

2.1. Background

Before the national election 2017, the then-ruling coalition in Austria, made up of the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the conservative People's Party (ÖVP introduced a new law on integration ('*Integrationsgesetz*'), in the wake of their new governmental action plan of January 2017. The new legislative package runs under the guiding principle of 'integration through performance' and sets out the compliance with fundamental values of legal and social order migrants. In the context of the new package on integration, which comprises several amended laws, there exists a new measure to prohibit full-face veiling, i.e. the concealing of someone's face by means of clothing or other objects, which would render the person unrecognisable. The integration package as a whole with this particular Act is representative of the current political climate in Austria, and showcases varying discourses from institutional and civil society side on claims to justice by a constructed minority. Similar discussions on nationally recognised ethnic minorities are not present in the current political discourse.

The Act in question is termed Federal Act on the Prohibition of Face Covering in Public (*Anti-Face-Covering Act – AGesVG*). This provision is valid in all public spaces and public buildings as of October 2017, and a breach is punishable by a fine of up to 150 Euros. The only exceptions to this new prohibition are explicit entitlements laid out by federal or provincial law, or artistic, cultural or traditional contexts such as events, sports, and health or professional practices. Situated in the context of the integration law, the full-face veil ban applies particularly to wearers of the Burqa and the Niqab – the veils that cover the whole face, or leave only the eyes open. The legislation specifies 'we believe in an open society that is also based on open communication. Full-body veils in public space stand against that and will therefore be prohibited' and 'those who are not prepared to accept Enlightenment values will have to leave our country and society'.

As the law makes exceptions for cultural or other reasons for veiling the face, it can be understood as targeting a religious minority and endowing it with particular rights and obligations – in this case clearly obligations. In Austria, around 150 women are estimated to be directly affected by the banning of full-face veils. There exists a clear narrative claiming to speak in the interest of all Austrians, which often excludes religious and ethnic minorities, as exemplified by the wider context of the legislation and the political context.

2.2. Data selected for analysis

Following documents were screened and analysed to shed light on the Federal Act on the Prohibition of Face Covering in Public (*Anti-Face-Covering Act – AGesVG*):

- Legal text of the Federal Act on the Prohibition of Face Covering in Public (*Anti-Face-Covering Act – AGesVG*)

- The New Integration Act, within which the Federal Act is situated

- Clarifications on the New Integration Act

- Information pamphlet by the Ministry of the Interior (BMI)

- Statements, proposed amendments and comments by private actors and non-institutional actors (primarily NGOs) on the Integration Act

For the purpose of this analysis, six one-hour interviews were conducted with various individuals who have a direct relation with the subject of justice in the context of the ban on full-face veils. One of them was a public official, one an academic expert, and one a legal representative. Three interview partners were members of non-governmental organisations and/or activists, and/or therein in representative positions. Out of six interview partners, four are Muslim. Three interviewees are female, and three are male.

Appendix I: Hungary

EVENT 1: General elections in Hungary (national, European, local/minority)

1.1.   Background – the general context of the elections

Hungary is a parliamentary republic with a unicameral National Assembly (which elects the executive prime minister by a majority. Since the 2010 elections, Fidesz and its junior coalition partner, KDNP, enjoyed a supermajority in the National Assembly. In the words of Győri (2014), the 2014 election year comprised 'three elections, one winner,' as 'Fidesz [-KDNP] returned with another landslide victory' at all three levels (p. 9). The turnout was considered relatively low—around 60%--and was '9% lower than the three elections won by the left (1994, 2002, 2006)' (p. 9). Fidesz-KDNP garnered 133 seats out of 199, while Left Unity followed in second with 38 seats, radical Jobbik followed in third with 23 seats, and green LMP with 5 seats.

Parliamentary election results of 6 April 2014

	Fidesz-KDNP		Left Unity (MSZP-DK-E14-PM-MLP)		Jobbik		LMP	
	2014	Change since 2010	2014	Change since 2010	2014	Change since 2010	2014	Change since 2010
Share of popular vote	44.87	-7.88	25.57	+5.87	20.22	+3.85	5.34	
Share of seats	66,8	-1,3	19,1	+3,8	11.6	-0,6	2.5	
Number of seats (2014 only)	133		38		23		5	

Source: Győri (2014) - *Hungarian politics in 2014* (Friedrich Ebert Foundation and Policy Solutions)

With its two-thirds majority, the Fidesz-KDNP governing coalition was able to advance a major legislative overhaul (broad overview in following section). This included passing fundamental changes to the electoral law and system prior to the 2014 election season:

'The laws retained the mixed proportional-majoritarian nature of the previous system, but reduced the parliament to 199 members from 386 and increased the share of single-member districts, leaving 106 individually elected members and 93 party-list seats. Parties must receive at least 5 percent of the national vote to win any of the latter. The laws sparked strong resistance from the opposition for their apparent gerrymandering of the new constituencies, a shorter period for collecting the signatures required for candidacy, and changes in the allocation of excess and lost votes that favour the dominant party (…). As a consequence of the changes, the new Hungarian system is less proportionate but simpler than the old one. The staffing of the National Electoral Commission with people loyal to the incumbent government has also been a problem for the past decade and remained a concern in 2014. The laws granted the vote for the first time to ethnic Hungarians in neighbouring countries who have accepted Hungary's offer of citizenship. After the adoption of the Elections Procedures Law, human rights groups voiced concerns that it discriminates against out-of-country voters with residence in Hungary. While newly registered citizens without residence were allowed to vote via mail, the few hundred thousand Hungarians working abroad had to vote in person at the country's consulates' (Kovács 2015: 272-75).

In its assessment of the 2014 elections, the observer mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) concluded that the elections were efficient, offered diverse choice, but that Fidesz-KDNP 'enjoyed an undue advantage because of restrictive campaign regulations, biased media coverage and campaign activities that blurred the separation between political party and the State' (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2014; H4.2.01). As a result, Freedom House downgraded Hungary's electoral process rating from 2.25 to 2.75 (Kovács 2015: 269).

1.2.   Selection parties

- **Fidesz-KDNP** - Conservative, Christian-nationalist coalition, displaying paternalism vis-à-vis Roma and Jewish minorities (language of coexistence), increasingly anti-immigrant.

- **Jobbik** party – radical nationalist party, displaying paternalism and criminalization vis-à-vis Roma and Jewish minorities.

- **Left Unity** - loose coalition of left-wing and liberal parties, including **MSZP**/Hungarian Socialist Party,[176] **DK**/Democratic Coalition,[177] **E14** Together – party for a change in era,[178] **PM**/Dialogue for Hungary[179]— (**E14-PM** formed an earlier alliance) — and **MLP**/ Hungarian Liberal Party,[180][181] displaying a discourse of solidarity and inclusion also in the frame of defending European and democratic Hungary.

- **LMP** party – green, anti-globalist party, claiming to support rights of national and ethnic minorities.

1.3.   Selection documents

Sources for Event I include the participating parties' published campaign programs, speeches and press statements by party leaders, electoral campaign slogans, and campaign logos and banners. It should be noted that the governing Conservative-Christian coalition (Fidesz-KDNP) claimed that it did not need to publish an electoral program because its current agenda would be 'continued.' We choose to limit our analysis to the campaign programs, salient (and highly publicized) speeches and press statements, and visual symbols because in our assessment these artefacts were among the key vectors of communication and feature the core idea constructions and language perpetuated by the discourses and frames.

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[176] MSZP was the democratic successor to the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (MSZMP)—the ruling Marxist–Leninist party from 1956 to 1989—and entered the first democratically elected National Assembly in 1990.

[177] DK is a social liberal party founded in 2011 by Ference Gyurcsány, former prime minister (under MSZP) from 2004 to 2009.

[178] E14 is a social liberal party founded in 2012 by Gordon Bajnai, former prime minister (under MSZP) from 2009 to 2010 and born out of liberal political movements and civil society organizations.

[179] PM formed in 2013 from eight former LMP (green party) members who splintered from the party.

[180] MLP is effectively a revival of the SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Democrats), which was in alliance with MSZP from 1994 until 2008. It received less than 1% of the vote in 2010 and was subsequently dissolved.

EVENT 2: Debates around the migrant-refugee crisis of 2015-16

2.1. Background

In the winter of 2015, responding to the Charlie Hebdo terroristic attacks in Paris, Viktor Orbán positioned himself emphatically against immigration. By the summer of 2015, Hungary was overwhelmed with 100,000s of migrants and refugees from mostly Middle Eastern and African countries passing through the Balkan route. By 2016, a border fence had been constructed across the border with Serbia, and Hungary largely remained a transit country. Despite that Hungary is not a destination country, the crisis came to monopolize political discourse for the next three years and is now the hallmark of the current 2018 election campaign.

We chose to analyse this second event in connection with the first because we believe that – following on the first event – it illustrates the evolving and stronger demarcations and polarization in political justice discourses. We show that the frames of claimed political representation were divided along the partisan bifurcation of conservative right and liberal left. That is, the conservative and radical right monopolized the claim that their political parties were protecting and preserving Hungary for Hungarians (Europe for white Europeans), while left representations focused on solidarity against hatred discourse and defending European and democratic Hungary.

2.2. Data selected for analysis

For Event II, we chose to analyse press statements made by party politicians, the language of the 'national consultation,' quota referendum, and billboard campaigns because—as in the former case—in our assessment these artefacts were among the key vectors of communication and feature the core elements of various discourses and frames. We also deemed these sources as manageable chunks of data given the time constraints and extensive scope of study. The timeframe of the analysis is from January 2015 to October 2016 (quota referendum).

We also corroborated our analysis with perspectives from four expert interviews: two social scientists specializing in Hungary's party system and political narratives, as well as a politician who participated in the 2014 elections and a civil society activist with extensive first-hand knowledge about the discursive contexts covered here (HU4.2.01, HU4.2.02, HU4.2.03, HU4.2.04).

Appendix I: Netherlands

EVENT 1: Dutch Parliamentary election, 15th March 2017

1.1.   Background – the general context of the elections

General elections, held on 15 March 2017, took place after the cabinet Rutte-II, a coalition of the liberal party (VVD) and the labour party (PvdA), completed their full four-year term. The election was again won by the Liberal Party (VVD),[182] contradicting opinion polls that forecasted the victory of the populist Party for Freedom (PVV). An important event that contributed to the shift of voters from the right-wing PVV to the centre-right VVD was the diplomatic row with Turkey, just four days prior to the elections, which arose when the Dutch cabinet decided to withdrew the landing rights of a Turkish ministers[183] and expelled another one[184] out of concern that their campaign for the Turkish constitutional referendum would disrupt public order.[185] In 2016, at the outset of the electoral campaign, Turkish internal politics also caused major unrest in the Netherlands, when Dutch citizens with Turkish background protested against the coup d'état attempt in Turkey. The demonstrations triggered nationwide debates about Dutch identity and the loyalty of citizens with migrant background. Other widely debated electoral themes included migration and asylum, and healthcare.

1.2.   Selection parties

Due to low electoral threshold (.67%), the Dutch electoral system can be described as exceptionally open for (small) minority representatives.[186] For the 2017 general elections, 28 different parties registered themselves at the Electoral Council, 13 of which entered the Parliament. For our analysis we selected six of the electoral winners based on their ideological profile and voting behaviour (2010-2016) on issues related to migration and integration of ethnic minorities:

- **People's Party for Freedom and Democracy** (VVD – *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*): centre-right; pro-free market; socially liberal but increasingly seen as hardening anti-immigration stance; pro-European.[187]

- **Party for Freedom** (PVV – *Partij voor de Vrijheid*): far-right; founded in 2006 by Geert Wilders; anti-immigration and anti-Islam; EU exit advocate.

- **DENK** (DENK – Dutch for 'think', Turkish for 'equality'): progressive-left; a newcomer migrant party that emerged after a split of two MPs from PvdA; positions itself directly opposite the PVV; pleas for inclusive citizenship, the rights of migrants and multicultural society.[188]

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[182] Nichols, D., & Wroth, W. (2017). Dutch election: Wilders stalls, but left still faces a stronger right. Green Left Weekly, (1130), 19.

[183] https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2017/03/11/verklaring-kabinet-intrekken-turkse-landingsrechten.

[184] https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2017/03/12/verklaring-kabinet-uitgeleiden-turkse-minister-kaya.

[185] 'Hoe Turkse Nederlandse Verhoudingen onze verkiezingen beïnvloeden.' Available at: https://www.elsevierweekblad.nl/nederland/opinie/2017/04/hoe-turks-nederlandse-verhoudingen-onze-verkiezingen-beinvloeden-486008/.

[186] Andeweg, R. B. (2005). The Netherlands: the sanctity of proportionality. The Politics of electoral systems. P497; Vossen, K. (2018). *Een paradijs voor partijen: Nederland en zijn kleine politieke partijen.* In: Een versplinterd landschap (Ed. Friso Wielenga, Carla van Baalen, Markus Wilp). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 245-258.

[187] Van Schie, Patrick. (2018). *Het 'geheim' van de Nederlandse liberalen*. In: Een versplinterd landschap. 221-245.

[188] Vossen, K. (2018). *Een paradijs voor partijen: Nederland en zijn kleine politieke partijen.* In: Een versplinterd landschap. 245-258.

- **GreenLeft** (*GroenLinks*): progressive-links; environmentalist; socially liberal; left with regard to socio-economic issues; pro-European.

- **Christian Union** (CU - *ChristenUnie*) – a Christian-social party that emerged from two orthodox protestant parties; takes a strong position when defending the freedom of religion, but ambivalent about other liberal values; left with regard to social-economic issues and developmental help.

- **Christian Democratic Appeal** (CDA - *Christen-Democratisch Appèl*); a right-conservative Christian party; right-wing with regard to the themes of immigration and integration.

1.3.   Selection documents

The analysis of electoral campaign is based on three types of documents comparable per party: (1) the electoral program/manifesto's of the parties included in the analysis; (2) transcripts of the 2016 parliamentary debate about the Budget Memorandum with focus on statements made by the representatives of parties analysed (the debate was considered a 'kick-off of the elections' due to numerous, explicit and repetitive references to the 2017 elections; it also received a lot of media attention); (3) transcripts of the parliamentary debate that took place in the aftermath of the military coup in Turkey; the debate focused primarily on the statement 'Go away' ('Pleur op') by the Prime Minister Mark Rutte addressed at the Turkish-Dutch protesters who had demonstrated against the coup. The statement and the position it represented became an important campaign slogan of the VVD during the elections and played a major role in election debates about dual nationalities and the limits of civil rights.

EVENT 2: Debates around the figure of Black Pete as a part of annual Saint Nicolas celebration in the Netherlands

2.1.   Background

The Dutch tradition of Saint Nicolas (Dutch: Sinterklaas) constitutes one of the most controversial issues in the contemporary Netherlands. In the second half of November, the mythical figure of Saint Nicolas, accompanied by helpers – Black Petes (Dutch: Zwarte Piet), comes to the Netherlands by boat full of presents and candies for Dutch children. The celebration has a national and a local character – the official national parade of Saint Nicolas is broadcast by the national TV; yet each municipality, school, library, etc. organize in addition their own celebrations. While there might be some minor differences between them, until recently the figure of Black Pete was a universal and obligatory element of any Saint Nicolas related festivity. To some, Black Peter with his black face, thick red lips, fizzy hair and colourful attire of a pageboy is an innocent yet indispensable element of the cheerful festivity, to others it is a clown-like caricature that symbolizes racial oppression, harms the people of colour and strengthens the existing stereotypes of black people as servient, not particularly clever but cheerful and physically strong. While the opponents to the Black Pete figure demand its adaptation by the removal of racist elements (especially the black face), the Black Pete defenders see any such change as a threat to the primordial tradition, Dutch culture and identity.

While debates about the meaning of the figure of Black Pete and its role in the Saint Nicolas celebration are not new, since 2011 a heavy contestation of the tradition has been taking place. It started with the violent arrest of two activists who demonstrated against the figure of Black Pete during the national Saint Nicolas parade in the town of Dordrecht. The debate takes place predominantly in (social) media, yet it has also been taken to court (2013), involved official reactions by Council of State (Raad van Staat), College for Human Rights (College voor de rechten van mens), Child Ombudsman (Kinderombudsman) and the United Nations; it was an object of parliamentary

debates and a series of debates on the municipal level. Since 2011 the national Saint Nicolas parade has been the sight of conflicts between the various sides of the debate, and in particular the anti-Black Pete activists and the local authorities.

2.2. Data selected for analysis

For the current analysis, we selected texts related to two specific events – the arrest of anti-Black Pete activists during the Saint Nicolas parade in Rotterdam in 2016 and the legislative proposal by the right-wing Party for Freedom (PVV) – *Zwarte Pietwet* – that aimed at the protection of the traditional appearance of Black Pete during festivities co-organized/co-financed by the authorities. For the purpose of this study we analysed: the parliamentary debate on the bill proposal; the debate in the Municipality Council following the controversial police intervention in Rotterdam; the Black-Pete-debate related opinions of Child Ombudsman and the Collage of Human Rights; and a selection of texts published on the website of anti-Black Pete activists (KOZP, NUC, Nederland Wordt Beter). To explore the narrative of the proponents of the Black-Pete figure, we analyses as well a selection of texts published on the website of pro-Black Pete activists (Sint en Pietengilde). In total ca. 30 documents have been analysed. The document analysis was supplemented with four interviews with representatives of pro- and anti-Black Pete movements, a right-wing politician and a representative of a human rights civil society organization.

Appendix I: Portugal

Taking as key aspects the injustices and right violations that have been denounced by Afro-descendants and Roma communities in the metropolitan Lisbon context,[189] the Portuguese case study combines a discussion of the situations of racial institutional discrimination focusing on two relevant public debates: 1) the impact of the discourse of open anti-Roma discrimination by a candidate running to the municipality of Loures[190] and 2) the public debate that followed the legal persecution of police officers on the grounds of racial violence against Afro-descendants in a police station in Lisbon.

EVENT 1: Municipal (local) elections in October 2017: the Loures case

1.1. Background – the general context of the elections

A series of municipal elections were held on October 1st 2017 in 308 Portuguese municipalities. The elections concerned over 9 million Portuguese (and some foreigners, with voting right).[191] The elections were important as they measured the first reactions of voters to the Socialist government (centre-left), in power with the support of the Communist Party and Left Block (left). In the aftermath of the socio-economic crisis that hit Portugal in 2008, the elections also represented a test of support for the (socio-economic) political options brought up by the new left government vis-à-vis the political options adopted by the previous centre-right governments that resulted in conditions of extreme austerity.[192]

The elections, in which about 54% of the voting population participated,[193] confirmed popular support for the economic measures of the left government. As a result, the Socialist party (alone or in alliances) won 160 municipalities (10 more, including in metropolitan Lisbon). Throughout the electoral campaign, the question of 'minorities' in Portugal emerged in campaign for the municipality of Loures (part of Metropolitan Lisbon). Here, the political agenda of one of the candidates – André Ventura (from Social-democratic party, of the centre-right, in alliance with monarchic party) – openly blamed Roma people for the insecurity and violence in the municipality and for their supposed economic dependence on the social security, draining the taxpayer's money.[194] In addition,

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[189] Including Lisbon and the municipalities that constitute the metropolitan Lisbon (*grande Lisboa*).

[190] In reality, it was the candidate representing one of the key political parties in Portugal (social democrats). Together with the socialists, they have alternated the control over the majority of the national assembly.

[191] See information available at the Observatory for Migrations, at https://www.om.acm.gov.pt/documents/58428/418987/Boletim+Estat%C3%ADstico+OM+%23+2+-+Recenseamento+Eleitoral+Estrangeiros+-+certo.pdf/11cceb3f-1b2f-4389-ab30-c1efee4d6c93, accessed in December 2017. It was estimated about 27.000 foreigners (both within the EU and from other countries, such as Brazil and Cape Vert which hold significant communities in Portugal).

[192] Abreu, Alexandre; Mendes, Hugo; Rodrigues, João; Gusmão, José Guilherme; Serra, Nuno; Teles, Nuno; Alves, Pedro Delgado; Mamede, Ricardo Pais (2013), *A Crise da Troika e as Alternativas Urgentes*. Lisboa: Tinta da China.

[193] Data available at https://www.eleicoes.mai.gov.pt/autarquicas2017/, consulted in December 2017.

[194] *'I' newspaper*, edition of July 17th 2017; *Sapo24*, edition of September 3rd, 2017; *Diário de Notícias*, edition of September 23rd, 2017.

(footnote continued)

Ventura insisted that the modern State has been 'too tolerant' regarding Roma community, considering that they are not 'integrated' into the nation. As a result, the local elections in Loures jumped to the national storefronts and so did the debate on racial issues and racialized communities in Portugal, particularly in the urban peripheries. Andre Ventura's accusation stirred various critical comments from various political sides (surprisingly, the candidate's party was, then, in an alliance with the communist party in that municipality) and led the Left Bloc to bring a formal accusation of racism against the social-democrat candidate.[195] The racial tension became particularly intense, which translated into two animated TV debates held on July and September 2017 by TVI24, a private television company with open access involving the key political forces (socialists; alliance of social-democratic and monarchic parties; alliance CDU, of communist and green parties; Christian-democratic party and left bloc).[196]

These accusations brought to the national stage: 1) the debates on Portuguese identity; 2) the need to discuss the possibility of recognition of the presence of minorities in Portugal (including the demand for afro-descendants and Roma communities to enter the electoral lists in eligible places); 3) the debates about Portuguese identity and the question of citizenship regarding afro-descendants and Roma people, seen as 'people of migrant background'; 4) the demand of a rewriting of Portuguese history and identity that enables recognition of its imperial past and colonial and racialized present.

1.2. Selection parties

In Portugal the idea of representation is implicit in the lack of recognition of ethnic minorities as a significant part of Portuguese society, disproportionally subjected to poverty and precarity. Representation of minority (interests) happens in particular instances, as in the legislative proposals in the parliament from some parties (mostly left wing), but that doesn't correspond to a direct possibility of minorities to influence decisions taken by the elected body. For the 2017 general elections, various parties and citizen's movements registered themselves to run for the municipal elections. The key political forces running for Loures municipal elections were:

- Bernardino Soares (CDU – communist and environmentalist coalition, male) – then mayor (in alliance with social-democrats) and was re-elected, but without majority at the municipality.

- Sónia Paixão (PS – socialist, female); second most voted in Loures.

- André Ventura (PPD/PSD.PPM – social-democrat, male). This university professor, who made the racist remarks about the Roma people became the third most voted in 2017 elections;

- Pedro Pestana Bastos (CDS-PP – Christians-democrats in a coalition with the social democrats, but broke the alliance because of the pronouncements of the PSD candidate) – male, lawyer.

- Fabian Figueiredo (BE – Left Block, male, sociologist).

Other minor candidates: João Resa (PCTP/MRPP – Trotskyist party, male); Ana Sofia Silva (PAN – animal rights, female, lawyer); Mário Pontes (PDR/JPP) – male, heading a coalition of Democratic Republican Party – PDR and the movement 'Together for the People' (this coalition had to fight for the right to participate up to the Constitutional Court).

Throughout the municipal campaign, the Portuguese parties addressed the 'Portuguese population' as a whole, assuming it to be a homogenously white and mostly defined by harmonious relations. The attention given to ethnic and racial tensions has been scarce, even in local municipal elections, where proximity to the problems is more

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[195] See *Rádio Renacença*, edition of July 17th, 2017.
[196] Available at www.tvi24.iol.pt/videos/politica/polemica-de-loures-acendeu-debate-na-tvi24/596fb1b30cf257bba39f9854#/iol/login and www.tvi24.iol.pt/videos/a-caminho-das-autarquicas/a-caminho-das-autarquicas-loures/59bafd840cf2a96cb1f4e65c, accessed in December 2107.

visible in the political discourse. For the analysis we selected five key figures, as they represent the main political forces present in the parliament, including on issues related to citizenship and integration of 'ethnic minorities':

- **Socialist Party** (PS): the main political party, strongly europeist and progressive has sought, over the recent years, to advance with several political project to seek a solution to the 'minority question' through social integration. In power, with parliamentary support of communists and Left Block, its current leader and prime-minister is of Indian ancestry.[197]

- **Social-Democrat Party** (PSD): europeist, second major political force; in government, in alliance with CDS (2011-2015) advanced a government plan to 'integrate' the Roma community, with little success.[198]

- **Democratic-Christian Party** (CDS): right-wing conservatives, with some ambivalence regarding European integration; it was a part of the government in alliance with the social-democratic party until 2015. It is the only political party that has 'representatives' of ethnic minorities in parliament.[199]

- **Communist Party** (PC): with some questions regarding European integration, defends the social integration and support to minorities and migrants.[200]

- **Left Block** (BE): progressive-left; pro-European; the most recent party in parliament; defends inclusive citizenship, the rights of migrants and another law of citizenship, reflecting the multicultural character of Portuguese society.[201]

1.3.   Data selected for analysis

The analysis of electoral campaign was carried out based upon the following documents: a) the electoral programs/manifesto's of the parties and movements involved in the Loures elections; b) the legal framework of that limits the formal recognition of minorities in Portugal; c) public debates in the media regarding the 'minorities' with focus on public statement made by the representative of parties analysed; especially important were the public debates on TV, that exposed nationally an absent debate, regarding 'minorities'; d) interviews, especially with one of the candidates (Left Block) to the elections. It became particularly relevant as this candidate advanced, as referred above, with a public claim against the social-democrat candidate, accusing him of explicit racism. This claim and the following statements became an important campaign topic during the elections, and triggered various debates on the right to citizenship and the racialized political landscape in Portugal.

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[197] The program is available at http://noticias-de-loures.pt/entrevistas/quero-ter-uma-candidatura-agregadora=17, accessed in September 2017.
[198] See *Diário de Notícias*, edition of June 29th 2017.
[199] See *Rádio Renascença*, edition of July 26th 2017.
[200] See *Avante*, edition of June 8th 2017.
[201] See *Esquerda.net*, edition of August 2nd 2017.

EVENT 2: The Cova da Moura Case: the prosecution of police officers of the Alfragide (Metropolitan Lisbon) police station for crimes of racism

2.1. Background – the case

In February 2015, six young men, aged 23 to 25 at the time, went to a police station in Alfragide, part of Lisbon metropolitan area, to protest against the 'arbitrary and violent' arrest of one of their friends from Cova da Moura. Cova da Moura is a slum located just 15 minutes' drive away from the centre of Lisbon. The five men were then also detained and humiliated by the police. As they reported, they were detained for 48 hours, during which they were 'victims of tremendous physical and psychological violence by officials of an authority dominated by feelings of xenophobia, hate and racial discrimination.'[202] On the other side, the police officers stated that dozens of young men had attempted to force their way into the police station to free their friend, claims that were contradicted by the victims and other witnesses.

Publicly, in the majority of the newspapers, the conflict was presented as the police having been attacked by 'a neighbourhood black mob'. However, the inhabitants of Cova da Moura, counting upon the support of a skilful lawyer, managed to reverse the case. Later on, all six men were later cleared of charges of resisting arrest and assault. Two years later, in July 2017, the Public Prosecutor's office charged finally 18 officers of the Alfragide police station. The charges included various crimes, such as aggravated fabrication of documentation, slanderous denunciation, falsehood of testimony, torture, among others, aggravated by racism that agents have practiced against the six-young people during and after their detention in 2015.[203] This case stands as a landmark, because ii was the first time the Prosecutor office stood on the side of the afro-descendant people; therefore, the case got international attention from the media.[204]

2.2. Data selected for analysis

For this study we analysed two key events: 1) a debate about '*Portugal, a Racist Country?*', in the summer of 2017,[205] in the aftermath of the prosecution of the 18 police officers. This debate was broadcasted on public television; and 2) the debates regarding the Alfragide police station, when 18 police officers were suspended and accused of racism and violence against afro-descendants.

For the purpose of this study we analysed: a) the TV debate and its impact in Portuguese society; b) newspapers content analyses of news on the two events selected (especially two key newspapers: *Público* e *Diário de Notícias*, between June 2017 and February 2018); c) the Facebook activity of 'SOS Racism'– the most active and prominent antiracist NGO in Portugal, very vocal in exposing the racially tainted case of 'Cova da Moura' arrests; d) interviews with people involved in the case as well as with activists and politicians.

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[202] As stated in the accusation claim submitted against the police.

[203] See *Jornal de Notícias*, edition of July 11th 2017.

[204] See *DW*, edition of July 11th, 2017.

[205] This specific show, held on July 17th 2017. The Portuguese study included the discourse analysis of the participants in this debate, including, besides the journalist Fátima Campos Ferreira, Jorge Vala, a white researcher at the Institute of Social Science of the University of Lisbon; Pedro Calado, white, High commissioner for migration; Cristina Roldão, an afro-descendant, researcher at the centre for sociology studies of the University of Lisboa (CIES-IUL); Abílio Neto, a black jurist; Piménio Ferreira, physic engineer and Roma activist; and Mamadou Ba, a black leader of the SOS Racism association. The debate is available at https://www.rtp.pt/play/p3033/e298781/pros-e-contras, accessed in September 2017.

Appendix I: Turkey

EVENT 1: Two national elections held in 2015

1.1. Background – the general context of the elections

The first event is constituted by two national elections held in June and November 2015, which followed each other because a government could not be formed after the first.

1.2. Selection parties

We have considered four political parties represented in the parliament. The ten percent electoral threshold prevents a wider representation and leaves smaller parties (such as Felicity Party that adheres to a more radical version of Islamist politics or the centre-right True Path Party) out of the parliament. Until the elections of 2015, the HDP, like the other Kurdish parties formed and closed before its establishment, could only be represented by the independent candidates it supported. The four political parties examined in this report are, by order of their shares in popular vote:

- **The Justice and Development Party** (AKP- Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) – conservative, centre right, Islamist.

- **The Republican People Party** (CHP- Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) – secular, centre left.

- **The People's Democratic Party** (HDP- Halkların Demokrasi Partisi) – liberal left, pro- Kurdish.

- **The Nationalist Action Party** (MHP- Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) – conservative nationalist.

1.3. Data selected for analysis

In the analysis, party manifestos, electoral programs, and electoral speeches are mainly used.

EVENT 2: Two peace initiatives: 'The Kurdish resolution' and 'the Alevi initiative'

2.1. Background – the case

The second event is the two initiatives undertaken the AKP government in the second half of the 2000s to establish peace and social harmony: 'The Kurdish resolution' or 'the peace process' and 'the Alevi initiative.' The second event is important in setting the background to the first. Since the two initiatives could not proceed smoothly in a way to achieve their desired ends, grievances and claims of the Kurdish and Alevi minorities dominated the framing of justice in the discourses of different political parties participating in the elections.

2.2. Data selected for analysis

For the Kurdish Peace/Resolution Process:

- **The Reports of the Councils of Wise People**: These are the seven regional reports written by the Councils of Wise People on the basis of field research conducted in seven geographical regions of Turkey.

- **The Report of the Parliamentary Commission** entitled 'The Investigation of Social Peace Methods and Assessment of Resolution Process.' A parliamentary commission consisting of the 10 deputies from the AKP and one deputy from the BDP was established in 2013. The report is based on interviews with 43 victims of armed struggle and a field research conducted in the area of armed conflict.

- **The minutes of Imralı.** This document was prepared by the Kurdish participants in the Resolution Process and it consists of the minutes of the discussions between the leader of the armed branch of the Kurdish movement Abdullah Öcalan and the deputies from the Kurdish party in the Imralı prison.

For the Alevi initiative (which consisted in seven workshops organized by the Ministry of State):

- **The Seven Volume reports** on the seven workshops prepared by the Ministry of State.

- **The final report of the Alevi Opening process** written by the reporter of the Alevi initiative.

- **The 'Red Book'** which was prepared by two important Alevi cultural associations as an evaluation of the initiative from the perspective of these associations.

Appendix I: United Kingdom

EVENT 1: UK General Election, 8 June 2017

1.1.   Background – the general context of the elections

Prime Minister Theresa May announced this early election at a time when her Conservative Government had a small minority that was split over the Brexit question. There were other factors too: Mrs May had become leader of the Conservative Party – and hence Prime Minister – as a result of the previous leader, then Prime Minister David Cameron, standing down after the Brexit vote, and wanted to confirm her legitimacy as leader. The Conservatives were riding high in the opinion polls following the election of Jeremy Corbyn as leader of the Labour Party. However, to many people's surprise no party managed to secure an overall majority and the election resulted in a hung Parliament. The Conservative Party remained the largest with 317 seats and 42.3 percent of the vote, the Labour Party gained 30 more seats resulting in 262 seats with 40 percent of the vote, and Liberal Democrats won 12 seats with 7.4 percent of the votes. The main topics of public debates during the election campaign included education, housing, the NHS and social care, and migration in a broad sense, as well as the dominant topic of Brexit. Terror attacks in Manchester on 22 May and London on 3 June shifted the course of the campaign toward security and anti-terrorism policies.

1.2.   Selected parties

We selected the major political parties who contributed to public debates and narratives during the campaign, i.e. the Conservative Party (centre-right), Labour Party (centre-left), Liberal Democrats (pro-market, socially liberal), Scottish National Party, Green Party (left) and UK Independence Party (anti-immigration, anti-EU right). The emphasis is on the first two as the main contenders due to the UK constituency-based electoral system. The other parties are included to illustrate broader debates regarding migrants' rights, inequalities and Brexit.

1.3.   Selected documents

21 documents were selected for in-depth analysis. In addition to party manifestos, which allow for in-depth analyses of official narratives in a stable form, TV debates have become an established part of UK election campaigns and reveal how these narratives interact with questions and challenges. Due to the Conservative campaign's decision to withdraw from TV debates with other leaders, we also selected the Question Time Party Leaders Special in which presenter David Dimbleby and a live audience ask questions to party leaders. To examine the election campaign's shift toward security and anti-terrorism, official statements by Mayor of London Sadiq Khan and Theresa May in her capacity as PM were included too. Advocacy groups were selected based on their engagement with issues of migration, migrant rights and BAME equality during the election. They cover different stances, with Operation Black Vote focusing on BAME rights, Migrants Organise, Migrants' Rights, and Hope Not Hate being migration support organizations, and Migration Watch UK standing as an anti-migration advocacy group. The Trades Union Congress has been included as representative of the majority of trade unions in England and Wales. TUC issued several election statements and a report regarding its recommendation on how to proceed with Brexit.

EVENT 2: Grenfell fire

2.1.   Background

On 14 June 2017, the Grenfell Tower fire consumed a low income residential tower block in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC, in West London), spreading rapidly and killing 71 residents. Grenfell Tower stood in an ethnically and socio-economically mixed area with both double-fronted Victorian houses and post-war council estates. The local Council has long been dominated by the Conservative Party, which won 37 out of 50 seats in the 2014 elections (12 went to the Labour Party and 1 to Liberal Democrats). Grenfell residents were represented by Lancaster West Residents Association (LWRA), a democratically structured body whose membership is open to all residents of Lancaster West council estate (of which the Tower was part). The Association consultated with the Council and its TMO, an arm's-length organization created in the 1990s to manage its housing stock. On paper, the TMO empowered tenants by allowing them to elect over half of its board members. In practice, however, some residents encountered difficulties translating their claims to the TMO, criticized for its culture of neglect and underperformance.

In recent years the area of North Kensington has undergone major regeneration projects with redeveloped estates, replacement of 538 Council properties with new homes and a rebranding of Portobello Square (Masey 2016). As other social housing tenants, Lancaster West residents were worried about the implications of such trends for their future in the borough. In 2010, some came together to create the Grenfell Action Group, focused on opposing the construction of a leisure centre on a green space near the estate. In the following years, the group broadened its target to encompass the progressive disappearance of social housing and associated gentrification taking place across the borough and London, attributing them to a deliberate policy of 'managed decline'. Residents' concerns were not converted into representation on a formal political level but rather represented as troublemaking. In the immediate aftermath of the fire, community groups and individuals organized to provide emergency assistance to survivors and defend their interests, spurred by what was widely perceived as a slow and inadequate response from local and national authorities.

2.2.   Data selected for analysis

19 documents were selected for in-depth analysis. For discourses of political representation and justice in official narratives, we selected statements and reports issued by the Government, the Home Office, the RBKC, and the TMO. Statements by individual politicians such as Jeremy Corbyn and Labour MP David Lammy were included to offer a view from the opposition. Advocacy groups include Grenfell Action Group and Lancaster West Residents Association as community-led groups that were involved in the area both before and after the fire. Islamic Relief was selected as a nation-wide charity that offered support in the immediate aftermath of the fire and has a more religious outlook. The Movement for Justice campaign is a community initiative that came about after the fire and employs different means of communication such as Facebook rather than traditional media. For semi-structured interviews we contacted Lancaster West Residents' Association, Justice4Grenfell and BME Lawyers for Grenfell, as well as Labour Councillor Judith Blakeman, elected in Grenfell Tower's Notting Dale ward and a member of the Grenfell Recovery Scrutiny Committee. Justice4Grenfell has been playing a key role in the organization of monthly silent marches in honor of the victims and BMELawyers4Grenfell is a coalition of BAME lawyers and activists who have mounted challenges against specific government actions.

Appendices II – List of sources analysed per country

Appendix II – Overview of documents analysed: Austria

EVENT 1: Austrian national election on 15th October 2017

Party manifesto's

ÖVP:

Österreichische Volkspartei (2017) Der Neue Weg. Neue Gerechtigkeit, Teil 1/3. Das Programm der Liste Sebastian Kurz – die neue Volkspartei zur Nationalratswahl 2017. Available for download at: http://diepresse.com/mediadb/pdf/Neue%20Gerechtigkeit.pdf.

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Österreichische Volkspartei (2017) Der Neue Weg. Ordnung & Sicherheit, Teil 3/3. Das Programm der Liste Sebastian Kurz – die neue Volkspartei zur Nationalratswahl 2017. Available for download at: https://diepresse.com/mediadb/pdf/Wahlprogramm_Teil3.pdf.

SPÖ: Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (2017) Plan A für Austria. Das Programm für Wohlstand, Sicherheit & gute Laune. Available for download at: http://diepresse.com/mediadb/Wahlprogr.pdf.

FPÖ: Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (2017) Österreicher verdienen Fairness. Freiheitliches Wahlprogramm zur Nationalratswahl 2017. Available for download at: http://diepresse.com/mediadb/fpoe2.pdf.

The Greens: Die Grünen (2017) Das ist grün. Wahlprogramm der Grünen - Nationalratswahl 2017. Available for download at http://diepresse.com/mediadb/pdf/Wahlprogramm_Gruene.pdf.

NEOS: NEOS Österreich (2017) Leitantrag. Available at http://diepresse.com/mediadb/pdf/Wahlmanifest_NEOS.pdf.

PILZ: Website of Liste PILZ. Available at https://listepilz.at.

Election campaign material

Election campaign material refers to pictures of campaign posters, as well as private photographs thereof.

Die Presse (2017) Wahlplakate: Parteien werben mit Uncle Sam und Radlern. Available at https://diepresse.com/home/innenpolitik/nationalratswahl/5273905/Wahlplakate_Parteien-werben-mit-Uncle-Sam-und-Radlern.

Television interviews

All **television interviews** were originally aired via the Austrian Broadcasting Service (ORF) and were available for online viewing for a week after the airing date. Afterwards, the original videos could be found on a privately run Youtube channel.

Österreichischer Rundfunk (ORF) TVThek (2017). Nationalsratswahl 2017. Available for 7 days after original airing date at http://tvthek.orf.at/profiles/genre/Nationalratswahl-2017/6794117#scroll.

Youtube (2018) Channel Austria TV. Available at https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCwkLHDZOXyUEorg4k8OdCZA.

Additional institutional sources

Bundesministerium für Inneres (BMI) (2017) Die kandidierenden Parteien: Nationalratswahl 2017. Available at http://www.bmi.gv.at/412/Nationalratswahlen/Nationalratswahl_2017/start.aspx#pk_02 .

Republik Österreich (2017) Zusammen. Für unser Österreich. Regierungsprogramm 2017-2022. Available for download at https://www.oevp.at/download/Regierungsprogramm.pdf.

Republik Österreich (2017). Für Österreich. Arbeitsprogramm der Bundesregierung 2017/2018. Available for download at https://diepresse.com/mediadb/pdf/Arbeitsprogramm.pdf.

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Center for Strategic & International Studies (2017) Parliamentary Elections: Austria. Available at https://www.csis.org/programs/european-election-watch/austria .

Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) (2017) Austrian legislative election 2017. Available at https://www.fes.de/strategy-debates-global/strategy-debates-austria.

Walton, D. (2007) Dialog Theory for Critical Argumentation. John Benjamins B.V.

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Atlantic Council (2017) Austrian Elections Demonstrate Success of Aestheticized Populism. Available at http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/austrian-elections-demonstrate-success-of-aestheticized-populism.

Austria Presse Agentur (APA OTS) (2017) Außenpolitischer Ausschuss beschließt Integrationspaket mit Stimmen von SPÖ und ÖVP. Available at https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20170508_OTS0194/aussenpolitischer-ausschuss-beschliesst-integrationspaket-mit-stimmen-von-spoe-und-oevp.

Der Standard (2002) FPÖ wurde als eine Art Dämon aufgebaut. Available at https://derstandard.at/835965/FPOe-wurde-als-eine-Art-Daemon-aufgebaut.

Der Standard (2017) Grünen Chefin Eva Glawischnig tritt zurück. Available at https://derstandard.at/2000057828948/Gruenen-Chefin-Eva-Glawischnig-tritt-zurueck.

Die Presse (2017) Kurz: „Vorgezogene Wahlen wären der richtige Weg'. Available at http://diepresse.com/home/innenpolitik/5216475/Kurz_Vorgezogene-Wahlen-waeren-der-richtige-Weg.

Kurier (2016) Flüchtlinge: Grüne und FPÖ kritisieren Kurz-Vorschläge. Available at https://kurier.at/politik/inland/aussenminister-sebastian-kurz-will-pflicht-zu-ein-euro-jobs-fuer-fluechtlinge-und-burkaverbot/216.330.181.

Kurier (2017) Die wichtigsten Punkte im Wahlprogramm der Liste Pilz. Available at https://kurier.at/politik/inland/die-wichtigsten-punkte-im-wahlprogramm-der-liste-pilz/284.306.603.

Kurier (2017) Große Koalition vor der Scheidung. Available at https://kurier.at/politik/inland/grosse-koalition-spoe-oevp-vor-der-scheidung/263.830.666.

Kurier (2017) KURIER-OGM-Umfrage: Kurz bleibt vor Kern und Strache. Available at https://kurier.at/politik/inland/kurier-ogm-umfrage-kurz-bleibt-vor-kern-und-strache-kleinparteien-muessen-zittern/290.566.272.

Kurier (2017) Peter Pilz: Der letzte grüne Gründervater geht. Available at https://kurier.at/politik/inland/peter-pilz-der-letzte-gruene-gruendervater-geht/275.928.852.

Kurier (2017) Schwarz-Blau I begann unterirdisch – ein Rückblick. Available at https://kurier.at/politik/inland/schwarz-blau-i-begann-unterirdisch-ein-rueckblick/294.010.593.

Kurier (2017) Worum geht es eigentlich im Grünen-Streit? Available at https://kurier.at/politik/inland/streit-zwischen-glawischnig-und-jungen-gruenen-worum-geht-es-eigentlich/256.037.939.

Profil (2009) Zeitgeschichte Serie 1989: Wie Jörg Haider die Anti-Ausländer-Politik erfand. Available at https://www.profil.at/home/zeitgeschichte-serie-1989-wie-joerg-haider-anti-auslaender-politik-254612.

Profil (2017) ÖVP: Mitterlehner tritt zurück: kommt jetzt Kurz? Available at https://www.profil.at/oesterreich/reinhold-mitterlehner-aktuell-8127103.

Profil (2018) Regierungsklausur: Kurz und Strache präsentieren Ergebnisse. Available at https://www.profil.at/oesterreich/regierung-kurz.

Salzburg 24 (2016) Eine Chronologie: Faymann ging, Kern kommt. Available at http://www.salzburg24.at/eine-chronologie-faymann-ging-kern-kommt/4721557.

The Economist (2017) An interview with Christian Kern. Available at http://www.economist.com/blogs/kaffeeklatsch/2017/06/austria-s-changing-politics.

The Guardian (2017) Muted protests in Vienna as far-right ministers enter Austria's government. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/18/thousands-protest-as-far-right-ministers-enter-government-in-austria.

The Local (2017) How Austria's far-right leader Strache brought the Freedom Party back from the brink. Available at https://www.thelocal.at/20171013/austria-far-right-leader-strache-election-deputy-chancellor-freedom-party.

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Zeit (2017) Sebastian Kurz will große Koalition auflösen. Available at http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2017-05/oesterreich-sebastian-kurz-oevp-spoe-koalition-ende.

EVENT 2: Federal Act on the Prohibition of Face Covering in Public (Anti-Face-Covering Act – AGesVG), entered into force on 1st October 2017

Institutional documents

Legal text of the Federal Act on the Prohibition of Face Covering in Public (Anti-Face-Covering Act – AGesVG)

Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich. Integrationsgesetz und Anti-Gesichtsverhüllungsgesetz sowie Änderung des niederlassungs- und Aufenthaltsgesetzes, des Asylgesetzes 2005, des Fremdenpolizeigesetzes 2005, des Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetzes 1985 und der Straßenverkehrsordnung 1960. Jahrgang 2017, ausgegeben am 8. Juni 2017, Teil 1. Available at https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2017_I_68/BGBLA_2017_I_68.pdf.

The New Integration Act within which the Federal Act is situated

Nationalratsbeschluss der Republik Österreich. Integrationsgesetz und Anti-Gesichtsverhüllungsgesetz sowie Änderung des niederlassungs- und Aufenthaltsgesetzes, des Asylgesetzes 2005, des Fremdenpolizeigesetzes 2005, des Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetzes 1985 und der Straßenverkehrsordnung 1960. Available at www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussendungen/2017/Integrationgesetz.pdf.

Information pamphlet by the Ministry of the Interior (BMI)

Bundesministerium für Inneres (BMI) Ab 1. Oktober 2017: Verbot Gesichtsverhüllung in Österreich. Available for download at http://www.bmi.gv.at/bmi_documents/2091.pdf.

Non-Institutional documents

Various statements, proposed amendments and comments by private actors and non-institutional actors (primarily NGOs) on the Integration Act

Republik Österreich Parlament (2017) Stellungnahmen Integrationsgesetz, Anti-Gesichtsverhüllungsgesetz; Niederlassungs- und Aufenthaltsgesetz, Asylgesetz u.a., Änderung (290/ME). Available at https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXV/ME/ME_00290/index.shtml#tab-Stellungnahmen.

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Al Jazeera (2017) Austria moves to ban full-face veil in public spaces. Available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/austria-moves-ban-full-face-veil-public-spaces-170131131559685.html.

Al Jazeera (2017) Austria's parliament bans full-face veil in public. Available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/austria-parliament-bans-full-face-veil-public-170517051602575.html.

Austria Presse Agentur (APA OTS) (2017) FPÖ-Schimanek: Burkaverbot ist auch in Österreich umzusetzen. Available at https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20170116_OTS0120/fpoe-schimanek-burkaverbot-ist-auch-in-oesterreich-umzusetzen.

Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (BPB) (2017) Leitkultur als Integrationskonzept – revisited. Available at http://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/islamismus/255521/leitkultur-als-integrationskonzept-revisited.

Der Spiegel (2017) Österreich rätselt über Burkaverbot. Available at http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/burkaverbot-anti-verhuellungsgesetz-irritiert-oesterreich-a-1172022.html.

Der Standard (2017) Integrationsfonds: Zahl der Muslime in Österreich wächst. Available at http://derstandard.at/2000055891947/Zahl-der-Muslime-in-Oesterreich-waechst.

Der Standard (2017) Lunacek zu Kurz: 'Burka ist ein Stoffgefängnis für jede Frau!'. Available at http://derstandard.at/2000064969523/Duell-Lunacek-gegen-Kurz-Die-Burka-ist-ein-Stoffgefaengnis.

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Die Presse (2010) Debatte: Ein Burka-Verbot ohne Burka. Available at http://diepresse.com/home/innenpolitik/560174/Debatte_Ein-BurkaVerbot-ohne-Burka.

Die Presse (2017) Die Vermessung des Sebastian Kurz. Available at http://diepresse.com/home/innenpolitik/5218371/Die-Vermessung-des-Sebastian-Kurz.

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Integrationsfonds (ÖIF) (2017) Integrationsgesetz in neuem Regierungsprogramm verankert. Available at https://www.integrationsfonds.at/monitor/detail/article/integrationsgesetz-in-neuem-regierungsprogramm-verankert/.

Integrationsfonds (ÖIF) (2017) Integrationsgesetz in neuem Regierungsprogramm verankert. Available at https://www.integrationsfonds.at/monitor/detail/article/integrationsgesetz-in-neuem-regierungsprogramm-verankert/.

Österreichischer Rundfunk (ORF) (2015) Letzte Änderungen an Islamgesetz. Available at http://religion.orf.at/stories/2694181/.

Interviews

Six one-hour interviews held in total in Graz, Vienna, and on the telephone:

A4.2.01 – an expert and practitioner working with discrimination in Austria

A4.2.02 – a representative of a governmental institution concerned with migration in Austria

A4.2.03 – an academic expert working on Islam in Austria

A4.2.04 – an NGO representative active in the Muslim community in Austria

A4.2.05 – a practitioner and representative of the Islamic faith community in Austria

A4.2.06 – a representative of the Islamic faith community in Austria

Appendix II – Overview of documents analysed: Hungary

EVENT 1: 2014 General elections in Hungary (national, European, local/minority)

The party manifesto's/electoral programmes

A 60 lépés program (2014-es választási program) (2014). *Jobbik.hu.* Retrieved 18 August 2017, from https://www.jobbik.hu/programunk/60lepes.

A kormányváltók nyolc ígérete, nyolc pontja (2014, March 8). *Kapcsolat.hu*. Retrieved 17 January 2018, from http://kapcsolat.hu/cikkek/kormanyvaltok-nyolc-igerete-nyolc-pontja.

Gyurcsany, F. (2013). *Európai Magyarországot! Demokráciát, biztonságot, fejlődést! A Demokratikus Koalíció programja 2013* [Translation: 'European Hungary! Democracy, security, development! the 2013 program of the Democratic Coalition']. Retreived 31 August 2017, from http://dk365.hu/kongresszus/data/dk_program.pdf.

Lehet Más a Politika (2014a). Az LMP választási programja 2014. Retrieved 31 August 2017, from http://lehetmas.hu/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/AZ-LMP-V%C3%81LASZT%C3%81SI-PROGRAMJA-2014-teljes1.pdf.

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Vona, G. (2014). Kimondjuk. Megoldjuk: A Jobbik országgyűlési választási programja a nemzet felemelkedéséért. Retrieved 12 January 2018, from https://www.jobbik.hu/sites/default/files/cikkcsatolmany/kimondjukmegoldjuk2014_netre.pdf.

Statements and/or speeches by campaigning politicians published in the press or on party affiliated websites

Az agónia elkezdődött és új világrendnek kell épülnie (2013, May 6). *Mandiner.* Retrieved 18 August 2017, from http://mandiner.hu/cikk/20130506_vona_gabor_az_agonia_elkezdodott_es_uj_vilagrendnek_kell_epulnie.

Az egyik fő érv a liberális demokrácia ellen, hogy az képtelen lenne a rezsicsökkentésre (2014, September 27). *444.* Retrieved 16 November 2017, from https://444.hu/2014/09/27/a-fo-erv-a-liberalis-demokracia-ellen-hogy-az-keptelen-lenne-a-rezsicsokkentesre/.

Bajnai, G. (2013, February 14). Gordon Bajnai's speech at the governance assessment meeting of the Together 2014 Electoral Alliance. *Free Hungary.* Retrieved Retrieved 31 August 2017, from http://www.freehungary.hu/index.php/comments/1775-gordon-bajnais-speech-at-the-governance-assessment-meeting-of-the-together-2014-electoral-alliance.

Controversial monument divides Hungarians, angers Jewish community (2014, July 24). *Euractiv.* Retrieved 17 January 2017, https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-europe/news/controversial-monument-divides-hungarians-angers-jewish-community/

Czene, G. (2014, November 7). Jól teljesít a fideszes hűbéri rendszer. *Népszabadság.* Retrieved 17 January 2017, from http://nol.hu/belfold/jol-teljesit-a-huberi-rendszer-1496967.

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E14-PM turns to the EC over Orbán's 'end of liberal democracy' speech (2014, July 28). *Free Hungary.* Retrieved 28 July 2017, from http://www.freehungary.hu/index.php/56-hirek/3118-e14-pm-turns-to-the-ec-over-orban-s-end-of-liberalism-speech.

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'Ha kiderülne, hogy zsidó vagyok, lemondanék' - Kuruc-interjú Vona Gáborral a legkellemetlenebb kérdésekből (2013, February 6). *Kurucinfo.hu*. Retrieved 24 January 2017, from https://kuruc.info/r/6/107638/.

Hungary's opposition parties slam prime minister over Baile Tusnad address (2014, July 27). *Free Hungary.* Retrieved 24 January 2017, from http://www.freehungary.hu/index.php/56-hirek/3112-hungary-s-opposition-parties-slams-prime-minister-over-baile-tusnad-address.

Indul a Jobbik aláírásgyűjtése az ingyenes gettófelszámolásért (2014, June 16). Jobbik.hu. Retrieved 24 January 2017, from https://www.jobbik.hu/hireink/indul-jobbik-alairasgyujtese-az-ingyenes-gettofelszamolasert.

Iránytű Intézet: A Jobbik a fiatalok vezető ereje (2013, October 3). *Alfahir*. Retrieved 21 January 2018, from https://alfahir.hu/iranytu_intezet_a_jobbik_a_fiatalok_vezeto_ereje.

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Jobbik, which was visibly pro-Russian, did not oppose the Paks nuclear power plant and criticized the left for its 'hysteria': Paks bővítése olcsó áramot hozna (2014, February 4). Jobbik.hu. Retrieved 24 January 2017, from https://www.jobbik.hu/hireink/paks-bovitese-olcso-aramot-hozna. .

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Lambert, S. (2014). *The orange files - Prime minister Orbán's speech to supporters – May 10, 2014.* Retrieved 31 August 2017, from https://theorangefiles.hu/christian-democratic-peoples-party/.

Lambert, S. (2016c). *The orange files - Notable quotes: Prime minister Viktor Orbán.* Retrieved 8 December 2016, from https://theorangefiles.hu/christian-democratic-peoples-party/.

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HU4.2.02 – social scientist, expert on Hungarian society and minorities

HU4.2.03 – civil society activist working with socio-economically vulnerable groups in Hungary

HU4.2.04 – Hungarian politician who participated in 2014 general elections

EVENT 2: Debates around the migrant-refugee crisis of 2015-16

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HU4.2.03 – civil society activist working with socio-economically vulnerable groups in Hungary

HU4.2.04 – Hungarian politician who participated in 2014 general elections

Appendix II – Overview of documents analysed: Netherlands

EVENT 1: Dutch Parliamentary election, 15th March 2017

The party manifesto's/electoral programs

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Handelingen TK 2016-2017, **2-6.** Available at: Handelingen 2016-2017, nr. 3, item 7 [accessed on 25-05-2018].

Parliamentary debate on the Aftermath coup in Turkey (13 September 2016) **Handelingen TK 2015-2016**, 110-21.
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         https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aHs__3wrnPY
PVV: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tfv4mAWCaS0&t=6s
DENK: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tuSqmcy50Gw&t=1s
GL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hfRKfh7wnTQ&
CU: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iusANj0nXzo
CDA: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SimHZ7_ZQ10

EVENT 2: Debates around the figure of Black Pete as a part of annual Saint Nicolas celebration in the Netherlands

Parliamentary documents

Parliamentary debate on the Black Pete Bill on 16 February 2017. *Handelingen TK 2016-2017*, 54-6. Available at: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20162017-54-6.html [accessed on 16-11-2017].

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NL4.2.02 – an anti-Black Pete activist

NL4.2.03 – a far-right politician

NL4.2.04 – a representative of a civil rights organization

Appendix II – Overview of documents analysed: Portugal

GENERAL (BACKGROUND) DOCUMENTS – EVENT 1 & EVENT 2

Key legal documents

Document	Date	Highlights	Available at
Constitution of Portuguese Republic	1976	Article 13 (Principle of equality): *'1. All citizens possess the same social dignity and are equal before the law. 2. No one may be privileged, favored, prejudiced, deprived of any right or exempted from any duty for reasons of ancestry, sex, race, language, territory of origin, religion, political or ideological beliefs, education, economic situation, social circumstances or sexual orientation'*	http://www.en.parlamento.pt/Legislation/CRP/Constitution7th.pdf
Law nº67/98, of October 26th	1998	*'transposes Directive 95/46 / EC of the European Parliament and of the European Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of to the free movement of such data'*	https://dre.pt/web/guest/pesquisa/-/search/239857/details/maximized
Decree-Law nº146/2015, February 3rd	2015	Creation of the High Commission for Migrations; Mission: as *'collaborating on determining, executing and assessing the public, transversal and sectorial policies concerning migrations that are relevant for the integration of migrants in the national, international and Portuguese-speaking contexts, for the integration of the*	Decree-Law: https://dre.pt/home/-/dre/70236274/details/maximized?p_auth=GqV4GZYd

		immigrants and ethnic groups – in particular, the Roma communities – and for managing and valuing of the diversity between cultures, ethnics and religions'	
Organic Law nº2/2006, of April 7th	2006	Law of nationality – possibility of obtaining Portuguese citizenship by naturalization	https://dre.pt/pesquisa/-/search/650954/details/normal?l=1
Organic Law nº9/2015, of July 29th	2015	Law of nationality privileges *jus sanguinis*	https://dre.pt/home/-/dre/69889521/details/maximized?p_auth=n7CUPfaV

Key newspaper articles about racism in Portugal, the recognition of nationality of Afro-descendants and the ethnic identification in census

'A fábula de um país com racistas sem racismo', Mamadou Ba, Jornal Público, 7 September 2017. Available at: https://www.publico.pt/2017/09/07/sociedade/opiniao/a-fabula-de-um-pais-com-racistas-sem-racismo-1784575.

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Debate between Fabian Figueiredo (Left Block candidate) and André Ventura (social-democrat party) mediated by the journalist.

EVENT 2: The Cova da Moura Case: the prosecution of police officers of the Alfragide (Metropolitan Lisbon) police station for crimes of racism

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'MP da Amadora acusa novos polícias por agressões e mentiras', Valentina Marcelino, Diário de Notícias, 23 October 2017. Available at: https://www.dn.pt/portugal/interior/ministerio-publico-da-amadora-acusa-novos-policias-por-agressoes-e-mentiras-8864676.html.

Public television debate

'Portugal, a Racist Country?', July 2017. Available at: https://www.rtp.pt/play/p3033/e298781/pros-e-contras.

Participation of Fátima Campos Ferreira, Jorge Vala, a white researcher at the Institute of Social Science of the University of Lisbon; Pedro Calado, white, High commissioner for migration; Cristina Roldão, an afro-descendant, researcher at the centre for sociology studies of the University of Lisboa (CIES-IUL); Abílio Neto, a black jurist; Piménio Ferreira, physic engineer and Roma activist; and Mamadou Ba, a black leader of the SOS Racism association.

Selection of text posted on 'SOS Racism' Facebook page:

SOS RACISM: https://www.facebook.com/sos.rac/

'The agents already heard denied all the accusations and contradicted the version defended by the MP, starting with the location of the first incident of that day, caused by the arrest of one of the young men in Cova da Moura (…)'. June 2018. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/sos.rac/posts/2121894281173324.

'Request for financial support'. June 2018. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/sos.rac/posts/2112905758738843.

'Our neighbourhoods are police training camps (…). They have theoretical classes at school and practices in our neighbourhoods in Amadora'. April 2018. Available at: *https://www.facebook.com/sos.rac/posts/2058281677534585*.

'The police officers suspected of racism and the torture of young blacks in the Cova da Moura neighbourhood outside Lisbon will be held in court for these and other crimes. The decision was taken by the court of criminal investigation of Sintra, which only acquitted a sub-commissioner'. December 2017. Available at: *https://www.facebook.com/sos.rac/posts/1890377357658352*.

'The worst classified professionals in the Police school end up in offices like Amadora and Sintra, areas where no one wants to go because 'there are blacks'. August 2017. Available at: *https://www.facebook.com/sos.rac/posts/1776050005757755*.

'The PSP National Directorate has not yet taken any disciplinary decision against the 18 Alfragide police officers charged 10 days ago with crimes of torture, kidnapping, physical offense – all aggravated by hatred and racial discrimination – against six young men from the neighbourhood of Cova da Moura, in Amadora'. July 2017. Available at: *https://www.facebook.com/sos.rac/posts/1743784262317663*.

Interviews carried out for the project

PT4.2.01 – Left Block candidate, male, sociologist

PT4.2.02 – Male, migrant, House of Mozambique in Lisbon

PT4.2.03 – Group interview with youngsters from Cova da Moura

PT4.2.04 – Migrant, female academic leaving in Lisbon area

PT4.2.05 – Roma activist, male, Roma mediator

PT4.2.06 – Researcher in sociology, female

Appendix II – Overview of documents analysed: Turkey

EVENT 1: Two national elections held in 2015

Party Rallies

- Devlet Bahçeli, 19 May 2015, İstanbul Rally, see at: https://www.haberler.com/mhp-nin-istanbul-mitingi-7368466-haberi/.

- Devlet Bahçeli, 19 May 2015, NTV channel live broadcast, see at: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/bahceli-kutahya-da-kutahya-yerelhaber-797968/.

- Devlet Bahçeli, 9 May 2015, İzmir Rally, see at: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/mhp-li-vural-dan-buca-mitingi-izmir-yerelhaber-1041241/.

- Devlet Bahçeli, 26 October 2015, Ankara Rally, see at: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/dun-yedi-duvele-meydan-okuduk-/siyaset/detay/2137774/default.htm.

- Devlet Bahçeli, 3 May 2015, Speech about the content of election manifesto, see at: http://88.255.31.62/htmldocs/genel_baskan/konusma/3809/index.html.

- Ahmet Davutoglu,17 May 2015, İstanbul Rally, see at: https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/basbakan-davutoglunun-istanbul-mitingi-konusmasinin-tam-metni/74831#1.

- Ahmet Davutoglu, 27 October 2015, Antalya Rally, see at: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/basbakan-ahmet-davutoglu-antalya-da-antalya-yerelhaber-1035593/.

- Ahmet Davutoglu, 6 Mayıs 2015, Ağrı Mitingi, see at: https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/basbakan-davutoglunun-agri-mitingi-konusmasinin-tam-metni/74589#1.

Election Manifestos

AKP, 2015 Election manifesto, p.27, see at: https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/dosya/59647.

CHP, 1 November 2015 Election Manifesto, p.43, see at: https://www.chp.org.tr/Public/0/Folder//52608.pdf.

HDP, 7 June Election Manifesto, see at: http://www.hdp.org.tr/tr/materyaller/genel-secimler/genel-secim-7-haziran/6010.

MHP, 7 June Election Manifesto, see at: https://www.mhp.org.tr/usr_img/mhpweb/MHP_Secim_Beyannamesi_2015_tam.pdf.

EVENT 2: Two peace initiatives: 'The Kurdish resolution' and 'the Alevi initiative'

Reports

The Reports of the Councils of Wise People, see the report of southeastern region. Available at: http://www.mazlumder.org/webimage/akil%20insanlar%20heyeti%20guneydogu%20raporu.pdf

The Report of the Parliamentary Commission. Avialable at: http://tbmm.gov.tr/komisyon/cozum_sureci/docs/cozum_kom_raporu.pdf

The minutes of Imralı. Available at:
http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/diger/406516/iste_imrali_gorusmesinin_tutanaklari_.html.

The Seven Volume reports of the Alevi Opening process, as there is no access to official website, see the reports of workshops, for volume I: http://www.farukcelik.com.tr/images/editor/1.pdf, for volume II: http://www.farukcelik.com.tr/images/editor/2.pdf, for volume III: http://www.farukcelik.com.tr/images/editor/3.pdf, for volume IV: http://www.farukcelik.com.tr/images/editor/4.pdf, for volume V: www.necdetsubasi.com/alevi-calistaylar?download=3:11-kasim-2009-istanbul, for volume VI: www.necdetsubasi.com/alevi-calistaylar?download=4:17-aralik-2009-ankara.

The final report of the Alevi Opening process. Available at:
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Interviews

T4.2.01 – Mesut Yeğen, Academician, İstanbul, 28.01.2018

T4.2.02 – Ayhan Bermek, Director of Cem Foundation, İstanbul, 05.02.2018

T4.2.03 – Necdet Saraç, Director of Alevi Bektaşi Federation, İstanbul, 08.02.2018

Appendix II – Overview of documents analysed: United Kingdom

EVENT 1: UK General elections 2017

Party manifestos

Conservative Manifesto. 2017. 'Forward together'. Available at: https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto

Green Party BAME Manifesto. 2017. Available at: https://www.greenparty.org.uk/assets/files/green-party-BAME-manifesto.pdf.

Green Party Manifesto. 2017. 'Green guarantee'. Available at: https://www.greenparty.org.uk/assets/files/gp2017/greenguaranteepdf.pdf.

Labour Manifesto. 2017. 'Many not the few'. Available at: https://labour.org.uk/manifesto/.

Liberal Democrat Manifesto. 2017. Available at: https://www.libdems.org.uk/manifesto.

Scottish National Party Manifesto. 2017. 'Stronger for Scotland'. Available at: https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/thesnp/pages/9544/attachments/original/1496320559/Manifesto_06_01_17.pdf?1496320559.

UKIP Manifesto. 2017. 'Britain together'. Available at: https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/ukipdev/pages/3944/attachments/original/1495695469/UKIP_Manifesto_June2017opt.pdf?1495695469.

TV interviews and debates

Andrew Neil interviews Theresa May Election. 2017. Available at: https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/0EF884A4?bcast=124188573&sub=Andrew [SSO required].

BBC election debate live with Mishal Husain. 2017. Available at: https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/0F0753E3?bcast=124336560 [SSO required].

Question Time leaders special with May and Corbyn. 2017. Available at: https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/0F03887D?bcast=124259973 [SSO required].

Advocacy groups

Operation Black Vote. 2017. 'A diverse Parliament matters – 2017 election'. Available at: http://www.obv.org.uk/news-blogs/diverse-parliament-matters-2017-election.

Hope not Hate. 2017. 'Immigration: A 2017 election summary'. Available at: http://www.hopenothate.org.uk/campaigns/general-election-2017/immigration-2017-election-summary./

Migrants Organise. 2017. 'Get out and vote say immigrants'. Available at: https://www.migrantsorganise.org/?p=26569.

Migrants' Rights. 2017. 'General election 2017'. Available at: https://migrantsrights.org.uk/blog/2017/05/08/general-election-2017-calling-for-progressive-immigration-policies/.

Migration Watch UK. 2017. 'Immigration Policy and Black and Minority Ethnic Voters'. Available at: https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/357.

Other

GUARDIAN, 14 June 2017. Abuse of Diane Abbot driven by racism and misogyny, says Umunna. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/14/abuse-of-diane-abbott-driven-by-racism-and-misogyny-says-umunna.

NEW STATESMAN, 7 June 2017. All politicians expect criticism. But has the treatment of Diane Abbot crossed a line? Available at: https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/june2017/2017/06/all-politicians-expect-criticism-has-treatment-diane-abbott-crossed-line.

Sadiq Khan official statement in response to London Bridge attack. 2017. Available at: https://www.standard.co.uk/news/london/london-bridge-terror-attack-mayor-sadiq-khan-condemns-deliberate-and-cowardly-attack-on-innocent-a3556376.html.

Sadiq Khan speech after London Bridge attack. 2017. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/london-bridge-attack-2017-sadiq-khan_uk_593591a7e4b013c48169dfb1.

Theresa May speech after London Bridge attack. 2017. Available at: http://time.com/4804640/london-attack-theresa-may-speech-transcript-full/.

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Trades Union Congress (TUC). 2017. 'Managing migration better for Britain'. Available at: https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/ManagingmigrationbetterforBritain.pdf.

EVENT 2: Grenfell Tower fire

Local authorities

KENSINGTON AND CHELSEA TENANTS MANAGEMENT ORGANISATION (KCTMO), 12 September 2017, 2017-last update, Grenfell Tower fire. Available: http://www.kctmo.org.uk/main/38/grenfell-tower-fire [20 October, 2017].

KENSINGTON AND CHELSEA TENANTS MANAGEMENT ORGANISATION (KCTMO), 20 August 2016, 2016-last update, Filming in TMO properties. Available: http://www.kctmo.org.uk/sub/publications/74/filming-in-our-properties [20 October, 2017].

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ROYAL BOROUGH OF KENSINGTON AND CHELSEA, 2017. *Grenfell Tower: Amnesty from prosecution for illegal subletting.* London.

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ABBOTT, D., 2017. *Letter to the Rt. Hon Amber Rudd MP.* 5 July. London.

CORBYN, J., 2017a. *Jeremy Corbyn statement on Grenfell Tower fire,* https://labour.org.uk/press/jeremy-corbyn-statement-grenfell-tower-fire/ [18 May 2018].

CORBYN, J., 2017b. *The pattern in clear from Grenfell, working class voices are ignored – Corbyn's speech in Parliament,* https://labourlist.org/2017/06/the-pattern-is-clear-from-grenfell-working-class-voices-are-ignored-corbyns-speech-in-parliament/ [18 May 2018].

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MAY, T., 2017. *Statement from the Prime Minister on Grenfell Tower: 17 June 2017.* London: Prime Minister's Office.

OWEN, J., SICH, A. and STRAUSS, J., 21 June, 2017-last update, Grenfell Tower fire David Lammy: 'If burning in your home is not political, I don't know what is' – video [Homepage of Guardian], [Online]. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/video/2017/jun/21/david-lammy-if-burning-in-your-home-is-not-political-i-dont-know-what-is-video [26 October, 2017].

Advocacy groups

COLLINS, D., 2017. *Press Statement David Collins Former Chair of Residents Association for Grenfell.* Wednesday 14 June 2017. London: Independent.

GRENFELL ACTION GROUP, 20 November, 2016-last update, KCTMO – Playing with fire!. Available at: https://grenfellactiongroup.wordpress.com/2016/11/20/kctmo-playing-with-fire/.

GRENFELL ACTION GROUP, 16 December, 2015-last update, RBKC Labour and the elephant in the room. Available at: https://grenfellactiongroup.wordpress.com/2015/12/16/rbkc-labour-and-the-elephant-in-the-room/.

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ISLAMIC RELIEF UK, 14 June 2017, 2017-last update, Grenfell Tower CNN Interview | Islamic Relief UK. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=265rc48-2Xc&ab_channel=IslamicReliefUK.

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Interviews

UK.4.2.01 – female, 39, Grenfell activist

UK.4.2.02 – female, 45, Grenfell activist

UK.4.2.03 – female, 45, Grenfell activist

UK.4.2.04 – female , app. 70, Councillor

UK.4.2.05 – male, 40, resident representative

UK.4.2.06 – male, 29, migrant activist

Appendix II – Overview of documents analysed: European level

The internal report mapping the tenants of the European of discourse on representative was based on the analysis of a selection of documents issued by European Parliament (EP) and Council of Europe (CoE). The two institutions were chosen for their normative stance and voice on issues that pertain to equality, justice and freedom of expression.

The Council of Europe (CoE), which brings together the largest group of European countries, is the oldest intergovernmental organization that advocates freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, equality, and the protection of minorities in the European context.

The European Parliament (EP) is a forum for political debate and decision-making at the EU level. The Parliament does not only promote democratic decision-making in Europe, but also supports the fight for democracy, freedom of speech and fair elections across the globe. Both institutions are crucial in setting normative agenda for the political debate around principles that govern (representative) justice in Europe and beyond.

For the current analysis we selected documents that (1) focus explicitly on the presence and role of national, ethnic, religious and migrant groups in European public sphere, and (2) could be seen as setting a normative framework for the pursuit of representative justice in Europe. We focused predominantly on the most recent documents and/or those which, like *Framework Convention For The Protection Of National Minorities,* feature most prominently as a source of reference in a great number of EP and CoE policy documents.

The EP documents that are chosen for the analysis are:

- European Parliament resolution of 27 February 2014 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union (2012) (2013/2078(INI)). Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT%20TA%20P7-TA-2014-0173%200%20DOC%20XML%20V0//EN.
- European Parliament resolution of 8 September 2015 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union (2013-2014) (2014/2254(INI)). Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2015-0286&language=EN&ring=A8-2015-0230.
- REPORT on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union in 2015 (2016/2009(INI)) Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Rapporteur: József Nagy. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2F%2FEP%2F%2FTEXT%2BREPORT%2BA8-2016-0345%2B0%2BDOC%2BXML%2BV0%2F%2FEN&language=EN.

The Council of Europe documents chosen for analysis include:

- Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (2008) *Commentary on the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and public affairs*. ACFC/31DOC(2008)001. Council of Europe: Strasbourg. Available at: https://rm.coe.int/16800bc7e8 [accessed on 16-12-2017].
- Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (2016) 'Part VI Minority rights with a broad scope of application,' in: Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities *The thematic commentary No 4 The scope of application of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities*. ACFC/56DOC(2016)001. Council of Europe: Strasbourg. Available at: https://rm.coe.int/16806a4811 [accessed on 16-12-2017].

- Council of Europe (1992) *Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level*. ETS 144. Council of Europe: Strasbourg. Available at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/144 [accessed on 16-12-2017].
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- Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2015) *Resolution 2043 on Democratic participation for migrant diasporas*. Council of Europe: Strasbourg. Available at: http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.asp?fileid=21595&lang=en [accessed on 16-12-2017].
- Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2015) *Resolution 2076 on Freedom of religion and living together in a democratic society*. Council of Europe: Strasbourg. Available at: http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=22199&lang=en [accessed on 16-12-2017].
- Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2016) *Resolution 2123 on Culture and democracy*. Council of Europe: Strasbourg. Available at: http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.asp?fileid=22963&lang=en [accessed on 16-12-2017].